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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is threefold; first, to investigate the relationship between 
the level of authoritarianism practised by management, as perceived by employees, 
and the way this might impact on the transactional element in an individual’s 
psychological contract; secondly, to explore the composition of the transactional 
psychological contract and identify if it can be sub-divided; thirdly to investigate if pay 
satisfaction acts as a mediating or moderating variable between authoritarian 
management and the transactional psychological contract.
The data research follows a two-stage process; the first is a qualitative stage 
comprising two exploratory studies in the same organisation utilising a self-complete 
diary and follow-up in-depth interview; the second is a quantitative (main) study 
involving call centre workers in eight organisations. In the second stage perceptions of 
authoritarianism is measured using Ashkanasy and Nicholson’s (2003) ‘climate of fear’ 
scale, the transactional psychological contract by the scale adopted by Millward and 
Hopkins (1998) and pay satisfaction is measured by a derivative of the Heneman and 
Schwab (1985) Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire. The data analysis utilises SPSS v12.
The findings of tests for correlation, for the total sample and by individual organisation, 
indicate that the higher the perceived level of managerial authoritarianism the higher 
will be the transactional element of the psychological contract. The results of a series 
of factor analyses suggest the transactional element in the psychological contact is 
made up of three smaller components, these are labelled Individual Disengagement, 
Organisational Disengagement and Legal Contract, but further research is required as 
the factor loadings are not as strong as is desirable. The results of a series of 
regressions confirm that satisfaction with pay can act as a mediating variable between 
managerial authoritarianism and the level of the individual’s transactional psychological 
contract. However, further research is required as the results are inconsistent between 
the total sample and by individual organisation. Further analysis revealed that 
employee expectations act consistently as a moderating variable in between 
authoritarianism and the relational psychological contract, but inconsistently in relation 
to the transactional psychological contract.
There are a number of limitations in the research. The first is the sample size, whilst 
the total sample (n=256) lends itself to an extensive analysis, at the individual 
organisational level it is not sufficiently large to allow full analysis. The second is the 
research context, restricting the data collection to call centres limits the ability to 
generalise the results to other sectors. The third is the lack of extreme perceptions of 
high or low authoritarianism in a particular organisation; most organisations were 
clustered around the scale mid-point. The fourth limitation lies in the restriction of the 
focus to the transactional element of the psychological contract, in retrospect it might 
have proved beneficial to look at the relational element also.
The research makes a number of small contributions in terms of the process and 
findings. The first is the specific focus on a single organisational climate element, 
management style, and a single element in the psychological contract, the 
transactional, which differs from previous research approaches. Secondly, the 
exploration of the transactional element identified a number of smaller factors, making 
further investigation worthwhile. Thirdly, the identification of the inconsistent mediating 
effect of pay satisfaction between perceived authoritarianism and the transactional 
element in the psychological contract makes further research desirable.
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I wanted the gold, and I sought it;
I scrabbled and mucked like a slave.
Was it famine or scurvy - 1 fought it;
I hurled my youth into a grave 
I wanted the gold, and I got it -  
Came out with a fortune last fall,- 
Yet somehow life’s not what I thought it,
A somehow the gold isn’t all.
From: The Spell of the Yukon, by Robert Service
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this research is to make a contribution to the existing body of knowledge 
about the relationship between employees and their organization and its agents. The 
formal relationship between employees and their employer organization is articulated in 
the employment contract which sets out the terms of the employment relationship and 
the legal obligations of the parties. In addition to the legal contract there exists a 
‘psychological’ contract, which relates to the perception of mutual obligations and 
reciprocity by the parties to the contract, the promises made to, or inferred by them, 
and the consequent expectations that are created. The roots of the psychological 
contract lie in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), insofar that both parties enter into 
the social exchange for some mutual benefit.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief overview of the 
previous research in the area of authority in organizations and the psychological 
contract; it also identifies the apparent gap in the literature in relation to the role of 
employee satisfaction with pay as a mediating variable. Section 1.3 provides rationale 
for the study by identifying the nature of authority in the employment relationship and 
the way this might impact specifically on the transactional element of the psychological 
contract. More importantly the section sets out the potential role of pay as a trade-off 
for high levels of authoritarianism. Section 1.4 introduces the aims and objectives of the 
research, which formed the basis for the propositions. Section 1.5 provides an account 
of the context in which the research was conducted. Section 1.6 provides an overview 
of the research process that was followed from inception through to execution and 
completion.
1
1.2 Overview of the Research
This research is primarily concerned with the employment relationship and the 
psychological attachment that employees build with their organization. Both authority in 
organizations and the psychological contract have been the subjects of extensive 
research. Similarly pay satisfaction has attracted much interest in academic circles. 
Authority is, of necessity, an integral part of organizational life, as authority relations 
form the basis for the employment relationship, but the way in which it is practiced 
might impact on the ‘psychological’ relationship between the individual and the 
organization.
The overarching purpose of the research is two-fold: first, to acquire a greater 
understanding of the relationship between a specific element of the organizational 
climate, authoritarian management, and the effect this might have on employees when 
constructing their emotional attachment to the organisation; secondly, to make a 
worthwhile contribution to the existing body of knowledge on the psychological contract 
by disseminating the results of the research to the wider academic community.
1.2.1 The psychological contract
Organisational psychology theory and literature advocates an emotional or 
psychological attachment, strong or weak, between the individual employee and the 
organisation in which they work; commonly referred to as the ‘psychological’ contract. 
The psychological contract is separate and distinct from the legal-economic contract 
which governs the relationship, although the latter may influence the former; it is partly 
based on individual expectations, but, more importantly, it is based largely on the 
notion of mutuality of obligation and reciprocity from one contracting party to the other.
The literature suggests the existence of two main psychological contract ‘types’, these 
are the relational and the transactional (Rousseau and McLean-Parks, 1993), although 
other typologies have been adopted, such as the transitional and balanced (Rousseau, 
2000a) and the more holistic approach adopted by Guest and Conway (1997; 2000). 
The relational psychological contract pertains to a socio-emotional relationship 
between the employee and the employer which is long-term, open-ended and based on 
high emotional involvement in the organization, as well as the economic exchange. The 
employee and employer are essentially partners in common aims and values, with 
mutual concern for growth and well-being. The transactional psychological contract is
2
based upon the wage-effort bargain, on the monetizable exchanges enshrined in the 
principle of a ‘fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’. The transactional relationship is often 
short-term, with limited personal involvement in the job and little emotional attachment 
or loyal from the employee to the organization or from the organization to the 
employee. What is clear from the literature is the covert character of the psychological 
contract and the degree of instability; from the moment the psychological contract is 
constructed it is subject to change and renegotiation, often at very short notice.
1.2.2 Managerial authority
To date there has been considerable research in the areas of authority, 
authoritarianism and power in organizations. Authority, as Fromm (1961) observes, is 
not a quality that is possessed. Authority is the fulcrum on which the interpersonal 
relationship between superior and subordinate is balanced; it is likely that the way in 
which authority is exercised in organizations, with overt or covert use of power, and the 
degree to which it is regarded as legitimate, impacts on the perceived, or psychological 
relationship between the parties involved. The way in which authority is exercised may 
be determined by the organisational structure and culture/climate, or by the individual 
preference of those in positions of authority.
Similarly, the way in which authority is perceived by individual employees might be 
influenced by the structure and climate of the organization, or the authoritarian 
disposition of the subordinate. A review of literature on authority and authoritarianism in 
organizations revealed the extent to which management might use differing types and 
degrees of authority and power to achieve their goals. In extreme cases this can 
manifest itself as a tyrannical regime where manager rule by the threat of sanction and 
the creation of fear; yet employees stay with the organization.
The use and abuse of authority and power in by management is likely to foster 
differential responses from superiors and subordinates. Authority and the legitimacy 
surrounding it may create rights-based issues; whether the superior has the right [in 
certain circumstances] to exercise authority over the subordinate by giving orders. 
Power, on the other hand, is likely to generate issues related to fairness; about whether 
the superior has treated the subordinate fairly in terms, perhaps, of the sanctions 
applied or the rewards given or withheld.
3
1.2.3 The authority - psychological contract interaction
Much of the psychological contract literature adopts a holistic view of the construct, by 
scrutinizing the whole and investigating the way in which contracts might be relational 
or transactional or a combination of the two (Macneil, 1985; Millward and Hopkins, 
1998; Rousseau, 2000a). In addition, a considerable amount of the literature focuses 
on causes and consequences of psychological contract breach and violation (Pate and 
Malone, 2000; Robinson, 1996; Thompson and Bunderson, 2003). There is little, if any, 
research which scrutinizes one, single psychological contract element, such as the 
transactional, in relation to a single contextual factor, such as authoritarian 
management, in detail.
There is a degree of variability in the way that psychological research has taken 
account of the organizational climate as an influencing factor in the formation of the 
psychological contract. Some adopt a predominantly expectation-based perspective 
(Levinson et al, 1962; Portwood and Miller, 1976), which, it might be argued, fails to 
pay adequate attention to the role of climate. Other research does include the role of 
climate in psychological contract formation (Guest and Conway, 1997; Guest 2004), 
but these do not pay particular attention to management style.
An investigation into pay satisfaction revealed a large body of literature on employee 
satisfaction with pay, but much of this is looking at pay in isolation and addressing 
issues of distributive and procedural justice (Heneman and Shwab (1985), or as part of 
the wider job satisfaction research (Spector, 1997), with pay considered as a single 
facet. What appears to be missing from the literature is research into the relationship 
between the [authoritarian] organisational climate and the psychological contract, with 
particular emphasis on the way in which highly authoritarian management might be 
overlooked, ignored or traded-off for good pay.
This raises a number of questions:
• Does excessive managerial authoritarianism impact on the psychological 
contract?
• Do employees perceive management to be authoritarian?
• Why do people remain in overtly authoritarian organizations?
• Can other contractual elements negate or counter authoritarian management?
4
1.3 The Research Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the research by identifying the nature of authority 
in the employment relationship and the way this might impact on the transactional 
element of the psychological contract. More importantly the section sets out the 
potential role of pay as a trade-off for high levels of authoritarianism.
As discussed above, much of the research on the psychological contract is aimed at 
identifying the nature, causes and consequences of the psychological contract (Guest 
and Conway 1997; Guest, 2004) by taking a multi-faceted approach. There appears to 
be a dearth of research into the relationship between a single facet, such as the 
practice of managerial authority, and the impact on a specific element in the 
psychological contract. Similarly, there is a lack of research into potential mediating 
orvariables to counter any negative effects of excessive authority on the state of the 
psychological contract.
If one accepts that authority, in varying guises and degrees, is present in all 
organizations, and that all employees construct a psychological contract with their 
employer, the relationship between these two variables appear to be worthy of study. 
As the literature suggests that extreme authoritarianism in management may be 
perceived as tyrannical and bullying it appears logical to assume this will lead to a 
transactional psychological contract; to make an assumption to the contrary, that a 
relational contract may be the product- of tyranny appears counterintuitive. Thus, the 
rationale for the research is the apparent gap in the research to date and existing body 
of knowledge and the potential for enhancing our understanding of the employment 
relationship.
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives
As set out in Section 1.1, the aim of this research is to make a contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge about the relationship between employees and their 
organization and its agents. The particular focus of the research is the relationship 
between management climate, the transactional element of the psychological contract 
and satisfaction with pay as a mediating or moderating variable. Given the apparent 
absence of research which combines these three conceptual areas, the research is 
considered exploratory.
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The overall objective of this research is to establish the extent of the relationship 
between the level of authority exercised by management, the overarching managerial 
climate rather than the style adopted by individual managers, and whether employees’ 
pay satisfaction impacts on the transactional dimension of the psychological contract 
as displayed by the employee.
More specifically, based upon the reviews of the literature on authority in organisations 
and the psychological contract, three research objectives have been formulated:
1. To test the relationship between perceptions of authoritarianism and the
transactional psychological contract and to investigate the magnitude of 
the transactional element.
2. To analyse the component structure of transactional psychological
contract. Although considered a single dimension it is possible that this 
element of the psychological contract has differential meaning in relation 
to managerial authoritarianism.
3. To test whether pay satisfaction has a mediating or moderating effect
upon the relationship between perceived authoritarianism and the 
transactional psychological contract.
1.5 The Research Context
The research context is call centres, also referred to as contact centres. The choice of 
this particular type of organisation is based upon the conventional, bleak view; that the 
call centre is the 21st century ‘dark satanic mill’ (Wylie, 1997) where the electronically 
delivered workflow in incessant (Taylor and Bain, 1999) and the nature of the work 
provides little in the way of intrinsic reward.
The literature also suggests a common management style in call centres that is 
authoritarian, target-driven, and punitive; where there is an abusive use of power 
which, in some cases, is institutionalised, insofar that it is an integral part of the 
organisational climate. In environments such as these, it is not unreasonable to 
anticipate employees’ perceptions of management authoritarianism to be high and that 
this translates into a high transactional psychological contract.
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If there is a perception of high managerial authoritarianism and the transactional 
psychological contract is also high, this might be indicative of a predominantly negative 
and instrumental or utilitarian relationship. If that is the case, then there may be another 
factor which. intervenes to reduce the degree of negativism and prolong the 
employment relationship.
1.6 The Research Process
The process followed for this research is set out in overview in Figure 1.1 below. 
Following the reviews of the literature on authority in organisations and the 
psychological contract, the research problem objectives were defined and the research 
propositions were formulated. A two-stage exploratory study was conducted using a 
mixed-method qualitative approach; self-complete diary and in-depth follow-up 
interview. Whilst the results of the exploratory studies indicated dual contractual 
relationships, as expected, they also indicated an overarching perception of highly 
authoritarian management and a lack of perceived trust and fairness. This, combined 
with high reported pay satisfaction and long organizational tenure, seemed to indicate 
that satisfaction with pay acts as a mediator or moderator of dissatisfaction with the 
work-based social exchange relationship and, as such, impacts on the psychological 
contract.
In the light of this finding, a further review of the psychological contract literature was 
carried out; this identified a knowledge gap, as no research could be found which 
specifically investigates the relationship between authoritarian management, pay 
satisfaction and the psychological contract. As a consequence of this finding, the focus 
of the research was adjusted to investigate the relationship between these three 
constructs.
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Figure 1.1 The research process
Initial research idea
Definition of research objectives
Literature Review of 
authority in organisations
Literature Review of 
the psychological contract
Deductions and discussion
Revaluation of the propositions
Data collection, analysis and 
interpretation
Designing the research 
methodology
Conclusion, limitations and 
recommendations for further 
research
2. The transactional element of the psychological contract (as measured 
by the Millward and Hopkins scale) is comprised smaller factors.
3a. Pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
3b. Pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
1. Perceptions of high management authoritarianism will lead to a high 
transactional psychological contract.
Formulation and refinement of research propositions
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Following this Introduction chapter, Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on 
authority in organisations. The chapter provides a conceptualisation of authority and a 
discussion of the locus of authority in organisations, in which the formal versus 
acceptance theories are compared and contrasted. This is followed by a discussion of 
the authority-power interaction. The focus of the chapter then moves from authority as 
a concept to authoritarianism at the individual and organisational level, this section 
looks at the preferences for domination and control and the potential outcomes of a 
mismatch in the relationship, where a low authoritarian personality works in a high 
authoritarian climate. There is a brief discussion of the potential role of pay and, in 
particular, employee satisfaction with pay as a means of reducing the impact of overtly 
authoritarian management on the emotional attachment between the individual and the 
organisation. The final sections in the chapter discuss authority relations in call centres 
and the broader organisational climate and its’ impact on managerial behaviours.
Chapter 3 extends the literature review by addressing the concept of the emotional 
attachment between the individual and the organisation in greater detail and depth by 
presenting a review of the literature on the psychological contract. The chapter opens 
with a discussion of the essence of the psychological contract and its’ definition, in 
which the role of Organisational Justice Perceptions, Equity Theory and the reciprocal 
nature of the relationship is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the 
conceptual basis for the psychological contract, which compares and contrasts a 
number of theoretical models which contribute to the broader understanding of the 
construct. The focus of the chapter the turns to the formation and development of the 
psychological contract and provides a critique of the way in which individuals construct 
their contract, the information upon which it is based, and the way in which it develops 
over time as a result of internal and external events and incidents. This is followed by 
a discussion of the ways that psychological contracts are categorised, with particular 
emphasis on the Relational and Transactional categories. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the changing psychological contract and the potential for unmet 
expectations to translate into perceptions of breach and violation.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the methodological approached that was 
adopted for the research. After the introduction, the chapter provides an account of the 
two qualitative exploratory studies and the methodological and substantive findings 
which emerged from these, with particular emphasis on authority and pay satisfaction
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and the subsequent impact of these on the psychological contracts of the participants. 
This is followed by the formulation of the research objectives, questions and 
propositions. The next section provides a detailed explanation of the main study and 
the quantitative data collection process, the section presents details of the design of 
the concepts and measures used in the data collection instrument. There is an account 
of the pilot study which preceded the main data collection, including the sampling 
procedures followed, the research context, distribution of the questionnaires and the 
response rate. The chapter closes with details of the tests that were conducted to 
measure the reliability of the scales in used in the instrument and the normality of the 
distribution of the data.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the data analysis in relation to the three research 
objectives and the three research propositions. The chapter opens with the sample 
characteristics and descriptive statistics; this is followed by sequential analyses of the 
data regarding the relationship between authoritarian management and the 
transactional psychological contract, the factor composition of the transactional 
psychological contract and, finally, the influence of pay satisfaction as a mediating 
variable in the relationship between management authoritarianism and the 
transactional psychological contract. The chapter also reports on additional analyses in 
which items from the Total Transactional Psychological Contract scale were extracted 
and used to create a Relational Psychological Contract scale, which was then used in 
regression analyses to ascertain if pay satisfaction or expectations acted as a 
moderating variable between authoritarianism and the relational and transactional 
psychological contracts.
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the results in relation to the three research 
objectives with reference to the literature and theoretical foundation. Each of the 
research objectives are discussed sequentially.
Chapter 7 provides a broader conceptual discussion of the conclusions drawn from the 
research and the contribution to the existing body of psychological contract knowledge. 
The chapter presents a discussion of the limitations of the research in terms of the 
process followed and the results that were generated. The chapter closes with 
recommendations for future research into the relationship between authoritarian 
management, satisfaction with pay and the psychological contract.
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1.7 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has introduced the research by providing a brief overview of the 
employment relationship with particular emphasis on the psychological contract, 
authority in organisations, and the potential relationship between the two, at the same 
time introducing pay satisfaction as a potential intervening variable. The chapter has 
presented the research aims and objectives, along with the research rational. The 
context in which the research was conducted has been described, as has the process 
that was followed in the execution of the research.
The next chapter provides a detailed review of the literature surrounding authority in 
organisations, including the locus of authority in organisations, the relationship between 
authority and power, and organisational climate and managerial behaviour.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW - AUTHORITY IN ORGANISATIONS
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this literature review chapter is to provide a commentary on the way in 
which authority and power are used as a means of achieving organisational 
objectives. This is of particular relevance to the following chapter on the psychological 
contract, as it provides an insight into the superior-subordinate relationship from a 
structural perspective and investigates the manner in which organisations attempt to 
exert control over employees. The chapter reviews the literature on authority in 
abstract and in context and it explores the definition, sources and types of authority 
and the relationship between authority and power. The chapter addresses the 
predispositions of individuals towards authoritarianism - their preferences to be 
controlled or to be given liberty to act - and how this might influence their response to 
authority and as a consequence condition authority relations. The chapter also 
considers authority as one of the components that contribute to the broader, more 
general, organisational climate.
There is little doubt that organisations are highly complex and dynamic entities, for 
more intricate than the organisational chart implies. According to Daft .and Weick 
(1984: 284), they ‘have characteristics typical of level 8 on Boulding’s (1956) 9-level 
scale of complexity’. Whilst there are variations in size, some organisations are large 
and others small, most are structurally fragmented and multidimensional (Daft and 
Weick, 1984). Organisations vary in their structures; some are complex in terms of 
dual reporting lines and matrix structures, which create vertical and horizontal 
relationships and a multi-layered hierarchy, others create and maintain simple 
structures with single reporting lines and/or a comparatively flat hierarchy. The nature 
of the work and the technology employed also determines, to some extent, the climate 
and nature of the employment relationship (Riley, 1991).
13
The climate of an organisation, including the way that management behaves, varies 
from organisation to organisation; some might display a tendency towards a 
democratic approach, espousing and practicing employee participation and 
involvement in decisions that affect them, others may be overtly authoritarian, using 
tight control mechanisms and authority/power-relations, resulting in managerial 
dominance and compliance mechanisms in pursuit of their objectives, [potentially] 
creating fear among employees. The presence of a trade union may also be a 
component in climate construction as it introduces an additional [third] party into 
authority relations and in doing so might alter the ‘rules of play’.
The nature of authority and the way that it is used in organisations is by no means a 
simple case of issuing instructions with an automatic expectation of obedience. The 
authority mechanism may be closely related to the structural and hierarchical nature of 
the organisation itself; indeed there is considerable debate over the locus of authority, 
whether authority resides with the superior (top-down) or whether it lies with the 
subordinate (bottom-up). Some observers argue the former, that authority is related to 
the position of the superior in the hierarchy and the inherent right to issue orders. 
Others adopt a contrary position, arguing instead that the decision by the subordinate 
of whether or not to obey a directive gives them ownership of authority; consequently, 
without the consent of the subordinate, the superior has no authority.
The way in which authority is defined or regarded may depend upon the observer’s 
perception or frame of reference; authority may be regarded as a set of behaviours 
(authority relations) by a ‘behaviourist, whereas the structure-ist views authority as a 
type of power. The literature suggests that power plays an important role in the 
exercising of authority and, as with authority itself, power is a complex phenomenon. If 
one accepts that the amount of power in an organisation is finite, then it seems 
reasonable to argue that if the power of one party (the superior or organisation) 
increases then the other party (the subordinate or worker) has less. This zero-sum 
approach appears to be appropriate in relation to the employment relationship and the 
ever-moving ‘frontier of control’ between management and workers (Goodrich, 1975) 
and the way this might create the potential for the excessive use, or abuse, of power 
by superiors to the detriment of subordinates; thus contributing to a climate of 
discontent and [possibly] fear.
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The way in which an individual responds to authority may depend on their own level of 
authoritarianism -  their preference to control others and to be controlled themselves 
Schuler, 1976; Furnham and Drakeley, 1993). Those preferring to control or to be 
controlled are likely to react differently in authority relations compared to those who 
prize self-determination; overall this may upset the notion of fairness of treatment and 
have some bearing on the state of an individual’s psychological contract with the 
organisation.
2.2 A Conceptualisation of Authority
Although a great deal has been written about the concept of authority, there has been 
considerable debate about the nature of authority and it role in achieving desired 
behavioural outcomes. One of the earliest contributors was Follett (1925), cited by 
Metcalf and Urwick, (1941), who, although not using the term explicitly, addressed the 
issue of authority in the context of the giving of orders. As Follett (1925), cited by 
Metcalf and Urwick (1941: 51), observes:
To some men the matter of giving orders seems a very simple affair; they 
expect to issue their orders and have them obeyed without question. Yet, 
on the other hand, the shrewd common sense of many a business 
executive has shown him that the issuing of orders is surrounded by many 
difficulties; that to demand an unquestioning obedience to orders not 
approved, not perhaps even understood, is bad business policy.’
This suggests that authority is not as simple as issuing orders with an expectation of 
obedience without question. Similarly, Fromm (1961) argues authority is not a quality 
possessed by one person, but the interpersonal relations that exist between the 
superior and the subordinate. Both these views suggest a set of deeper psychological 
considerations; as Follett (1925) goes on to note (cited by Metcalf and Urwick (1941: 
51):
'.... psychology, as well as our own observation, shows us not only that you 
cannot get people to do things most satisfactorily by ordering them or 
exhorting them; but also that even reasoning with them, even convincing 
them intellectually, may not be enough.’
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According to Weber (1968), authority is related to the degree of legitimacy with which 
it is perceived. Weber (1968) identifies three types of authority: rational-legal authority 
is based on the perception of the legality and rectitude of rules and the right of those in 
authority to issue orders and, to some extent, the power vested in the authority 
position; traditional authority is based upon the belief that those in authority have a 
natural right to be there; charismatic authority relates to the personal characteristics of 
the individual in authority. Thus, based upon the above, authority may be accorded to 
a superior on the basis of different perceptions held by different individuals 
concurrently; the superior may be in a position of absolute authority, not merely by the 
status held, but by the way in which his or her position of authority is perceived by 
subordinates.
The issue of the absolute authority of the superior and the conformity, even ‘blind 
obedience’, of subordinates without question or consideration of alternative courses of 
action is taken up by Simon (1955: 134), who observes:
‘In a very real sense, the leader, or the superior, is merely a bus driver 
whose passengers will leave him unless he takes them in the direction they 
wish to go.’
This suggests that authority is far more complex in nature than simply the issuing of 
orders; that those ‘in authority’ do not have total control, that there is a requirement for 
those subjected to authority to consent to it, to accept or confirm it by acting upon the 
orders they receive, or indeed denying it through disobedience. In essence, 
subordinates will only follow instructions if they recognise their rectitude and attribute 
validity to them. Milgram (2005) raises the issue of the bounded nature of authority by 
suggesting that authority is not ubiquitous, there are limits to authority relations, as 
Milgram (2005: 140) puts it, ‘authority is contextually perceived and does not 
necessarily transcend the situation in which it is encountered’; a manager may have 
authority over employees in the workplace, but no authority over them in the street 
outside. There may also be a relationship between national cultural differences and 
perceptions of authority in this regard, as Inzerilli and Laurant (1979) cited by Inzerili 
(1980: 62) found that:
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Americans tend to conceive authority in functional terms implying that 
the authority of an individual is limited to the area of his organizational 
functions. The French, instead, tend to conceive authority without relation to 
the functions performed by an individual and, consequently without specific 
boundaries.’
This implies that it is not only the structural aspects of the organisation (Payne and 
Pugh, 1976) or the way that management behave (Ansari and Stringer, 1994), but that 
national cultural differences are influential in creating or interpreting the organisational 
climate.
One of the early writers on management functions and processes was Barnard (1938), 
who introduced the concept of ‘organisational equilibrium’, which is based upon what 
might be termed quid pro quo ‘plus’, that the employee will continue his or her 
participation (cooperation) provided that the inducements offered are equal to or 
greater than the contributions required by the organisation. The notion of Barnard’s 
(1938) organisational equilibrium is developed further by March and Simon (1958; 
1993) who discuss, in more detail, the nature of the exchanges that influence the 
employees decision to continue their participation in an organisation. In their 
discussion of the employee’s relationship with the organisation, March and Simon 
(1993: 110) touch on the issue of authority by observing that:
‘In joining he accepts an authority relation, that is he agrees that within 
some limits (defined both explicitly and implicitly by the terms of the 
employment contract) he will accept as the premises of his behaviour 
orders and instructions supplied to him by the organisation’.
Similarly Whyte (1963: 16), in The Organization Man, considers authority and the 
employee and suggested that, for the employee: ‘every decision he faces on the 
problem of the individual versus authority is something of a dilemma’. However, in 
terms of the visibility of authority, much seems to hinge on the degree of obedience 
and compliance, as Simon (1955: 129) observes:
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the more obedient the subordinate, the less tangible will be the 
evidence of authority. For [overt] authority will need to be exercised only to 
reverse an incorrect decision.’
Given that authority is a key variable in the relationship between superior and 
subordinate, what then is authority, how is if defined? A succinct definition of the 
concept is offered by Duffy (1959:167) who, drawing on the work of Barnard (1940), 
Follett (1925) and Simon (1955), observes:
‘Authority is the relationship that exists between individuals when one 
accepts the directive of another as authoritative, that is, when the individual 
receiving the directive weighs the consequences of accepting it against the 
consequences of rejecting it.’
Thus, it would appear, the authority of those issuing orders or instructions must be 
confirmed, on the basis of considered choice, by those subjected to these directives. 
Consequently, it would seem that the nature of authority demands further scrutiny in 
terms of its origins and the two-way relationship through which it exists; as Weber 
(1961: 62) notes:
‘If persons behave in a certain way, one may say that an authority 
relationship exists. No one can exercise or possess authority if authority is 
defined as a type of interaction among persons.’
As far as Barnard (1968: 165) is concerned, a person will only accept authority when 
four conditions are satisfied, these are:
‘(a) he can and does understand the communication; (b) at the time of his 
decision he believes that it is not inconsistent with the purpose of the 
organization; (c) at the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible 
with his personal interest as a whole; and (d) he is mentally and physically 
able to comply with it.’
This appears to be a rather prescriptive and calculative viewpoint, an additional 
perspective is offered by Tyler (1998), who suggests that some people defer to
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authority because they have certain internalised values which tell them that morally, it 
is the right thing to do. It could also be that particular reactions to authority are not so 
much to with self-recognised internalised values, but rather related to the personality 
type of the individual and their predisposition toward or against authority. According to 
a number of authors (Adorno et a/, 1950; Schuler, 1976), individuals have a 
preference for high authoritarianism whereas others prefer low authoritarianism; an 
aspect of personality which is discussed in a subsequent section.
It would appear the individual considers a number of aspects before deciding whether 
or not to accept an instruction as being authoritative, some decisions are calculative, 
though which conscious choices to obey or disobey, while others are less deliberate, 
even unconscious, owing to the individual’s personality. As far as Tuck (1972) is 
concerned, there are two pre-conditions for an authority relationship; first, that the 
individual believes the authority to be right and, secondly, that the authority believes in 
its own rectitude. For Ohmann (1957: 47):
‘.... the manager’s authority is in essence trust, and his hold on it is at best 
tenuous and dependent on his stewardship. As a corollary, the exercise of 
authority in a dictatorial or unilateral way will head into difficulty’
From this it might be concluded, that an abuse of authority by the manager my lead to 
his or her authority being withdrawn by those above or rejected by those below. It 
might be argued then, that in the exercise of authority, those in positions of superiority 
tread a fine line which divides acceptability from unacceptability, both from above and 
below.
2.3 The Locus of Organisational Authority
Where then does authority reside within organisations? According to Bendix (1961), 
when managers make their appeals for cooperation, they automatically identify 
themselves as persons in authority’. However, if, as noted above, authority is not 
possessed by an individual, but is reliant upon the interaction between two or more 
individuals, this raises the question of whether authority rests with the person issuing 
the directive or the recipient of it? In other words is authority ‘top-down’, residing 
formally with the superior, or ‘bottom-up, residing with the subordinate, or perhaps a 
combination of the two? The answer lies in two theoretical approaches; the ‘formal’
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theory versus the ‘acceptance’ theory, and the ‘objective’ theory versus the 
‘subjective’; theory, each of which are discussed in more detail below.
2.3.1 The ‘formal theory’ of authority
According to the ‘formal theory’, or ‘classical view, authority moves from the top of an 
organisation downwards. The classical viewpoint, as Albanese (1966: 137) notes, is 
based on the view that:
‘....authority moves from the top down. Every manager gets his authority 
through the process of delegation from the next level up.’
This suggests that authority is related to the post the manager occupies, that the 
manager is in a position of authority by virtue of his or her status in the organisation. 
The relationship between formal position or status and authority is taken up by 
Cotgrove (1980: 163), who suggests that:
‘Men may accept authority because it rests upon tradition. In stable 
societies, authority is legitimised by long usage. In times of crisis and 
change, traditional authority comes to be questioned.’
Given the general hierarchical nature of organisations, regardless of the number of 
strata, it might be fair to conclude that there are different degrees of authority residing 
at different levels in the organisation; this is the view held by Newport (1967), who 
suggests that, as authority is delegated, it can be traced to its ultimate source up the 
scalar chain. In some cases ultimate authority can be traced to ‘the property rights of 
ownership’ (Young, 1968: 2008). As Pearse (2000) notes, bureaucratic organisations 
are designed on a ‘staff’ and ‘line’ basis, with organisation charts depicting vertical 
command and control systems. However, there may be a distinction is sources of 
authority in relation to organisational status, for, as Cotgrove (1980: 250) observes:
The authority of the official is based upon his position in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy. The authority of the professional, however, is based on 
knowledge. His actions alone are based on his professional judgements 
and he alone, or in consultation with his professional colleagues (peers), is 
in a position to decide.’
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So it would appear that authority is not only related to position in the hierarchy, but 
also to the position in terms of role and function that the individual occupies within it.
2.3.2 The ‘acceptance theory’ of authority
In contrast to the ‘formal theory’ of authority, the acceptance theory is a bottom-up 
view. In other words, the authority of the superior is confirmed by the subordinate 
accepting it as legitimate and obeying the instructions or, on the other hand, deciding 
not to do so.
If one accepts the thesis that authority rests with the individual and their confirmatory 
acceptance, then how can cooperation be relied upon? As far as Barnard (1968: 167) 
is concerned, the decisions of individuals occur under three conditions:
‘.... (a) orders that are deliberately issued in enduring organizations usually 
comply with the four conditions mentioned above; (b) there exists a ‘zone of 
indifference’ in each individual within which orders are acceptable without 
conscious questioning of their authority; (c) the interests of the persons who 
contribute to an organization as a group result in the exercise of an 
influence on the subject, or on the attitude of the individual, that maintains a 
certain stability of this zone of indifference.’
The four conditions to which Barnard (1968) refers in this quote were discussed earlier 
in this chapter. Clearly (a) relates to the perceive, reasonableness of the order; 
reasonable orders will be complied with whereas those deemed unreasonable may 
not. (b) seems to relate to the nature of the order or instruction and implies a sense of 
normality; instructions which are frequently given and complied with create an ongoing 
behaviour pattern, whereas, perhaps, unusual or abnormal instructions may not result 
in the indifference to which Barnard refers. Indeed, Barnard (1968: 169) states that 
orders which are ‘unquestionably acceptable’ lie within the zone of indifference, 
whereas those which are unacceptable, barely acceptable or unacceptable do not lie 
in the zone. Consequently, one could argue that authority exists in established 
patterns which are contingent upon the nature of the instructions or orders and the 
frequency they are given.
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It should be noted, however, that not all authority relations allow for the choice to 
accept or reject a decision. As Fromm (1961) notes, the relationship between the 
master and slave is somewhat different to the teacher and pupil; both relationships 
include similar roles, a superior and a subordinate, but it is the nature of those roles 
which and the purpose of the relationship that differ and as a consequence change the 
authority. As Fromm (1961: 141):
The interests of teacher and pupil lie in the same direction. The teacher is 
satisfied if he succeeds in furthering the pupil; of he has failed to do so, the 
failure is his and the pupil’s. The slave-owner, on the other hand, wants to 
exploit the slave as much as possible; the more he gets out of him the more 
he is satisfied.’
It appears, then, that the acceptance theory argument is not quite as clear-cut as it 
appears at first glance; it is not simply about the relative superior-subordinate status, 
but also about their individual status. In the case of the tutor and pupil relationship, the 
pupil is, within the confines of the prevailing regulatory framework, free to accept or 
reject the tutor’s authority. The slave on the other hand is bonded to the slave-master 
and not at liberty to reject the authority. Whilst in both cases there are superiors and 
subordinates, it is their individual status that, to some extent, determines the authority 
relations. In organisations it might be fair to assume that subordinates are at liberty to 
accept or reject the authority of superiors, but how is liberty defined? Legal liberty and 
economic liberty are fundamentally different concepts and, whilst the subordinate 
might be legally free to reject the authority of the superior, the economic 
consequences of authority rejection might amount to the subordinate being 
economically bonded to the superior and not wholly free to exercise choice.
2.3.3 Additional perspectives on authority
As far as the top-down/bottom-up theories are concerned, a similar distinction, 
although a different taxonomy, is drawn by Barnard (1938; 1968). In Barnard’s (1938; 
1968) opinion, authority can be sub-divided into objective and subjective aspects or 
components. The objective aspect is, according, to Barnard (1968), the role of 
authority in the formal communications system of an organisation. As such, authority is 
embedded in the downward flow of command from senior management, the Board to 
of Directors, through supervisors to individual workers (Young, 1962) and is related to
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‘official authority deriving from office’ (Fayol, 1949). This perspective presumes that an 
instruction or communication from the organisation, or an individual in a superior 
position, carries authority (Barnard, 1968), will be regarded as authoritative and 
complied with.
The subjective element relates to the acceptance of the superior’s [manager] authority 
by the subordinate, which is rather more interesting from the psychological 
perspective. If the subordinate accepts the orders or directives of then the authority of 
the superior is confirmed or legitimised (Barnard, 1938; Duffy, 1959; Albanese, 1966) 
and a perception of managerial legitimacy created (McNulty, 1975). If, however, the 
individual refuses to obey the directive of the superior, then authority is denied 
(Barnard, 1938; Weber, 1961; Albanese, 1966). In essence, the formal theory of 
authority equates to the objective and the acceptance theory of authority with the 
subjective.
Consequently, authority does not simply reside with the person in authority but also 
with the subordinate subjected to it (Albanese, 1973); if the individual refuses to 
accept directives then the superior has no authority, or the authority is diminished, 
regarding that issue. There must be congruence between the pattern of authority and 
the values of the individuals and groups over which it is exercised (Albanese, 1973).
There also appear to be authority ‘thresholds’ across which authority may not be 
accepted; thus authority might exist for some decision or instructions but not for others 
(Weber, 1961). Likewise, there may be a general perception of the legitimacy of 
authority, yet the authority of a particular manager might be regarded as illegitimate; 
for, as Riley (1991) notes, there is a personal dimension to authority, as individuals 
may confirm the authority of one superior, yet deny the authority of another. The 
decision to acknowledge or legitimise authority may be based upon the relationship 
that has evolved between the parties; the level of trust and trustworthiness and the 
attitudes that each exhibits. In this respect, Tyler and Lind (1992) suggest three 
relational concerns with authority connected to organisational justice perceptions; 
trust, neutrality, and standing. They argue that a person in authority will be deemed 
trustworthy if he/she behaved fairly and considered the views of the subordinate. An 
authority’s neutrality will be judged on the basis of unbiased decision-making, and 
standing by the way that the authority figure treats subordinates with dignity and
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politeness, and shows respect for their rights. This is particularly relevant to the 
psychological contract as, according to Guest and Conway (1997) fairness and trust 
are key components in the content of psychological contracts.
2.4 The Authority-Power Relationship
The relationship between authority and power can, paradoxically, be both simple and 
complex. On the one hand they are considered to be conceptually separate and 
distinct, on the other hand, they are inseparable. According to Tuck (1972: 194), 
‘authority involves the legitimation of power’, which suggests a reliance of one upon 
the other, without power authority cannot exist. The co-existence and inter-reliance of 
authority and power may vary according to the situation and the nature of the two may 
be different in each instance; in some cases the relationship will be strong and in 
others somewhat tenuous (Tuck, 1972). In certain circumstances, such as military 
organisations, there may be no opportunity to exercise choice over whether or not to 
accept a directive as authoritative, owing to the established legitimate and structural 
power relationships.
When it comes to the distribution of power, there is considerable disagreement 
(Parsons, 1969; Mennell, 1976), some arguing power to be relative, others adopting a 
contrary position. The debate hinges upon whether power is relative and based on 
‘zero sum’ gain, a concept drawn from economic game theory. Proponents of the zero- 
sum argue that power is relative insofar that what ‘the winner gains what the loser 
loses, so the sum of gains and losses is zero’ (Mennell, 1976: 108). Mennell (1976) 
argues against this approach by suggesting that:
‘.... a zero-sum game is artificially closed; most real relationships are open.
Each party to one trail of strength may, in an open system, enlist the 
support of allies, so that the amount of power resources in play is 
indeterminate and fluctuating. The value of the winner’s gains may exceed 
the value of the opponent’s losses -  or be less in a pyrrhic victory.’
A similar relative perspective may be adopted in relation to authority in terms of 
management/leadership style, for there may, as Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958: 96) 
suggest, be a linear relationship between managerial authority and subordinate 
freedom based on ‘boss-centred leadership’ and ‘subordinate-centred leadership’. The
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greater the degree of authority exercised by superiors, the lesser the freedom of the 
subordinate. Conversely, the less authority is exercised by superiors, the greater the 
freedom enjoyed by the subordinate. In a later version of their seminal paper, 
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1973), explicitly refer to power and influence of managers 
and non-managers. They acknowledge that their original paper assumed an almost 
unilateral power-position of management and did not pay due attention to the wider 
distribution of power, both internally and externally. Whereas in the earlier paper 
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) referred in their continuum model to the ‘use of 
authority by the manager’ and the ‘area of freedom for subordinates’, in their later work 
(1973: 167) they refer to the ‘area of freedom for the manager’ and the ‘area of 
freedom for nonmanagers’. Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s (1973: 167) retrospective 
commentary on the earlier paper contains a further development in view is the 
influence of ‘forces lying outside the organization’ upon the intra-organisational 
relationships; this is particularly relevant to the psychological contract, where the 
influence of external factors has been acknowledged (Crossman, 2002; Conway and 
Briner, 2005).
Power has been identified as a component in authority relations, as Milgram (2005: 
140) notes, ‘the power of an authority stems not from personal characteristics but from 
his perceived position in a social structure’. This is point is considered by Fromm 
(1961), who considers the relative relationship between teacher and the pupil, and the 
slave-owner and slave. The complexity of the authority/power interaction is taken up 
by Grimes (1978: 731), who highlights the difficulty in clearly distinguishing power and 
authority by stating that ‘authority and power merge imperceptibly with each other’. 
Riley (1991) also notes the inseparability of authority and power on one hand and the 
need to distinguish between them on the other. Likewise, Cotgrove (1980: 162) also 
argues for a distinction between power and authority by suggesting that:
‘Authority is power which derives from a belief in its legitimacy and does not 
therefore derive from coercion.... Legitimacy transforms power into 
authority.’
Consequently, it would appear that any discussion of authority must, of necessity, 
include a consideration of the role of power in confirming authority.
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According to Grimes (1978; 731) ‘power and authority are polar opposites’ and much 
depends on the convergence of goals between the individual and the organisation. A 
contrary position is adopted by Legge and Exley (1975: 52), who take a more 
integrated approach; with reference to the work of Mitchell (1968), they claim that:
the concept of authority has been defined as a form or power through 
which the actions of individuals or groups are concerted for the 
collaborative attainment of goal(s) through commands which are effective 
because the recipients regard them as being legitimate or acceptable’.
Of course, this does not identify what constitutes ‘legitimate’ or ‘acceptable’ 
commands, nor does it recognise the consequences of a perception of illegitimate or 
unacceptable demands being given and rejected. Indeed, if anything this conveniently 
simplistic definition creates more confusion than clarity. Grimes (1978), on the other 
hand, attempts to draw a clear distinction between power, which enables a superior to 
carry out his or her own will despite resistance, and authority, which involves an 
expectation that his or her orders will be obeyed, this perspective is virtually identical 
to that of Fayol (1949: 21), who stated that ‘authority is the right to give orders and the 
power to extract obedience’.
However if Grimes’ (1978) view, discussed above, that the key determinant is goal 
convergence is to be considered credible it must also be scrutinised closely, as here 
are times when personal and common goals are difficult to distinguish from each 
other. According to Grimes (1978) there are three potential responses to authority; 
acceptance, indifference, and rejection; this he argues has implications for Barnard’s 
(1938) acceptance theory of authority.
Likewise, McNulty (1975:579) also acknowledges the relationship between [formal] 
authority and power and notes that:
‘The concept of authority involves the power of decision makers to 
implement their decisions through subordinates. Acceptance of these 
directives by subordinates involves a perception of the superior’s ‘right’ to 
give orders.’
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A simple, yet useful model of authority versus power is presented by Buckley (1967), 
which draws a distinction, between an ‘authority system’ and a ‘power system’, in 
terms of compliance versus consensus and shared versus differential goals (Figure 
2 .1).
Figure 2.1: Authority and power systems
Group
Compliance
Authority
Structure
Group
Consensus
Group 
Goal Pursuit
Differential 
Goal Pursuit
Power
Structure
Authority System Power System
Source: Buckley, 1967: 178
According to Buckley (1967), where there are shared, collective goals and consensus 
about how they are to be achieved, then legitimate authority exists and is exercised. 
Where, on the other hand, there are divergent goals and no consensus those in 
superior positions pursue organisational objectives through the compliance of 
subordinates. In other words covert or overt power is exercised in order to achieve the 
requisite compliance. However, as Buckley (1967) implies, both authority and power 
are forms of control which occupy the end-points of a continuum. Buckley (1967) is 
careful to delineate between power and authority with carefully crafted definitions. 
According to Buckley (1978: 186), power is defined as:
‘Control or influence over the actions of others to promote one’s own goals 
without their consent, against their will or without their knowledge.’
Whereas, according to Buckley (1978: 184), authority is:
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The direction or control of the behaviour of others for the promotion of 
collective goals based on some ascertainable form of their own 
knowledgeable consent.’
A rather simplistic definition of power is proposed by Hinkin and Schriesheim (1994: 
779), who suggest that:
‘Power is the ability of one person (the agent) to cause another person (the 
target) to act in accordance with the agent’s wishes.’
A more insightful observation on power is offered by Mohr (1994: 54), who states that 
‘power cannot be equalized because the bases of power cannot be equalized. Power 
comes from something’. One of the early assessments of power in organisations was 
that of French and Raven (1959), which divides power into five different types, 
according to the power source, or something (Mohr, 1994), these may be further 
categorised under the headings of perception and identification. Reward power is 
based upon the subordinate's perception that the superior has the power to reward 
them for obedience or compliance. In contrast Coercive power is based on the 
subordinate’s perception that the superior has the power to punish them for 
disobedience or non-compliance. Legitimate power is also based on perception, that 
the superior has a right to issue orders and command obedience, based on their 
status or position. Expert power is also based on perception, that the superior has 
special knowledge or expertise, this type of power is characterised by the often cited 
expression that knowledge is power, and is less related to formal roles within the 
authority structure. An implication of this is that as subordinate knowledge/expertise 
increases so the authority of the superior diminishes. The last power type by French 
and Raven (1959) is Referent power, this is identification-based, similar to charismatic, 
whereby the subordinate seeks to emulate or imitate some of the superior’s 
characteristics and will obey instructions to be in favour. Some observers (Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993; DeZoort and Lord, 1994) identify an additional power dimension within 
French and Raven’s (1959) typology, Informational power, which, they argue, is 
distinct from Expert power, and based upon the content of the uniqueness of the 
information possessed and communicated by the superior, as Duffy (1959 172)
observes:
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‘Authority may also oddly come about because of a lack of information. A 
superior may be in a opposition referred to by Barnard as a 
communication center, that is, a position where information significant in 
forming the directives that he is to pass on to his subordinates tends to 
flow from him.’
In their work on obedience of auditors, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) (cited in DeZoort 
and Lord, 1994) offer a view that power and influence can be conceptualised in terms 
of normative and informational influences (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Typology of influence and power
Informational Power
Referent Power
Expert PowerReward Power
Legitimate Power
Coercive Power
Informational
Influence
Normative
Influence
Source: DeZoort and Lord, 1994: 8
The Normative influences include Reward, Coercive and Legitimate power. According 
to DeZoort and Lord (1994), this is because individuals are concerned with maximising 
social outcomes, whether or not they believe the actions of other are right or wrong. 
The informational influence includes Expert, Referent and Informational power. 
According to DeZoort and Lord (1994: 8), individuals’ follow this approach as they 
have a:
‘.... desire to be accurate. Responses from other individuals are used as a 
source of information. In this case, people comply because they believe the 
information from others is correct.’
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A more liberal assessment of the relationship between authority and power appears to 
have been adopted by Etzioni (1961) in the construction of his typology of 
organisations. According to Schein (1965), Etzioni’s typology of organisations is based 
upon the type of power or authority the organisation utilises. Schein (1965: 45) 
observes that Etzioni (1961) distinguishes three types of organisations:
‘.... on the basis of (1) whether they exert pure coercive power, (2) whether 
they attempt to elicit involvement through the exchange of economic 
rewards for membership and performance based on rational-legal authority, 
or (3) whether they attempt to elicit involvement on the basis of normative 
rewards.’
It is clear from Etzioni’s (1961) work that involvement should be interpreted as 
cooperation on the part of the subordinate/employee in behaving in a manner that 
meets the expectations of the superior/manager.
A yet different and broader typology of power is offered by Riley (1991), who identifies 
five distinct types of power. These are: Physical power which is applied by force; 
Resource power, which is applied through exchange and bargaining; Position power, 
which is applied through the application of rules; Expert power, which is applied 
through knowledge differential and learning opportunities; and Personal power, which 
is applied through persuasion. Riley (1991:72) makes a succinct distinction between 
authority and power by stating that:
The way to distinguish between them is to see authority as a ‘right to give 
orders’ and power in terms of sanctions and rewards which are a contingent 
necessity.’
It would appear that the distinction between authority and power is relatively easy to 
define theoretically, but not necessarily so easy to identify in practice.
2.5 Power and Authority in the Organisational Context
From a managerial perspective, authority appears to be a key issue in the 
management of the employment relationship for, as Baldecchino (1997: 92) notes, 
‘workers cannot be forced to work without a modicum of consent’, which raises the
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issue of just how much authority is mutually acceptable in given circumstances and 
whether obedience and liberty can coexist (Follett, 1925). Thus, the potential 
dichotomy between the need for authority on the one hand and freedom to act on the 
other is exposed; this is amply illustrated by Albanese (1966: 136) who observes that:
‘Authority is necessary if the work of the world is to get done. Freedom is
necessary because it is what makes the work of the world worth doing’.
The relationship between power and authority has been noted earlier in this chapter; 
as far as these concepts are concerned in the organisational context, according to 
McNulty (1975: 579), authority is related to the power through which ‘decision makers 
implement their decisions through subordinates’. However, whilst authority can be 
enhanced by the use of managerial power, the application of sanctions, such as 
withholding promotion or financial bonuses, the threat or actuality of discipline and/or 
dismissal, authority can also be resisted and managerial power undermined by the 
imposition of economic sanctions on the part of the individual, such as the threat to 
quit (Mandeville, 1960; Young, 1962). Thus, authority is centred on the relationship 
between individuals (the superior and the subordinate) and the subsequent 
interactions that occur. It includes an assessment of the ways in which organisational 
authority can be applied in the issuing of directives and the way in which power can be 
utilised when managerial authority is questioned, ignored or rejected. Although 
authority and power can be distinguished theoretically, in practice the two may be 
confused. As Goodrich (1975: 57), citing a collective agreement relating to the 
Birmingham Bricklayers, observes: ‘Each employer shall have the power to conduct 
his business in any way he may think advantageous....’. One might argue that what is 
meant here is the ‘authority’ to conduct the business in the way the employer sees fit.
In his assessment of authority and compliance, Duffy (1959: 170) suggests four 
factors are considered by individuals when deciding if a directive shall be regarded as 
authoritative. The first is the possibility o f punishment for not complying with an 
instruction, such as a reprimand, dismissal or demotion, in other words the amount of 
power the superior has at his or her disposal (Riley, 1991). The second is the social 
framework, in which the individual might consider whether the directive is generally 
acceptable to the group or regarded as established group norms, and whether non- 
compliance might result in peer-group sanctions. The third consideration is the feeling
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toward responsibility, in this case the subordinate might reject the directive of the 
subordinate to do one thing and follow a different course of action, thus accepting 
responsibility for their actions and any consequences that might result. The last 
consideration is the facts o f the situation, where the subordinate sees the directive as 
meeting the requirements of the situation, the directive will be complied with, in cases 
where the directive fails to meet the requirements of the situation compliance may be 
withheld.
An example of ‘facts of the case’ non-compliance is to be found in Morpurgo’s (2006) 
Private Peaceful, which chronicles the fate of a young (fictional) soldier during the 
battle of the Somme. The subordinate, Private Peaceful, certain that he and his 
colleagues have been spotted by German leaping into an unoccupied trench, refuses 
to obey the order of his superior, Sergeant Hanley, to leave the safety of the trench 
and attack the German line; for Private Peaceful the compliance with the order will 
lead to certain death, thus in Duffy’s (1959) view, the nature of the directive did not 
accord with the ‘facts of the situation’ as he saw them. Interestingly, the assessment of 
the facts was restricted to the short-term immediate situation and not the longer term; 
non-compliance, in this particular case, resulted in Private Peaceful being shot at 
dawn for cowardice -  the application of the ultimate sanction.
This, of course, raises the issue of how much authority and power is acceptable, and 
at what point is the application of authority and/or power perceived to be excessive 
and abusive by those to whom it is applied? Given that individuals have different 
personal characteristics, there is the potential for differential perceptions, what one 
person regards are excessive or abusive may not be the same as another person.
In their discussion of the ‘climate of fear’ in organisations, Ashkanasy and Nicholson 
(2003) address the issue of fear and anxiety in employees created by management 
behaviours. There is considerable similarity between the empirical focus of Ashkanasy 
and Nicholson (2003) and that of Bies and Tripp (1998). In their qualitative study of 
power and the powerlessness in organisations, Bies and Tripp (1998) assess the way 
in which certain behaviours might amount to tyranny, which has a certain resonance in 
relation to Ashkanasy and Nicholson’s (2003) work on fear. From their results, Bies 
and Tripp (1998: 205-206) construct an image of an ‘abusive boss’ and suggest that 
such a person displays one or more of the following behaviours:
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• The micromanager, who is obsessed with both detail and perfection, sets 
unreasonably high expectations; who is impatient and unforgiving when 
mistakes are made, and quick to apportion blame.
• The inexplicit direction with decisive delivery, in which the boss has high 
expectation of the employee but never clearly defines what the expectations 
are, leaving the employee second-guessing the bosses mind.
• The mercurial mood swings, in which the boss exhibits unpredictable 
behaviour; calm and pleasant, one minute angry and aggressive, the next.
• The obsession with loyalty and obedience, in which the questioning of the 
boss’s authority is tantamount to treachery and punitive action taken.
• The status derogation, where employees are belittled publicly, regarding their 
performance or character through open criticism or sarcasm.
• The capricious actions where, for example, targets are arbitrarily raised 
without any justification. In some cases the boss might apply double 
standards, expecting more from some employees than from others.
• The boss who exercises raw power for personal gain, where the promotion of 
an employee might be withheld or delayed by the boss, or the boss takes the 
credit for an idea or initiative of a subordinate.
These behaviours seem to suggest a power-based dominance by managers, in which 
they seek to impress their authority over subordinates by the use of sanctions, which 
may be regarded as illegitimate by the individual. This has potential implications for 
the psychological contract between the subordinate and the superior, for whilst the 
superior’s authority might be recognised by the individual and regarded as a legitimate 
right within the organisational hierarchy, the mechanism by which it is enforced may 
be considered unfair. Consequently, there is a possibility that the response this evokes 
may be reflected in the health of the psychological contract, as suggested by Guest 
and Conway (1997); the root cause of the potential breakdown of, or diminution in, the
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health of the psychological contract being the perceived injustice of the [excessive] 
application of power.
According to Bies and Tripp (1998: 211), employees respond to workplace tyranny by 
developing one of four coping strategies (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Responses to tyranny
Public Face 
Consent Dissent
Consent
Private Face
Dissent
Surrender Disguise
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Source: Bies and Tripp, 1998: 211
These responses follow the two-dimensional framework of public/private face and 
consent/dissent. In some cases the employee finds it easier to respond by giving up 
the fight and surrender to the will of the boss both publicly and privately. Others might 
respond by disguising their true feelings by publicly agreeing with the boss, while 
privately expressing strong dissent. The third response might be to disagree with the 
boss both publicly and privately, a course of action almost certain to result in open 
confrontation. The last response is to publicly dissent with the boss whilst privately 
consenting; Bies and Tripp (1998) found little real evidence of this, other than people 
acting as spies for the boss and expressing open dissent as a means of encouraging 
other employees to express their feelings, thus providing ‘intelligence’ to be 
communicated back to the boss.
2.6 Authoritarianism in Individuals and Organisations
It has been noted by Schneider (1975) and Schneider and Reichers (1983: 27) that 
‘individuals are attracted to jobs and organizations which fit their personalities’. Thus, it 
could be argued, individuals with a preference for authoritarian-style relations might be 
attracted to organisations with an overt authoritarian climate. It is unlikely, for example,
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that an individual would join a military organisation if they prized the freedom to act in 
pursuit of their own goals or had a preference for choice and discretion, for example, 
in whether to obey an instruction.
There has been considerable work on the way individuals exhibit a propensity or 
preference to control others or to be controlled themselves. The two principle 
conceptual areas appear to be those of locus of control (Lawler, 1971; Broedling, 
1975; Spector, 1982; O’Brien, 1983; Furnham and Drakeley, 1993) and 
authoritarianism (Adorno et al, 1950; Vroom, 1959; Schuler, 1976). Locus of control 
refers to the way in which individuals perceive the degree to which they control their 
own destiny; internals, those with an internal locus of control, perceive themselves to 
be in control of their own actions, whereas externals perceive their life to be controlled 
by other, external forces. Interestingly, Furnham and Drakeley (1993) found that 
internals display a more positive attitude towards organisational climate than 
externals.
As far as Fromm (1961: 146) is concerned, ‘the authoritarian character loves those 
conditions that limit human freedom’. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, relates to an 
individual’s preferences for control over other or to be controlled by others. As Schuler 
(1976: 320) notes:
‘.... essentially indicates the preference of a person to control or to be 
controlled by his or her environment. Low-authoritarian subordinates prefer 
supervisors who allow high participation and, therefore share in the 
controlling and decision-making processes of the tasks. High-authoritarian 
subordinates generally prefer supervisors who allow low participation.’
As far as the effects of authoritarianism on employee participation are concerned, 
Vroom (1959) found significantly different reactions between high and low- 
authoritarians; low-authoritarians, those with a preference to be involved in decision­
making, were more responsive. However, Vroom’s findings were challenged in later 
work by Tosi (1970), which suggest the response of the subordinate was not a 
function of the level of authoritarianism and advocated seeking other explanations. 
The situation was reversed again in by Lippert’s (1970) findings, which identified that 
low-authoritarian leaders were more inclined to adopt a participative style than high-
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authoritarian leaders, although the latter group might adopt this style upon receiving 
cues from superiors.
However, it has been noted (Gunn, 1994) that authoritarianism may display an 
unpleasant side and have inherent limitations. On the one hand, in an authoritarian 
regime superiors assume a position of superiority, as exemplars of standards and 
perfection whilst, on the other, blame for mistakes is laid firmly at the door of 
subordinates, who are regarded as an inferior class. As Gunn (1994: 34) observes:
‘Permitting superiors to function as a class of untouchables can 
superimpose patronage over productivity as a criterion of success in an 
organization. This is because superiors can use their absolute power to 
make blind obedience the order of the day.’
Thus authoritarian management style has the capacity to elevate managers to God­
like status, holding the destiny of subordinates in the hand and subjecting them, 
potentially, to whimsical and abusive behaviours, such as those set out by Bies and 
Tripp (1998). Gunn’s use of the term ‘untouchable’ is interesting, as in some societies 
this denotes an inferior class unworthy of any attention or consideration, being of no 
moral worth, whereas in this case Gunn (1994) seems to imply a superior 
untouchable, owing to the unassailable status and power. Gunn (1994) relates the 
authoritarian style to the top-down, bureaucratic nature of [some] organisations and 
the way this is used to enhance management power, implying a Machiavellian 
approach. Furthermore, Gunn (1994: 36) argues that the bureaucratic hierarchy 
results in ‘autocratic rule, poor management skills and coercive practices’. He goes on 
to suggest that superiors can abuse their power in, for example, hiding their own 
malpractice, or by the use of arbitrary or capricious performance standards, thus 
concurring with the view of Bies and Tripp (1998). In his assessment, Gunn (1994: 38) 
concludes that the use of a ‘coercive authority structure becomes a menacing 
construct in the organization’.
The use of the terms ‘tyranny’ (Bies and Tripp, 1998), ‘menacing’ (Gunn, 1994) and 
‘fear’ (Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003) on the face of it imply a somewhat sinister 
side of organisational life; of course, technically, ‘tyranny’ and ‘menace ‘are input 
behaviours and ‘fear’ an emotional output or consequence. One the one hand one
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could argue this is created by the inherent or adopted authoritarian style of superiors; 
alternatively it could be attributed to the way these behaviours are perceived by the 
subordinate, on the basis of the degree of their own high/low authoritarianism. Overall, 
the implication is that the overt use of excessive authority and power may be 
perceived as menacing or tyrannical, and result in the emotional response of rear.
According to Ashforth (1994:758), the antecedents of tyranny are a ‘joint function of 
certain individual predispositions and situational facilitators’, which is set out in Figure 
2.4. The model identifies a number of characteristics displayed by the superior which 
amount to petty tyranny, some of which are closely related to those proposed by Bies 
and Tripp (1998) and Gunn (1994), such as arbitrariness and belittling others publicly, 
which lead to negative emotional responses among subordinates. In terms of the 
individual predispositions [of the superior], Ashforth (1994) suggests this includes a 
preference for bureaucracy, authority conformity and order.
The [superior’s] belief about subordinates is dominated by McGregor’s (1960) Theory 
X orientation. The beliefs about the self component, Ashforth (1994) suggests, is 
typified by high self-esteem, which in turn occasionally results in perfectionism and 
arrogance, concurring with the view of Bies and Tripp (1998), and a reliance on power, 
fear and intimidation.
The preferences for action component is based upon authoritarianism and 
characterised by dominance and control over subordinates, at the same time possibly 
submitting to the will of superiors. Moving on to the situational facilitators, this 
concerns macro-level factors such as organisational values and norms, such as rule- 
oriented relationships, close supervision based on low trust, and micro-level factors, 
such as exploiting the powerlessness of subordinates and in doing so creating a 
greater power differential between superior and subordinate.
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The issue of differential power is taken up by Ashforth (1994: 763), who suggests that:
The greater the power differential and the stronger and more controlling the 
means of influence (e.g., rewards, coercion), the more inclined is the 
manager to attribute subordinates’ successes to managerial control rather 
than to the subordinates themselves.’
Once again, this corresponds with the view of Bies and Tripp (1998), that tyrannical 
managers ‘steal’ the credit from subordinates for their own personal gain.
The effects of the petty tyranny on subordinates are considerable, but, as Ashforth 
(1994) acknowledges, the effects also extend to other members of the role set. 
However, as Ashforth (1994: 765) notes, the impact on subordinates are more 
pronounced because:
‘.... (1) they are hierarchically depended and are thus a frequent target of 
tyrannical behaviors, and (2) the extent to which petty tyrants display 
different behaviours to less dependent members of the role set is not clear.’
Ashforth (1994) identifies five effects on subordinates, these are; (1) low leader 
endorsement and satisfaction; (2) frustration when superior interference gets in the 
way of goal achievement, stress created by verbal abuse and unsubstantiated blame 
for mistakes, and reactance through more frequent complaints rule-breaking and 
reduced productivity; (3) helplessness and work alienation, are essentially emotional 
responses, the former a psychological separation or distancing of the individual from 
the work, the former a sense of having no control over the work environment; (4) self­
esteem and performance, where the superior’s tyrannical behaviour results in the 
subordinate’s self-esteem being undermined or diminished, which might in turn have a 
negative impact on his/her work performance; (5) work unit cohesiveness concerns the 
positive effect of tyranny on group cohesiveness, as intimidated workers combine 
together to form a mutually protective shield; for example, Taylor and Bain (2003; 
1500) found that the labelling of some groups by managers as ‘bad boys’, to some 
extent backfired:
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The more managers took petty disciplinary action against these 
malcontents, the more they cohered as a group and developed common 
forms of expression and identity through a set of shared beliefs.’
However, as Ashforth (1994) notes, the Machiavellian superior may prevent this by 
invoking mistrust between subordinates.
All things considered, the work of Bies and Tripp (1998), Ashforth (1994) and Gunn 
(1994) provides a grim assessment of the use and abuse of extreme authority and 
power in organisations. The terms tyranny, menace and abuse, both individually and 
collectively, enable one to conjure up a vision of oppression, fear and anxiety among 
subordinates. This, however, raises the question of why people remain in overtly 
authoritarian regimes, rather than quit. This may be due to a lack of alternative 
employment; according to Trevor (2001) a tight labour market in which no other jobs 
are available restricts the ease-of-movement of workers. Another explanation for the 
acceptance of authoritarian management might be pay, insofar that authoritarianism 
might be traded-off for good pay.
2.6.1 Authoritarianism and pay satisfaction
The first point to note here is the apparent absence of specific literature on the 
relationship between authoritarian management and pay satisfaction. In the majority of 
cases satisfaction with pay is measured along with other more general job satisfaction 
measures. The Job Descriptive Index (Smith, Kendal and Hulin (1969), for example, 
measures job satisfaction with five items: present pay, work on present job, 
opportunities for promotion, and coworkers. The Job Satisfaction Survey (Spector, 
1997) measures satisfaction with nine ‘facets’; pay, promotion, supervision, fringe 
benefits, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of the work, and 
communication. Although each facet is measured separately the purpose is to 
construct a total job satisfaction score and the interaction between facets is not 
analysed.
In his assessment of the employment relationship, Crossman (2002) argues that 
people join organisations for two main reasons, a) economic need and b) career 
motive. It could be that in the case of economic need, overt authoritarianism has to be 
tolerated out of circumstance and in the case of career motive out of choice, as a price
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worth paying to obtain the career enhancement the organisation might provide in the 
longer term. According to Shapira (1981) and Riley and Szivas (2003), in certain 
[service] industries there may be a relationship between the positive attributes of the 
nature of the work that are traded-off for low pay. It would, on this premise, seem 
plausible that negative attributes of the work, such as managerial authoritarianism, may 
be traded-off for [perceived] good pay.
According to Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman (1959), both supervision 
(management style) and pay are ‘hygiene’ factors, which prevent dissatisfaction at 
work, yet no consideration appears to have been given to the potential relationship 
between these variables; it is arguably rather more complex than suggested to date. 
Perhaps the explanation lies in the low expectations employees have from the work 
itself, the style of management and the extrinsic rewards, or that authoritarian 
organisations attract people with a preference for this type of environment along the 
lines suggested by Schneider (1975) and Richter and Schneider (1983). Indeed, Tosi 
(1973) found that authoritarian individuals working for a directive boss produced the 
most satisfying subordinate/superior pairing.
It is also worth noting that, according to DeConinck and Stilwell (2004:230), employees 
who:
‘.... perceived they had been treated fairly in the amount of rewards 
allocated (distributive justice) and in the method that they were allocated 
(procedural justice), they were more satisfied with their pay and supervisor 
respectively.’
This suggests that, within organisations there is a relationship between pay satisfaction 
and perceptions of the behaviour of the superior, in which organisational justice 
perceptions are potentially important. However, the bulk of the research into the 
relationship between procedural and distributive justice and pay satisfaction follows the 
line of DeConinck and Stilwell (2004) insofar that it relates to specifically to satisfaction 
with the manner in which pay decisions have been made and the amount of the reward 
given, rather than pay in relation to other aspects of the employment relationship.
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There is however, within the broader concept of procedural justice, an additional 
conceptual field which might prove relevant to the relationship between authority and 
the psychological contract, that of interpersonal aspect of procedural justice construct 
(Greenberg, 1990), referred to as ‘interactional’ justice. This interactional justice is 
concerned with the way individuals perceive ‘the quality of the interpersonal treatment 
they receive during the enactment of organizational procedures’ (Bies and Moag, 1986: 
44). According to the findings of Bies (1986, cited by Greenberg, 1990), individuals’ 
perceptions of fairness of interpersonal treatment is judged on four principle elements; 
honesty, courtesy, timely feedback, and respect for rights. Whilst these finding were 
specifically related to recruitment, it might be appropriate to apply them in a more 
general sense to the broader superior/subordinate relationship.
There is a further potential point of interest in relation to pay and authoritarian 
management. In many organisations pay is determined at a high level as part of a 
structured pay system, over which the immediate superior may exercise little or no 
influence. If employees perceive their pay to be ‘good’ and, as a result, authoritarian 
management is deemed acceptable or overlooked by the employee, that one is traded 
off for the other, this seems to imply that pay may be used at the organisational level to 
buy compliance, thus reinforcing an organisational norm; indeed, Bain and Taylor 
(1999) provide evidence of contingent pay being withdrawn by authoritarian managers 
as a punishment for non-compliance with established behavioural norms.
2.7 Authority Relations in Call Centres
One type of organisation that has attracted considerable attention on owing to 
exhibiting an authoritarian style of management is the cal/contact centre (Taylor and 
Bain, 1999; Kinnie, Hutchinson and Purcell, 2000; Liefooghe and Mackenzie Davey, 
2001; Grimshaw et al, 2002; Zapf et al, 2003; Brannan, 2005; Rose and Wright, 2005; 
Mahesh and Kasturi, 2006). Interestingly, some of the call centre research creates an 
inverse relationship between pay and management style as, in some cases, findings 
suggest an authoritarian regime coexisting with relatively low pay.
There are mixed views and perceptions about the prevailing management style and 
organisational climate in call/contact centres. On the one hand some paint a bleak 
picture of the call centre as a coercive system, typified by low pay and short job 
cycles, of minimal selection criteria, rudimentary training (Kinnie, Hutchinson and
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Purcell, 2000; Rose and Wright, 2005), and equating to the modern-day equivalent of 
the ‘dark satanic mills’ of the industrial revolution (Wylie, 1997). Taylor and Bain 
(1999) describe call centre work as an ‘assembly line in the head’, on the basis of the 
labour process approach and the incessant, electronically delivered and monitored 
workflow. In describing the work of one call centre agent, Taylor and Bain (1999: 115) 
observe:
‘The pressure is intense because she knows her work is being measured, 
her speech monitored, and it often leaves her mentally, physically and 
emotionally exhausted.’
However, Bain and Taylor (2000) disagree with Fernie and Metcalf’s (1998) view that 
the call centre, with all the employee-monitoring assemblage amounts to an electronic 
panopticon, through which managerial authority and power is perfected and 
unassailable.
Although some power is viewed there as ‘legitimate’ in terms of the way it is perceived 
by subordinates (French and Raven, 1959), there is a contrary view in which some 
power is seen as being ‘illegitimate’ (Liefooghe and Mackenzie Davey, 2001); 
particularly when subordinates experience excessive or abusive use of power which 
they perceive as equating to bullying. In their assessment of organisational bullying in 
call centres, Liefooghe and Mackenzie Davey (2001) are careful to delineate between 
bullying at the individual level and that which occurs at the organisational level. 
Although one may support the other, the perception of organisational-level bullying 
might be regarded as an organisational ‘climate’.
Some of the call centre behaviours and practises found by Liefooghe and Mackenzie 
Davey (2001) were the punitive withdrawal of overtime, the use of publicly displayed 
performance statistics to openly belittle those at the bottom of the performance 
distribution, the covert threat of dismissal, all of which might be considered as abusive 
and constituting tyrannical or bullying treatment if judged against Bies and Tripp’s 
(1998) criteria. According to Einarsen (1999) bullying is a result of the real or 
perceived power difference between the superior and the subordinate.
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Likewise, Bain and Taylor (2000: 13) cite an example of punitive management in their 
case study research in one call centre, they note that:
The bonus system exemplified the punitive management style; entire 
payments would be jeopardised if workers were as little as five minutes late 
in a three month period.’
This, it can be argued, amounts to disproportionate arbitrary behaviour which 
constitutes bullying; Bain and Taylor (2000) report that it was certainly perceived as 
such by call centre agents. Similarly, Bain and Taylor (2000: 11) note that whilst 
employee observations (telephone monitoring) was ostensibly used for training 
purposes, there was a perception among employees that it was ‘largely employed for 
disciplinary purposes’ and in some cases led to dismissal. A similar approach by 
management was identified by Liefooghe and Mackenzie Davey (2001) where 
employees who did not meet their targets for two weeks in succession were put on a 
personal improvement plan, during this time they were not permitted to work overtime, 
which resulted in a financial penalty; Liefooghe and Mackenzie Davey (2001: 384) 
define this as part of a ‘covert bullying repertoire’. The employees subjected to these 
types of treatment displayed attitudes of discontent, and perceptions of unfair 
treatment and emotional responses of worry and fear -  ‘scared stiff’ (Liefooghe and 
Mackenzie Davey, 2001: 383), in some cases had decided to join a trade union to 
obtain protection (Bain and Taylor, 2000).
2.8 Organisational Climate and Managerial Behaviour
The impact of the organisational environment on employee behaviour has been 
recognised by a number of authors (Schneider, 1990; Ashkanasy, Wilderom and 
Peterson, 2000; Patterson, Warr and West (2004) According to Patterson, Warr and 
West (2004: 193):
‘It has long been clear that behaviour is a function of both a person’s 
characteristics and the nature of his or her environment. Important 
environmental features in work settings have sometimes been brought 
together under the general heading of ‘climate’, usually measured through 
individuals’ perceptions of their organizations’ policies and practices.’
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Consequently, one could argue, a high or low authoritarian disposition makes up an 
individual’s characteristics and the management style is part of the environment within 
which they act. If employees’ perception of the organisational environment is so 
central to their behaviour, then it seems logical to conclude that management 
behaviour, and employees’ perception of it, will feature significantly in any assessment 
of climate.
The impact of an organisation’s climate on employees’ cognitions and behaviours has 
been recognised for some time; climate has been referred to as a ‘character’ by Evan 
(1968), as a ‘personality’ by Steers (1979), and as a ‘psychological atmosphere’ by 
Pritchard and Karasick (1973). According to Ashforth (1985: 837), an organisation’s 
climate:
'.... has been viewed as a function of: (a) the organization’s structure; (b) 
the organization’s membership; and (c) more recently the memberships’ 
efforts to understand the organization.’
So, it would appear, the climate includes the type of organisation in terms of its 
structure, which might include aspects such as organic versus mechanistic and the 
contingent hierarchical construction, formal versus informal in terms of the delineation 
of work roles. Equally the climate may relate to the type of individuals within the 
organisation, employees and different levels of managers, and the way in which they 
interact from time to time. However, from the different definitions of an organisational 
climate which have been presented by numerous observers over time, it would appear 
it is rather more than this. In addition, as Hellriegel and Slocum (1974: 277) have 
observed:
‘.... on a conceptual level, the organizational climate construct has relatively 
well-defined boundaries and suggests considerable potential for describing 
and understanding behaviour of individuals within organizations, the 
movement from the conceptual to measurement level has posed a number 
of problems and ambiguities....’
Thus, simple definition of organisational climate may be easier to construct than it is to 
accurately measure, although it should be noted that Patterson et al (2005) appear to
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have developed a sound organisational climate measure, with seventeen climate 
dimensions, which generated good predictive, concurrent and discriminant validity 
scores.
The earliest definition of organisational climate, according to Ashforth (1985), is 
possibly that of Forehand and Gilmer (1964: 362), who describe it as:
set of characteristics that describe an organization and that (a) 
distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are relatively 
enduring over time, and (c) influence the behaviour of people in the 
organization’.
However, whilst appearing viable, this definition has attracted criticism for being overly 
simplistic and not recognising the way in which the climate of an organisation is 
interpreted by organisational members and the way in which it influences their 
attitudes, behaviours and motivation (Tagiuri and Litwin, 1968). This implies that 
different people may perceive the climate differently, suggesting it is subjective rather 
than objective. Consequently Tagiuri and Litwin (1968: 27) propose a [slightly] more 
detailed definition:
‘Organizational climate is a relatively enduring quality of the internal 
environment of an organization that (a) is experienced by its members, (b) 
influences their behaviour, and (c) can be described in terms of the values 
of the particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of the organization.’
Whilst this definition of organisational climate goes beyond that of Forehand and 
Gilmer (1964) a little, it is to some extent still ague and open to interpretation. Indeed, 
if the two definitions are juxtaposed they contain rather similar elements; enduring 
characteristics/environments that influence individual behaviour. What is not clear is 
how enduring the characteristics or environment needs to be to be accorded climate 
status. Similarly, the extent to which the behaviour of members is influenced is not 
specified. A perhaps more useful definition is that of Campbell et al (1970: 27), which 
is a little more detailed:
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. a particular set of attributes specific to a particular organization that may 
be induced from the way that the organization deals with its members and 
its environment. For the individual member within the organization, climate 
takes the form of a set of attributes and experiences which describe the 
organization in terms of both static characteristics (such as the degree of 
autonomy) and behaviour -  outcome contingencies.’
This definition not only considers individual behaviour, but also specifically includes 
the way in which the organisation behaves towards its members, as well as the way 
that individuals are influenced by the organisational climate itself, implying a dynamic 
rather than static climate, which is subject to change over time. Indeed, Woodman and 
King (1978: 818) acknowledge that the climate of the organisation changes over time, 
‘yet there is an air of permanence or at least some continuity over time’. This is of 
particular importance for the psychological contract, as the treatment received by an 
individual may guide them in the construction and any subsequent re-evaluation or 
reconstruction of their own psychological contract with their organisation or people 
within it, such as peers, managers and supervisors.
Furthermore, as Ashforth (1985) notes, the climate is not the exclusive property of the 
organisation, but rather jointly owned by the organisation and the individuals within it. 
There is some variance of opinion on this, Woodman and King (1978: 818) for 
example, identify the somewhat paradoxical situation regarding organisational climate 
by suggesting:
‘Phenomenologically, climate is external to the individual, yet cognitively the 
climate is internal to the extent that it is affected by individual perceptions.’
The climate of an organisation may be regarded as distinctive and that it might act as 
a stimulus for individual and group behaviour. Woodman and King (1978: 818) note 
the ‘reality-based’ nature of the climate and the way it might be shared by 
organisational members, although they also note this ‘may be constrained by 
individual differences in perception’.
An additional climate dimension is introduced by Schneider and Reichers (1983: 21), 
who suggest that it may not be wholly appropriate to refer to climate in singular terms;
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as climate is very much a personal perception of reality, there may be multiple 
climates in coexistence, they argue that:
psychological climates are the meanings an individual attaches to a 
work context, while organizational climates are the summated, averaged 
meanings that people attach to a particular feature of the setting.’
Schneider and Reichers (1983: 21) go on to note that climate is not a uni-dimensional 
phenomenon, that it is a combination of elements, some contextual, some 
organisational. They suggest that:
'.... people attach meaning to, or make sense of clusters of psychologically
*
related events. People in organizations encounter thousands of events, 
practices, and procedures and they perceive these events in related sets.
What this implies is that work settings have numerous climates and these 
climates are for something. So, for example, a work setting may have a 
climate for service (Schneider, Parkington & Buxton, 1980), a climate for 
safety (Zohar, 1980) and/or a climate for achievement (Litwin and Stringer, 
1968).’
This view is reinforced by the earlier work of Powell and Butterfield (1978: 153-154), 
who concur regarding the multi-faceted approach to climate construction, and observe 
that:
‘An organization is considered to have subsystem climates whenever at 
least one group (subsystem) of employees has different perceptions of the 
organizations climate than those of employees outside the subsystem.’
Consequently, it appears that as individuals attempt to make sense of what is going on 
around them in the organisation, the impact of climate and culture may stimulate 
certain interpretation or perceptions of reality and this will influence the way an 
individual’s psychological contract is formed. It is highly likely that employees might 
perceive mixed messages; one manager may prize customer service and implement 
policies and practices to achieve service quality, whilst another manager might be 
more concerned with safety maintenance or the financial performance of the
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organisation. Likewise, as Payne and Mansfield (1973) and Powell and Butterfield 
(1978) observe, there may be differences in the climate perceptions of managers and 
non-managers, over say the manner and extent to which managers exercise authority. 
In such a case each could be described as a subsystem climate. This observation is 
taken up by Patterson, Warr and West (2004), who offer two potential explanations. 
First, managers might have more wide-ranging information and evidence upon which 
to base their perceptions of the climate, whereas, in contrast, non-managers might 
take a more parochial perspective which is limited to their own areas of work and 
immediate environment. Secondly, managers have a direct impact on the climate of 
the organisation and its performance. As a consequence, their perceptions may be 
more closely aligned to output variables.
In terms of the relationship between organisational climate and authority, there have 
been a number of contributions. Pheysey, Payne and Pugh (1971) and Hollander 
(1971) view the organisational climate as being derived from the degree of centralised 
control that is imposed by senior executives. The use of the term imposed, itself 
suggests the use of overt authority and dominance. Indeed, Shankar, Ansari and 
Stringer (1994) suggest that:
‘.... managers in an authoritarian climate are status and power oriented, 
demanding blind obedience and personal loyalty from their subordinates.’
Drawing on the ‘structuralist’ work of Payne and Pugh (1976), which encapsulates the 
impact of the objective aspects of the work environment, such as size, 
hierarchical/authority structure, on organisational climate, Schneider and Reichers 
(1983: 25) comment that:
‘.... the organizational setting influences people’s attitudes, values, and 
perceptions of organizational events. Climates arise, then, from objective 
aspects of the work context, such as the organization’s size, the centrality 
or decentrality of decision making authority, the number of levels in the 
authority hierarchy....’
This establishes the relevance of perceptions of authority structures, such as 
hierarchy, and authority processes, centralised or decentralised control, in the
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organisational climate. Any ambiguity might impede the employees’ sense-making
processes and lead to differences in perceptions of the climate and a lack of
consensus; thus confirming the multiple climate views discussed above.
«
The way in which management behaves in an organisation, either collectively or 
individually, may be one contributory factor in the creation of an organisational climate; 
whether the management style is democratic, consensual, autocratic, or domineering, 
may be part of the organisational climate fabric. However, the overarching style may. 
not result in a single climate, for example, as Bendix (1961) notes, although superiors 
may exercise absolute arbitrary power over subordinates, it may not necessarily result 
in a tyrannical climate, it can equally take on the trappings of benevolence and 
paternalism. This is exemplified by Fox’s (1975) seminal work on the ‘unitary’ frame of 
reference, which espouses ideological convergence between the organisation and 
workers, in which there is an acknowledgement that management may resort to 
authority on the one hand and paternalism on the other to achieve their objectives.
A relatively new dimension in the climate of an organisation is the emotion of fear; 
Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003), drawing on the earlier climate research of Reichers 
and Schneider (1990), conclude that if organisational climate is derived from a shared 
perception by its members, then this principle should hold true when it comes to 
emotion, that the perception or experience of fear should also be shared. Ashkanasy 
and Nicholson (2003:24) argue that: ‘if an emotional climate is to exist, it requires a 
shared perception of the emotion in question’; Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003:24) 
define fear in broad terms as ‘experience of apprehension in the workplace’, which is 
‘determined in part by management practices’ Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003:27). In 
their data collection, Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003) addressed issues such as fear 
of making mistakes, anxiety inn the workplace, unpredictable repercussions, and hard 
responses by management for mistakes made.
It has also been argued that fear may constitute a weapon in the management 
arsenal; Hyman and Streeck (1988) argue that:
‘Companies rely on the fear of the workers that if they don’t adapt and 
exhibit flexible attitudes and abilities of their own innovation then they are 
ripe for selection for redundancy.’
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Consequently, it is probable that a relationship exists between organisational climate, 
in terms of the way in which authority is exercised in organisations, and the emotional 
outcome of those subjected to authority and authoritarian behaviour; these in turn may 
have some impact on the psychological contract of individuals in terms of reality 
versus expectations and whether there is a healthy quid pro quo perception.
2.9 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has reviewed the literature on authority, power, authoritarianism and 
organisational climate. The climate of an organisation varies from organisation to 
organisation and may be determined by the size, the technological nature of the job, 
the type of workers employed, and the technology employed for employee control 
purposes. The way that management behaves clearly impacts on organisational 
climate, some organisations adopt more authoritarian practices than others, using 
overt power to tightly control employees.
The chapter opened with a conceptual discussion of authority followed by the locus of 
authority in organisations and the authority-power interaction. The literature suggests 
a discreet but interdependent relationship between authority and power, the former 
being the ability to issue directives and the latter the ability to impose sanctions for 
non-compliance. Authority can be regarded as being either top-down (Formal Theory) 
or bottom-up (Acceptance Theory). Power can be related to the organisational 
structure and/or hierarchy, or related to the personal characteristics on the superior. 
Power can be perceived as legitimate, where the use of power by superiors in the 
relationship matches the expectations of subordinates. Alternatively, power can be 
regarded as legitimate at the macro level, yet illegitimate, where it is perceived to be 
excessive, through which the superior is seen as abusing the subordinates by, for 
example, exploiting the balance of power weighted in the superior’s favour. Such 
abuse of authority and power may create an attitude of discontent, a perception of 
unfairness, feelings of tyranny, and emotions of worry, anxiety and fear among 
subordinates and, as a consequence, impact negatively on their emotional attachment 
with the organisation.
If one accepts that different individuals display different preferences for authority, high 
or low authoritarianism as suggested by Schuler (1976), then it seems reasonable to 
conclude that there will be a relationship between the way in which authority is
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exercised and, more importantly, how it is perceived by subordinates. Those 
displaying high-authoritarianism preferences and seeking a highly regulated 
relationship are likely to exhibit different attitudes and behaviours to those who display 
low-authoritarianism, with expectations of low regulations and weak control 
mechanisms, yet encounter a harsh, highly authoritarian management regime.
The chapter also identified the potential relationship between authoritarian 
management and satisfaction with pay, that authoritarian management may be 
bought-out or traded-off with ‘good’ pay. The discussion of pay satisfaction in relation 
to authoritarian management identified a gap in the literature. There can be little doubt 
that the way in which management behaves will impact on the emotional attachment 
the employee builds with the organisation, their ‘psychological’.contract.
As far as the relationship between authority relations and the psychological contract is 
concerned, according to Golembiewski (2000), cited by Pines (2002:12), historically 
four types of psychological contract can be identified, the first two with explicit links to 
authority relations in the workplace, the last two related to competence and 
employability. The first type, with a clear link to authority, is ‘the Obey or Unbridled 
Authority Contract’, which can be traced back to the oppressive/suppressive 
nineteenth century employers, whose approach to the employment relationship could 
be placed on a continuum -  authoritarian at one end paternalistic at the other 
(Farnham and Pimlott, 1995); the second type is the ‘Benevolent Autocracy -  Loyalty 
Contact’ which was characteristic of the early twentieth century where continuity of 
employment was given in return for sufficient loyalty; the third type is the longer-term 
‘Continuous Employment given Competence Contract’, which seems to have emerged 
during the 1960s; the fourth and final type is the recently emerging ‘Continuous 
Employability Contract’, under which continuous adaptation and change is necessary 
to cope with the changing business environment. Although some of these types 
appear somewhat dated, this does not necessarily mean they are no longer applied in 
practice or relevant to contemporary organisational behaviour.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on managerial authority, power, 
authoritarianism and' organisational climate. The chapter addressed the nature of 
authority and the ways in which it can be exercised; it looked at the use of power as a 
means of asserting authority. The chapter explored the degree to which individuals 
exhibit authoritarian tendencies, to control others or to be controlled themselves, based 
upon their own authoritarian personality. The chapter concluded with an exploration of 
organizational climate and the way this might influence individual assumption, 
expectations and behaviours in the employment relationship.
This chapter builds on the preceding chapter by reviewing and critiquing the literature 
surrounding the psychological contract, which differs from other types of contracts, 
whether legal, or economic, whether explicit, or implied; it is characterised by 
imprecision, ambiguity and shrouded in uncertainty. There is uncertainty as to the 
identity of the parties to the contract and where the contract resides; some argue the 
psychological contract is one-way, simply constructed in the mind of the individual, 
other argue it is two-way, that both the individual and the organisation have 
psychological contracts with each other.
Individuals make assumptions about what life in the organisation will be like; they build 
expectations about their contributions to the organisation and what they should receive 
in return; they construct notions of reciprocity and mutual obligation, of fairness and 
equity! However, as organisations change over time so do the expectations of the 
people within them. These changes may be influenced by changes in the external 
environment or within the organisational context. Previously-held assumptions about 
the organisation may prove false or unfounded; expectations of organisational life may
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likewise prove unrealistic and go unmet, the previously healthy employment 
relationship, and the psychological contract that underpins it becomes soured.
The chapter explores the nature of the psychological contract and the fabric from which 
it is constructed, it investigates the way in which the contract is constructed and the 
way in which it develops and evolves over time. There is an assessment of the way 
that the psychological contract can be divided into various categories as a means of 
distinguishing between the different types, long-term or short-term, relational or 
transactional. The chapter evaluates the dynamic and changing nature of the 
psychological contract and what happens when, as a result of changes, there are 
perceptions of breach and/or violation.
3.2 The Essence of a Psychological Contract
The essence of the psychological contract is shrouded in uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The fabric of the contract is extremely delicate and easily damaged. The very term 
contract implies a clear agreement between the parties over certain aspects of the 
relationship, yet the ‘psychological’ contract, by its very nature, is far from clear. As 
Riley (1991: 38) observes:
‘Like anything which is imprecise, it is open to misinterpretation and is, as 
any agreement, potentially unstable. What keeps a psychological contract 
stable is the mutuality of the assumptions that lie behind it. If the amount of 
effort expected by the interviewer is the same as anticipated by the 
interviewee, then that part of the relationship is stable. If they aren’t the 
same, it is potentially unstable.’
Riley (1991: 40) goes on to note:
‘.... the notion of a labour contract tells us there is a relationship is based on 
unspoken assumptions, much of what is so important is actually secret. The 
nature of these assumptions can only become manifest by being triggered 
by some behavioural event.’
In this observation, Riley (1991) is careful to differentiate the ‘labour contract’ from the 
‘employment contract’, the former equating to the psychological contract and the later to
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the legal/economic ‘contract of employment’. It is probable that some assumptions may 
be shared by an individual and their manager, but equally, as Riley (1991) suggests, 
some may not be mutual and conflict may be the product of erroneous assumptions that 
are subsequently found to be incorrect. Consequently Riley (1991) draws attention to 
the effort-reward bargain and suggests trade-offs in terms of how much effort the 
employee will expend in return for a certain reward, which implies the role of equity 
theory (Adams, 1965).
As employees, and managers for that matter, often have incomplete information, each 
party to the contract, of necessity, makes a number of assumptions, often 
subconsciously, about the organisation and the people within it - the role they play, the 
way in which each will behave towards the other, and about conditions of work 
(Golembiewski, 2000).
From the management perspective, the appropriateness of the assumptions a 
manager makes about the people he or she interacts with impact of his or her in role 
effectiveness. As Schein (1978: 47) observes:
‘Every manager makes assumptions about people. Whether he is aware of 
these assumptions or not, they operate as a theory in terms of which he 
decides how to deal with his superiors, peers, and subordinates. His 
effectiveness as a manager will depend on the degree to which his 
assumptions fit empirical reality.’
Furthermore, Schein (1978:47) also goes on to note, assumptions not only influence 
the manager’s effectiveness, but philosophical assumptions have traditionally 
‘traditionally served as the justification for the organizational and political system of the 
time’.
Employees too may make assumptions about their organisation from the 
characteristics they exhibit, such as organisational size and structure; the size of an 
organisation is very visible and may form the basis for assumptions about the hierarchy 
and culture. Large organisations may be perceived to be bureaucratic with many levels 
of management, as suggested by Turban and Keon (1993). In their study of the impact
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of perceptions of organisational size on organisational choice, Greenhaus, Sugalski 
and Crispin, (1978: 122) found that:
experience in small organizations enhances the view that certain of the 
intrinsic outcomes are more likely to be provided in small organizations.’
This suggests that specific experience in a certain type of organisation (small) form the 
basis of generalised assumptions, that all small organisations will provide similar 
outcomes. According to Greenhaus, Sugalski and Crispin, (1978: 124):
‘.... the outcomes most strongly perceived to be available in small 
organizations were the opportunity to participate in the setting of goals, 
independence and responsibility on the job, opportunities to develop 
friendships, and being kept informed about things.’
If, however, the small organisation turns out to be different than it is assumed to be by 
the individual then the mutuality of assumptions set out by Riley (1991) will not be 
achieved.
The individual may assume the culture in a large organisation will be impersonal and 
formalised with the relationship with the head of the organisation mediated through 
supervisors (Jackson, Schuler and Reveiro, 1989). With large organisations, the 
individual may assume they will be ‘a small cog in a big wheel’. Conversely, small 
organisations may be assumed to be more flexible in their approach to organisation, 
less hierarchical in structure and offering more personal relationships with the owner or 
senior management. Evidence suggests that prior experience in certain types of 
organisation forms the basis for future expectations and acts as a guide for job search 
decisions; that small organisations are more likely to provide intrinsic outcomes such 
as participation in decision-making and goal-setting (Greenhaus, Sugalski and Crispin, 
1978), whereas intrinsic involvement are less likely to be found in large organisations 
(Hall, 1976).
Assumptions may also be a product of the technological nature and process of the 
employment; the more technical the job, the more precise the description of it can be 
articulated. As Riley (1991: 39) observes:
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'.... some jobs make for very imprecise labour contracts and other jobs 
attract more precise contracts and the determinant of both is the nature of 
the job itself and how far management can apply formal controls’.
With a job that is ‘technical’ in nature, yet not necessarily complex in design or content, 
the outputs can be specified with a much greater degree of precision than a job that 
utilises little more than labour inputs (Riley, 1991). The expectations of worker on the 
assembly line can be clearly defined in objective terms by the number of assemblies to 
be completed per hour, day, or week and the number of breakages or rejects. In 
contrast, with service workers, such as a supermarket checkout operator, a bar 
attendant or a bank teller, the outputs are less quantifiable and subjective based on 
notions of ‘high’ quality and ‘good’ service. As a consequence the emphasis is more 
likely to be on behavioural inputs such as timekeeping, appearance and norms 
conformity.
In organisations such as call centres, technology is used as a means of controlling 
employee performance in what is essentially a ‘service’ environment, where ‘computer 
systems are used to organize and automate parts of the job’ (Zapf et al, 2003); indeed 
Mahesh and Kasturi (2006) describe call centres as a ‘service factory’. In their 
research into the way in which new technology can be used as a means of managerial 
control, Grimshaw et al (2002) found examples of technology being used to set 
stringent performance targets which were linked to contingent performance-related 
pay. These stringent targets or regulations were a clear source of employee 
dissatisfaction. Similarly, various pieces of research have found that call centre 
employees, or customer service representatives, are often required to follow detailed 
instructions and a scripted dialogue (Deery, Iverson and Walsh, 2002) or a response 
flow diagram (Brannan, 2005) when responding to customer queries.
The extent to which the assumptions made by the parties reflect the subsequent reality
<
they encounter provides the potential for instability in the relationship. Riley (1991: 41) 
provides five statements about how workers and managers relate to each other:
• A relationship exists at a level of unspoken understandings and 
assumptions, as it were, below any consideration of satisfaction or 
manifest behaviour.
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• The true nature of the psychological contract remains secret unless 
triggered by some event which questions an assumption held by either 
partner.
• The two dimensions of the contract can be traded off.
• Stability may sometimes be achieved by illicit means amounting to 
collusion.
• The scope for these assumptions is determined by the nature of the 
job.
From this it would appear the key aspects of the psychological contract are that it 
is centred upon a relationship whereby much is left to subjective interpretation, 
based upon the assumptions made by each party. The contract may be latent 
until a consciousness of it is triggered by one or more assumptions proving ill- 
founded or erroneous. The parties may be able to compensate for shortcomings 
in the assumed relationship by engaging in some form of trade-off; one party 
may choose to overlook the behaviour of the other as a means of obtaining 
cooperation in another area.
3.3 Defining the Psychological Contract
Most attempts at defining of the psychological contract focus on exchange, 
expectations and reciprocity. However, numerous difficulties are encountered when 
seeking a clear, precise and universally accepted definition. Levinson, for example, 
(1972: 291) highlights the interdependent relationship between workers and managers 
and describes the psychological contract as ‘.... a set of mutual obligations and 
expectations between employees and organization that arises out of the needs of 
both’. Drawing on the work of Levinson (1963), Schein (1965: 44) suggests the 
relationship is founded on the assumptions and expectations held by individuals of the 
organisation, as employees:
'.... make assumptions about the nature of organizations and expect 
organisations to behave in certain ways toward them. Therefore, the actual 
interaction between the employee and the organization can best be thought 
of as working out of a psychological contract through what H. Levinson has 
called the process of reciprocation.’
6 6
In a later work Schein (1978:112) is rather more specific in terms of the content of the 
psychological contract and suggests it is a construct which:
. defines what the employee will give in the way of effort and contribution 
in exchange for challenging or rewarding work, acceptable working 
conditions, organizational rewards in the form of pay and benefits, and an 
organizational future in the form of a promise of promotion or other forms of 
career advancement.’
However, the notion of reciprocity adopted by Schein (1978), whilst being conveniently 
simplistic, is a little misleading; the reality of reciprocity is considerably more complex, 
as many of the dimensions included are open to subjective interpretation by each 
individual. For example, the quality and quantity of ‘effort and contribution’ is likely to 
be viewed differently by each individual employee and by different managers and, as 
Braverman (1974) suggests, in the employment relationship it is ‘labour power’ rather 
than an exact amount of labour that is exchanged. Likewise, what constitutes 
‘challenging work’ depends on the inherent or accumulated ability of the individual and 
whether the challenge is mental or physical is not defined; what are ‘acceptable 
working conditions’ will undoubtedly vary from individual to individual as acceptability is 
subjective and may change according to the situational context. Likewise the 
appropriateness and acceptability of ‘organisational rewards’ will vary according to the 
perceptions of each individual and, to some extent, be determined by their motivational 
efficacy and the extent to which they deliver individual satisfaction. Furthermore, 
Schein’s (1978) definition clearly implies reciprocity between the parties. However, as 
noted earlier, that reciprocity is founded on the perception of fairness and equity, 
concepts themselves derived from individual perceptions, themselves dependent upon 
a multiplicity of factors, including experience in the current or previous employment, or 
by observing how other are treated within or outside the organisation. Thus, 
Organisational Justice Perceptions (Greenberg, 1990) and Equity Theory (Adams, 
1963) are relevant contributors to our conceptual understanding of psychological 
contracts. The individuality of psychological contracts is borne out by Rousseau 
(2001a) who argues that contracts are constructed over time and will vary according to 
the reliability and consistency of the information sources drawn upon. Thus individuals 
may make judgements based upon partial or inaccurate information.
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For Schein (1978) the contract is ‘psychological’ insofar that it is a set of implicit, 
unwritten understandings. It should be noted, however, that whilst Schein uses the 
terms ‘psychological’ and ‘implicit’ conjointly and without differentiation, Rousseau 
(1989: 123), on the other hand, draws a clear distinction between the two, first defining 
the psychological contract by arguing that:
The term psychological contract refers to an individual’s beliefs regarding 
the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that 
focal person and another party.’
Whereas, in contrast, according to Rousseau (1989: 124), an implied contract is:
‘....a  mutual obligation existing at the level of the relationship (e.g., dyadic, 
interorganizational). Unlike psychological contracts, which are subjective 
perceptions held by individual parties to a relationship, implied contracts 
are patterns of obligations arising from interactions between parties (e.g. 
individuals and organizations).’
However, given that psychological contracts exist between individuals and their 
organisation within the organisational setting, the ‘mutual obligation’ could be more 
appropriately termed intra-organisational. Whilst Rousseau’s (1989) definition of the’ 
implied’ contract may be considered technically inaccurate, she does set out to 
distinguish the psychological from the implied.
According to Rousseau (1989: 124), a psychological contract emerges when ‘an 
individual perceives that contributions he or she makes obligate the organization to 
reciprocity (or vice versa)’. In a later work Rousseau (1995: 9) has defined the 
psychological contract as a set of ‘individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, 
regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their organization’ 
and, more recently still (Rousseau, 1998a: 665), that:
‘....by definition a psychological contract is the perception of an exchange 
agreement between oneself and another party’.
6 8
Furthermore, as Wright, Larwood and Doherty (1996: 216) note, ‘the psychological 
contract represents how people in the organization understand the way that things 
ought to be’. Likewise, Rousseau and Tijoriwala (1998: 680) argue that psychological 
contracts ‘originate when individuals infer promises that give rise to beliefs in the 
existence of reciprocal obligations’, inferring promises is perhaps necessary for, as 
Hiltrop (1996, 36) notes:
it is virtually impossible to spell out all the details at the time a contract 
is created. People fill in the blanks along the way, and sometimes they do 
so inconsistently’.
However, if individuals ‘infer’ promises, on the basis of certain assumptions, then the 
subjective and idiosyncratic nature of the process requires further examination, as do 
the factors used by individuals in the construction of their psychological contracts. 
Indeed, the concept of individual psychological contracting is considered in some detail 
in subsequent work by Rousseau (2001b), in which she differentiates the related but 
distinct nature of the ‘idiosyncratic deal’ from the psychological contract. The 
idiosyncratic deal, according to Rousseau (2001b: 261):
‘.... refers to those features of employment that the individual worker 
receives that differ from what workers in similar roles receive.’
Thus, it would appear, it is the [real] difference in treatment rather than perceived 
differences that separate the two, which raises the issue of whether this relates to the 
psychological contract. However, as Rousseau (2001b: 262) goes on to observe:
‘Over time, such arrangements can lead to widely divergent psychological 
contracts among workers in a firm. Unless idiosyncratic deals are managed 
properly, their proliferation can undermine trust and cooperation at work.’
This implies that perceptions of inequitable treatment arising from these idiosyncratic 
deals may lead to perceptions of psychological contract breach.
In her assessment of the perceptions of newly recruited employees, Rousseau (1990a: 
398) states that ‘all expectations are not obligations’ and that whilst the employee may
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be disappointed about unmet expectations, they may not perceive a broken promise. 
Robinson (1996) is rather more precise than Rousseau (1990a) about what constitutes 
a psychological contract and, in doing so, differentiates between the perceived 
promises or obligations of the psychological contract and the more general 
expectations that might exist. According to Robinson (1996: 575), psychological 
contracts:
‘.... entail beliefs about what employees believe they are entitled to receive, 
because they perceive that their employer conveyed promises to provide 
those things’.
Whereas, according to Robinson (1996: 575), expectations:
‘.... are general beliefs held by employees about what they will find in their 
job and the organization’.
However, if the views of other authors (Hiltrop, 1996; Wright, Larwood and Doherty, 
1996; Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998) that the psychological contract is based upon 
perception and inference are robust, then Robinson’s delineation of expectations and 
promises, is not so easily achieved in practice, indeed, as Levinson et al (1962: 20), in 
their discussion of the expectations of gas workers in Midland Utilities, observe:
‘As people expressed their expectations, or even where expectations were 
tacit, it was as if the company or other people were duty-bound to fulfil 
them’.
It would appear, that obligations from the organisation to the employee are as 
determined or inferred by the individual, implying that it is a combination of the 
assumptions, beliefs and expectations and perceived promises in the mind of the
individual that form the psychological contract.
\
3.4 The Conceptual Basis for the Psychological Contract
Before embarking upon a review of recent and contemporary conceptualisations of the 
psychological contract, it is worth considering the potential value of psychological 
contract modelling. As noted earlier, a number of observers have identified the role
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assumptions play in the employment relationship; Rousseau (1995: 49) for example, 
notes that:
‘Fundamental assumptions are the often unconscious beliefs that members 
share about their organization and its relationship to them. Like the lens of 
your eye, you can’t see fundamental assumptions, yet they affect 
everything you see.’
If, as has been suggested (Riley, 1991; Rousseau, 1995), assumptions do form the 
basis for a psychological contract and that each individual makes different assumptions 
about their relationship with the organisation, then psychological contract models 
appear to require observers to make assumptions about the assumptions individuals 
might make from time to time. It could be argued, therefore, that psychological contract 
models are of limited use in enhancing our understanding of the psychological contract 
concept. Yet, despite this, numerous psychological contract models have been 
formulated.
A number of models of the psychological contract follow the input-output format; for 
example, Levinson et al’s (1962) model is based upon inputs and outcomes (Figure 
3.1). According to Meckler, Drake and Levinson (2003), Levinson et al’s (1962) model 
shows:
‘....what motivates a person is that which makes one feel good about one’s 
self, and this often cannot be fully achieved via economic rewards.’
Although this is not overtly shown in the model itself. Meckler, Drake and Levinson 
(2003) go on to note that:
‘....in essence, people are naturally motivated to fulfil their psychological 
needs. The firm, in exchange for giving people the opportunity and tools to 
fulfil these needs, reserves the right to channel the resulting energy of 
employees into productive work that benefits the firm.’
Levinson et al’s (1962) model is based upon a congruence of expectations between the 
individual and the company. Thus, the psychological contract is formed from the
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mutuality of expectations. Levinson et al (1962) identified three categories of concern to 
employees; dependence, distance and change.
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Dependence is concerned with the degree of dependence (support) or independence 
(freedom) the individual seeks from the organisation. Where there was denial of 
dependence, this tended to lead to greater independence. Overdependence, on the 
other hand, might be regarded as a form of exploitation through which the individual 
demanded more support than might be reasonably justified. Legitimacy represents the 
mutually acceptable level of dependence. Interestingly, as Meckler, Drake and 
Levinson (2003: 222) note:
The role of authority figures was repeatedly cited by Levinson et al. (1962) 
as central to employees adequately working out their dependency needs.’
For example, Levinson et al (1962: 55) make specific reference to authority and the 
fulfilment of the psychological contract by stating that:
‘Interdependence with the organization requires and implies relationships 
with people. The interpretation of the contract is the function of people in 
authority who act on behalf of the organization. It is they that give life to the 
words of the formal contract and meaning to the organizational structure.
They mediate the dependence of the people on the company and vice 
versa. They are the agents of interdependence.’
As noted by Guest (1998) the role of agents or, as Levinson et al (1962:55) put it, 
‘people in authority’, is particularly relevant to the formation and development of the 
psychological contract, as a means of overcoming the ability or inability of 
organisations to ‘perceive’, as argued by observers such as Rousseau (1989). In 
response to Rousseau, Guest (1998: 675) is clear about the value of the agent in the 
psychological contract:
‘It should be possible to overcome this concern by careful use of language 
to specify the ‘agents’ and by further research on who is deemed to act as 
an agent of the organization in shaping the psychological contract.’
This issue is discussed further later in this chapter in relation to the development 
of a psychological contract.
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The Distance component relates to the amount of affection, privacy and control 
concerning relationships with other people in the organisation. The change component 
is about the concern of employees about organisational change and their ability to 
maintain their efficacy and status.
The reciprocation component refers to, as Meckler, Drake and Levinson (2003: 223), 
put it:
'.... the process of working through a series of unfolding psychological 
contracts in efforts to meet the expectations and concerns of the parties. It 
is not just a single episode.’
This demonstrates the dynamic nature of the psychological contract as an evolving 
phenomenon. In assessing the way in which reciprocity might be achieved, Levinson 
et al (1962: 129) provide the following set of conditions or opportunities:
• To plan at least some part of one’s work life; an area of freedom to 
function;
• To model one’s self on authority figures in the company;
• To act on the organization, to shape it to some extent to one’s own 
values;
• To experience one’s self and the organization as confronting stress 
together;
• To obtain the gratification of psychological needs for dependence and 
support;
• To be controlled, or to have personal controls enhanced by the demands 
of the company;
• To have the feeling of a fair-share partnership with the company;
• To be stimulated, which includes the experience of growth and change.
These ‘opportunities’ for reciprocation imply, in some instances, an explicit give-and- 
take relationship between the organisation and the employee; although elsewhere 
there it can be inferred that subordinates should submit to the authority of superiors, 
the ‘authority figures’, and the organisation. As Meckler, Drake and Levinson (2003) 
observe, Levinson et al’s (1962) set of conditions for psychological success is similar
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to that of Argyris (1964). According to Levinson et al (1962), successful reciprocation 
should produce positive, ‘mentally healthy’ outcomes, from which one might infer a 
‘positive’ psychological contract, in the form of the five behavioural characteristics to 
the far right of the model. Overall there is an impression of ideological coherence and 
convergence which may not necessarily be so easily achieved in practice as Levinson 
et al (1962) imply.
Another of the early models of the psychological contract was that presented by 
Portwood and Miller (1976), which draws heavily upon Levinsion et al’s (1962) work 
and addresses the issue of individuals’ expectations compared with the existing or 
experienced conditions (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Psychological contract model
Perceived degree of 
reciprocation in the 
psychological 
contract
Individual
expectations
Organization
expectations
Individual’s
needs
Job reality
Individual’s 
attitudes toward 
work
Relevant 
knowledge and 
experience
Diversity in need 
gratification
Ability to accept 
current role 
(commitment
Level of
productivity
(performance)
Degree of 
interpersonal 
competence 
(compatibility)
Source: Portwood and Miller, 1976: 110
In contrast to more recent observers (De Vos, Buyens and Schalk, 2003), Portwood 
and Miller (1976: 109) suggest the psychological contract is: ‘an implicit agreement, 
negotiated between the employee and the employing firm (usually at the employee’s 
time of entry)’. They go on to note the impact of Equity Theory (Adams, 1965) on any 
mismatch between expectation and experienced reality by suggesting that perceived
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inequity is overcome either by renegotiating the contract or adjusting their behaviour, 
such as purposely reducing their effort or commitment, to reduce the inequity and, in 
doing so restoring what they perceive to be the status quo.
More recently, Guest and Conway (1997) present a conceptual model for the 
psychological contract (Figure 3.3), in which they divide the psychological contract into 
three discrete areas: the causes, content and consequences.
Figure 3.3: A model of the psychological contract
Causes Content Consequences
The delivery of 
the deal
Fairness
Trust
Involvement climate 
Organisational climate 
HR Practices 
Experience 
Expectations 
Alternatives
Attitudinal consequences
Organisational commitment 
Job satisfaction 
Employee relations 
Security
Behavioural consequences
Motivation 
Effort 
Attendance/absence 
Organisational citizenship 
Intention to stay/quit
Source: Guest and Conway, 1997: 6
However, whilst the model is straightforward in construction, it appears to contain two 
weaknesses. The first weakness lies in the linear, left-to-right, nature of the model 
suggests a static, rather than dynamic approach and, as such, appears to provide little 
or no scope for the evolving nature of the psychological contract, through, for example 
the early socialisation process, as highlighted by Ashforth and Saks (1996), Thomas 
and Anderson (1998), and De Vos, Buyens and Schalk, 2003), or later in the 
relationship in relation to some form of organisational change, as Meckler, Drake and 
Levinson (2003: 227) note.
‘Another fundamental component of the psychological contract is the 
management of change. All of us become attached to people, places, 
things, ideas, aspirations, roles activities, functions, and even dreams. We 
may detach ourselves from many of these attachments as we grow and
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develop and acquire new attachments. But when we are ripped away from 
those attachments, we experience that loss, as exemplified by the firing of 
a colleague or a move to a different office space.’
The second weakness is the way in which the model almost exclusively focuses on the 
organisational context, with very little linkage to the external environment, other than 
the issue of alternative employment which relates to the external labour market; the 
external economic and social influences are largely ignored.
As far as the causes are concerned, Guest and Conway (1997: 7) divide the 
organisational climate into two aspects, the involvement climate and the rules climate. 
The former includes ‘involvement, communication and flexibility’, the latter on ‘the 
bureaucratic adherence to rules and procedures’, thus bringing authority into the 
psychological contract. Curiously, Guest and Conway’s (1997: 8) results indicate that 
the size of the firm might be a factor in organisational climate perceptions they observe 
that:
‘.... an involvement climate is less likely to be found in smaller 
organisations and is less likely to be reported by trade union members and 
therefore in organisations where a trade union exists.’
This supports the views of Turban and Keon (1993. Guest and Conway (1997: 8) go 
on to note that:
‘Rules-oriented climates are more likely to be reported by those working in 
the public sector rather than the private sector and by those in service jobs.’
Guest and Conway’s (1997) findings suggest a greater tendency towards adherence 
to rules than opportunities for involvement. The causes component includes human 
resource management policies and practices in areas such as training and 
development, grievance handling, redundancies, job enrichment/involvement and 
contingent pay (PRP and profit sharing). Also included in the causes are employment 
experiences (job stability, security, and redundancy), expectations (job security) and 
alternatives (the ability and ease of finding alternative employment), which make 
some reference to the state of the external labour market. Interestingly, in this section
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there is no consideration of management style or management’s behaviour and the 
impact this might have on the psychological contract; as managers tend to come and 
go the ‘new broom’ effect of a new manager might lead to perceptions of unmet 
expectations and inequity.
The content section includes fairness, trust and, what Guest and Conway (1997) refer 
to as ‘the delivery of the deal’. This includes perceptions of fairness in terms of 
treatment of individual by the employer and of individual and general fairness in terms 
of performance and reward, using three measures. Trust is assessed along two 
dimensions, the organisation and management. Delivery of the deal concerns the 
extent to which the organisation has kept its promises on the basis of a single 
measure.
The consequences, or outcomes, section is subdivided into attitudinal and 
behavioural: Under the attitudinal heading, job satisfaction, measured by a single 
item, but takes no account of the various facets (Spector, 1997) such as satisfaction 
with pay or supervision, the latter being particularly relevant to this research. 
Organisational commitment is measured by two items, but there is no attempt to 
distinguish the type of commitment, along the lines of Meyer and Allen (1991) for 
example. Job security, current and future, is measured by four items. Employment 
relations are measured by two items. Under the behavioural heading, motivation is 
measured by two items and effort by four. Attendance/absence is measured by a 
single item. Organisational citizenship is measured by two items and intention to 
stay/quit is measured by a single item. In general the measures in the research are 
high-level and, one could argue, lacking in sophistication.
In more recent work, which looks specifically at flexible employment contracts, Guest 
(2004) presents a different psychological contract model (Figure 3.4), but one which is 
derived from that of Guest and Conway (1997) presented in Figure 3.3 above.
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Figure 3.4: Employment contracts, the state of the psychological contract
and employee outcomes
Individual
factors
Contract-related
factors
Organisational
factors
Wider contextual 
factors
Psychological
Contract
State of 
Psychological 
Contract
►
Attitudes
Behaviour
Direct effect
Indirect effect
Source: Guest, 2004: 6
This model identifies four contributory factors that directly impact on the state of the 
psychological contract and indirectly impact on attitudinal and behavioural 
psychological contract outcomes. These factors are; individual, contract-related, 
organisational, and the wider context. A similar approach is adopted by Conway and 
Briner (2005: 48), who acknowledge the potential impact of external factors in shaping 
employees’ psychological contract expectations, by observing that ‘it also seems 
plausible that things that happen outside the organization may help to shape and form 
these expectations in several ways.’
In contrast to that of Guest and Conway (1997), this model provides for an analysis of 
the individual’s characteristics and the nature of the contractual relationship 
(permanent or temporary), combined with organisational factors (climate, culture, and 
norms) and the external environment (labour market conditions and changing social 
values). Thus, the model takes a much broader and arguably realistic perspective. It 
provides a framework for a more detailed analysis of the factors which contribute to
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the creation of a psychological contract, and any subsequent changes which might 
occur, its state, which influence the behavioural and attitudinal outcomes.
However, the model still offers no cyclical dimension in terms of how attitudinal and 
behavioural outputs might impact on the individual [input] factors, such as unmet 
expectations reducing organisational commitment, as suggested by Wanous et al 
(1992), which might affect the propensity to quit; Sturges and Guest (2001) found that 
unmet career progression expectations influenced employees’ intention to quit. It 
could also be the case that a reduction in trust in the organisation, or its 
representatives, might impact on organisational citizenship behaviour. For example, 
Braun (1997: 94) found that:
‘.... respondents who suffered a contract breach were likely to lower their 
contributions to the offending organization because they felt they could no 
longer trust their employers’.
This appears to confirm the model’s weakness and its limitations in providing an 
explanation into the workings of the psychological contract.
3.5 The Formation and Development of a Psychological Contract
The motives for an individual to enter into an exchange relationship, to join an 
organisation, or indeed to continue with it, may be the result of present-time economic 
needs, the necessity for paid employment, or by a longer-term perspective on, say, 
career development (Herriot and Pemberton, 1996). This might not always the case, 
workers in the voluntary or not-for-profit sector, for example, might be motivated by a 
mixture of altruism and self-interest (Clary and Snyder, 1999; Merrill, 2000; Tarling,
2000). They may be motivated by prosocial reasons (Pearce, 1993a) and seek 
satisfaction or intrinsic reward from making a contribution to broader society or, 
indeed, from congruence between personal and organisational values (Judge and 
Bretz, 1992).
The decision to enter into, and continue, a particular employment relationship may 
also be driven by self-perception (Super, 1986) and notions of ‘career’ versus ‘job’, 
which in turn might underpin any individual or organisational expectations that may 
subsequently form. Moreover, it may also be appropriate to reverse the traditional
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view of individuals being an organisation’s collective human resources, towards one 
of individuals adopting a more utilitarian stance by using organisations as career 
resources, through which they enhance their own human asset value by obtaining 
knowledge and expertise for future use, as Inkson, Heising and Rousseau (2001) 
found in their study of interim managers. It is, therefore, possible that relationships 
based purely on economic motives will result in lower psychological engagement 
between the individual and the organisation and a transactional contract will emerge.
A complex, yet illuminating model (Figure 3.5) is offered by Herriot and Pemberton
(1996), which sets out a series of [psychological] relationships between the employee 
and the organisation regarding careers. The model establishes the reconciliation, 
through negotiation, between the wants and offers of the individual and the 
organisation (Relationships 7 and 8), which in turn lead to either a transactional or 
relational psychological contract (Relationships 11 and 12). Where there is a strong 
relational contract, Herriot and Pemberton (1996: 736) hypothesize a relationship 
between procedural equity and the emotional responses that ensue; that where equity 
is perceived there will be mutuality of ‘loyalty, trust and commitment’ leading to a 
stronger relationship (Relationships 25 and 26), whereas perception of inequity will 
lead to ‘anger, grief and mistrust’. More recent research by Conway and Briner (2002) 
also found a significant relationship between negative emotions and broken promises 
and positive emotions where promises had been exceeded.
Interestingly, in contrast to Guest and Conway (1997), Herriot and Pemberton (1996) 
recognise the influence of the business environment on organisation (Relationship 1) 
and the social environment (Relationship 2) on individuals, and the effects these 
might have on the consequent formation of the psychological contract. Similarly, the 
motives for the organisation to engage in a particular type of relationship may be 
equally varied; these may range from a willingness to participate in an open-ended 
relationship that is balanced in terms of commitment and reciprocity, to engagingjn a 
short-term association that ‘enables the company to utilize specialist skills without 
making a long-term commitment’ (Inkson, Heising and Rousseau, 2001: 260).
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3.5.1 The formation of a psychological contract
For Rousseau (2001a: 512) the building blocks of a psychological contract are found in 
the ‘pre-employment experiences, recruiting practices, and early on-the-job 
socialization’. Consequently, the construction of an individual’s psychological contract 
can precede the formal employment relationship, as information relating to the image of 
the organisation may be known to the individual and may act as the stimulus for a job 
application and contribute to the expectations formed; a current employee, for example, 
may recommend the organisation as a good employer and, in doing so, fuel certain 
expectations (Baldacchino, 1997). Likewise, attitudes towards certain organisations or 
industries may act as drivers for the construction of the psychological contract. In the 
recruitment and selection stages certain promises may be made or understandings 
reached between the individual and the organisation, as Rousseau notes (1989: 124), ‘if 
an overt promise is made .... the more explicit and verifiable it is’. However, contrary 
evidence was discovered by Millward Purvis and Cropley (2003:234), who observe that, 
‘the prediction that a more explicit discussion will lead to an increased likelihood of a 
match between employer and employee was not borne out’. The importance of 
employees’ knowledge of their environment during the early organisational socialization 
or post-hire period is highlighted by Thomas and Anderson (1998: 761), who note:
‘.... the involvement of social knowledge in the development of cognitive 
constructs relating to the employee-employer relationship suggests that 
changes in employees’ psychological contacts are indeed towards a 
socially constructed reality’.
Thus, the individual processes information regarding the employment relationship and 
adjusts their psychological contract during the organisational socialisation period. This 
early socialisation period is referred to by Schein (1978: 100) as a ‘mutual testing and 
exploration period’, in which the organisation reserves judgement on matching talented 
individuals with career paths; at the same time the individual sees what the 
organisations is offering, before deciding on how much commitment to give in return 
(Schein, 1978).
Whilst it has been suggested that the initial psychological contract is created when-the 
employment relationship is formed, at the point that employment is offered (Sims, 
1991), further exploration of the literature reveals, the psychological contract is
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imprecise and based on assumptions about the voluntary nature of the exchange 
relationship (Blau, 1964), the degree of mutuality and reciprocity contributed by the 
parties and the reliance they place on the obligations of each other (Hallier and James, 
1997). For Levinson et al (1962: 36) the psychological contract is:
an evolving set of mutual expectations. When the beginning employee 
comes to work, he is not always certain what he wants (except that he 
wants a job), what he himself is offering for his side of the transaction or 
even what relationships he may establish with others. The new employee is 
not fully aware of the condition of employment, though these may be 
presented to him in some for of orientation’.
This view is supported by De Vos, Buyens and Schalk (2003), who observe that:
‘....newcomers’ psychological contracts are not formed once and for all at 
the time they join the organization. They evolve and are periodically revised 
as a result of sense made of experiences encountered after entry.’
This implies that individuals conduct environmental scanning to confirm or disconfirm 
previously held assumptions about organisational life. As individuals do not possess 
complete and perfect knowledge they, out of necessity, make assumptions about how 
organisational life is going to be (Lievans et al, 2001).
3.5.2 The development of the psychological contract construct
The psychological contract is, out of necessity, a dynamic phenomenon; as the 
individual’s career develops so their needs will change (Stroh, Brett and Reilly, 1994). 
Likewise, the organisation’s needs may differ over time as changes occur in the 
external environment, as noted earlier by (Conway and Briner, 205). As Csoka (1995: 
23) observes:
The most significant effect of the dramatic restructurings and downsizings, 
global competition and technological changes has been a rethinking of the 
employer-employee work relationship.’
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As a result the environmental changes the organisation’s expectations of the individual, 
the role that they play or the job that they do, will change also (Schein, 1978; Herriot, 
2001). Consequently, the maintenance of the psychological contract is ‘an ongoing 
process of negotiation and renegotiation’ (Schein, 1978: 120). However, as Schein 
(1978: 120) goes on to observe, ‘much of the process remains implicit and rests on 
assumptions’, and a manager’s effectiveness will depend on the degree to which his or 
her assumptions fit the reality (Schein, 1965); the same, for that matter, could be said 
of the individual.
The impact of the potential mismatch in psychological contract expectations are 
addressed by Portwood and Miller (1976: 109-110), who suggest that:
‘Organizations most often formalize their expectations into policies and 
management practices, thus creating a ‘job reality’ over which the individual 
has little control. The employee therefore must relate to the organization 
through a process of comparing personal expectations with conditions as 
they exist’.
Likewise, Menninger (1958) discusses the impact of a disparity in contribution on the 
relationship and suggests the contract breaks up prematurely when the balance or 
equilibrium is not achieved. However, the relationship may not break up immediately as 
‘the first effect of the awareness of dissatisfaction will be for one or both parties to 
attempt an improvement of the fault’ (Menninger, 1958:21) through the process of 
negotiation.
When a perception of inequity arises, the individual may attempt to renegotiate the 
agreement or adjust their behaviour to restore the notion of equity (Levinson et al, 
1962). Whilst any incongruence between the assumptions of each party may result in 
instability, manifest conflict may not be the outcome; assumptions can be revised and 
adjusted by both parties and this may be the case as long as the employment 
relationship exists (Riley, 1991), as Portwood and Miller (1976) (citing Wanous,1972), 
note:
‘....disparate expectations tend to merge with reality over time as new 
employees learn the system.’
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This again points to the dynamic nature of the psychological contract and the sources 
of information individuals refer to when assessing its state. The debate over the identity 
of the psychological contract seems to have been complicated by the issue of whether 
organisations, as entities, are capable of thought and perception. For example, in his 
assessment of the management of the psychological contract, Kotter (1973) discusses 
the expectations that organisations might have of an individual, and vice versa, but 
most of the discussion surrounds the employee-supervisor interaction.
Following the stance adopted by Kotter (1973), which suggest an acknowledgement 
that organisations rely upon individual managers to construct and transmit their 
expectations and thus create a psychological contract, Rousseau (1989: 126) takes a 
more robust stance in her assessment by stating unambiguously that ‘individuals have 
psychological contracts, organizations do not’. Rousseau (1989: 126) goes on to 
elaborate by arguing that the organisation:
‘.... provides the context for the creation of a psychological contract, but 
cannot in turn have a psychological contract with its members. 
Organizations cannot ‘perceive’ though their individual managers can....’
The psychological contract is, then, created and held at the individual level. Indeed, 
Rousseau (1989) and Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993) concentrate almost 
exclusively on the psychological contract from this individual perspective and, in doing 
so, minimise the influence of the organisational perspective. In a response to 
Rousseau (1998a), Guest (1998b), acknowledges the problem of organisational 
perception by introducing the concept of ‘agency’ and the role played by organisational 
agents in shaping the psychological contract.
While it could be argued that Rousseau (1989) is technically correct in her assessment, 
a counter argument may be advanced; that the organisational component in the 
psychological contract may be identified through the expectations it has of the 
individuals within it; these might be expressed as organisational norms which emerge 
over time and regulate and limit the transactions that occur within the relationship 
(Blau, 1964; Guest and Conway, 1997). These norms may be expressed as 
organisational codes of behaviour, or as policies and practices, as suggested by 
Levinson et al (1962: 33), who observe:
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The company, too, has expectations which arise out of its history and 
business environment. These vary in clarity and specificity. Such 
expectations may be viewed as company expectations, rather than those of 
a given management, because most would likely to be held by any group of 
executives who were to manage the company’.
In his examination of organisational behaviour, Argyris (1960: 96) analysed the 
relationship at the personal level, between factory employees and their foremen and 
makes the following observation:
‘Since the foremen realize the employees in this system will tend to 
produce optimally under passive leadership, and since the employees 
agree, a relationship may be hypothesized to evolve between the 
employees and the foremen which might be called the psychological work 
contract. The employee will maintain high production, low grievances, etc., 
if the foremen guarantee and respect the norms of the employee informal 
culture (i.e. let the employees alone, make certain they make adequate 
wages, and have secure jobs’.
Whilst this observation may appear reasonable, it is predicated upon a perceived 
congruence of expectations and assumptions between the employees and foremen, 
and indeed between foreman and foreman, regarding ‘high productivity’ and ‘low 
grievances’. However, as Kotter (1973) argues, this congruence may not exist and 
differences in the expectations of the individual and the organisation will result in low 
production and creativity, dissatisfaction and higher labour turnover. This is further 
complicated, as the work relationship is not simply between the employee and his or 
her foreman, other individuals are active participants in a direct or indirect manner. 
Similarly, the findings of Turnley and Feldman (1999a: 918) suggest that the outcomes 
of contractual incongruence are ‘likely to include turnover and poorer performance both 
on in-role and extra-role behaviours’.
Given the multiplicity of relationships that exist in any organisation, it seems logical to 
conclude that an employee will be involved in numerous concurrent psychological 
contracts of a personal or impersonal nature, as suggested by Herriot and Pemberton
(1997). As Crossman (2002; 2004), observes, each employee might be engaged in a
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number of concurrent and direct psychological contracts with the organisation 
(impersonal) and with their manager and supervisors (personal). Likewise, there will 
also be concurrent contracts involving other individual employees, which are visible to 
other employees (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: Inter-contractual relationships and impacts
Organization
Manager Psychologicalf4 I contract‘B’
Supervisor,  fe y ..| j
Employee B
Reference to 
and impact on
Psychological Contract 
Comparisons
Organization
Manager
Supervisor
— (5 HPsychological contract ‘A’ Employee ‘A’
Reference to 
and impact on
Psychological Contract 
Comparisons
Organization H (c^
Supervisor ..... ;..(c3j.. j
Employee *C
Source: Adapted from Crossman (2002:11; 2004: 62)
In such a scenario it is perhaps, not be unreasonable to assume the conduct of one 
psychological contract may, such as the firing of a co-worker be observed, evaluated 
and judged by other individuals and which might subsequently impact on their own 
psychological contracts and their own attitudes and behaviours, as suggested by 
Meckler, Drake and Levinson (2003). This process of ‘equality matching’ is discussed 
by Herriot (2001:123) who notes that:
‘.... we may look at others whom we perceive to be in a similar 
relationship. If our cost-benefit ratio is less favourable, or indeed if it is more
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so, than these comparisons then we may feel either angry or guilty and 
seek to redress the balance accordingly.’
These social comparisons are used, then, as a point of reference to confirm or 
disconfirm fairness and equity of treatment (either distributive or procedural) in the 
individual’s own contract (Herriot, 2001) and form the basis for subsequent actions to 
redress any perceived imbalances. This is amply demonstrated by Baruch and Hind’s 
(1999) discussion of the negative effects ‘survivor syndrome’ after a redundancy 
programme. Evidence suggests that those who remain in an organisation after a 
redundancy programme, even managers, experience negative effects such as anxiety 
and resentment, as noted by O’Neill and Lenn (1995) and reduced commitment, loyalty 
and performance, which has been identified by numerous authors (Baruch and Hind, 
1999; Brockner e ta l, 1992; Brockner, Tyler and Cooper-Schneider, 1992).
While Rousseau (1995) and Morrison and Robinson (1997) acknowledge that 
organisations are comprised of multiple agents, with whom the psychological contract is 
made, these are not considered as proxies for the organisation, on the ground there 
may be differences in what each agent is offering or expecting. While there appears to 
be a general reluctance to anthropomorphise the organisation, it cannot be denied that 
organisations are made up of agents with potentially divergent values, priorities and 
desires, as noted by Shore and Tetrick (1994) and Lee (2001). Consequently, the 
actions of these actors might be regarded by individuals as actions of the organisation 
itself (Levinson, 1965; Guest, 1998), which is confirmed by Eisenberger et al (1986: 
504) who note that:
‘.... employees personify the organization, viewing actions by agents of the 
organization as actions of the organization itself.’
The discretionary and potentially differential behaviour by organisational agents may 
lead to perceptions of inequity, unfairness and psychological contract breach, although 
equally, according to Moorman, Blakely and Neihoff, (1998), they may not necessarily 
lead to negative consequences and may contribute to employee perceptions of 
fairness.
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Whilst acknowledging the individual nature of psychological contracts Lee (2001: 7) 
argues a necessity to assume that ‘there is some uniformity as regards messages 
given to the single employee in question’. In contrast to Lee (2001), Herriot and 
Pemberton (1996) and Herriot, Manning and Kidd, (1997) highlight the potential 
dangers of assuming congruence between organisational agents when communicating 
information; the authors identify the conflicts that might arise between different 
organisational agents and their perceptions of the importance of organisational 
interests. Thus, the organisational aspect of the psychological contract is a pivotal 
issue regarding contract formation and maintenance for, as Lee (2001: 7) notes, 
‘different employer agents may present differing messages to employees as they 
represent the organization’. This inconsistency between agents may be a cause of 
perceived psychological contract breaches, as an individual might be led to expect 
certain conditions by one agent, only to have this contradicted by another. As 
Rousseau (2004: 121) notes, ‘when information sources convey different messages, it 
erodes the mutuality of the psychological contract’. This appears to demonstrate the 
problematic nature of the assumed congruence integral to Levinson et al’s (1962) 
model, discussed earlier.
Of course, whilst such inconsistencies might only be regarded as a breach if the initial 
conditions or promises (real or perceived) are better than those subsequently offered; it 
is unlikely to be regarded as a breach, or as problematic, if the subsequent 
experienced conditions or promises exceed or enhance those initially expected by the 
individual. Such a scenario is demonstrated by Herriot, Manning and Kidd’s (1997) 
example where the private medical treatment for an employee suffering from cancer 
was paid for by her company, even though she was not covered by the organisation’s 
private medical insurance policy.
The situation may be further complicated by the effect of individual or cultural 
differences and the way these might impact on the psychological contract. The same 
organisational message might be interpreted differently by individuals of different 
cultural backgrounds, as Thomas and Au (2001: F2) note, ‘.... there may be systematic 
differences in the interpretation that culturally different individuals have for the same 
organizational messages’. This position is supported Rousseau and Schalk (2000) who 
note, psychological contracts in France tend to be conflict-based, whereas those in 
Japan underpinned by a sense of social harmony and belonging. Similarly, cultural
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differences may intervene in perceptions of with whom the individual is psychologically 
contracted to, this, according to Rousseau and Schalk, 2000) might be the employer, 
as in the United States, co-workers as in Australia, or the State, as in France. Yet, as 
Dabos and Rousseau (2004) argue, creating and sustaining mutual understanding 
between employers and employees can lead to a healthier employment relationship 
and improved individual performance.
It is also important to recognise that whilst managers may be regarded as agents of the 
organisation, they are themselves are active psychological contract participants; each 
manager has their own relationship with the organisation as well as representing it in 
other psychological contracts. This is exemplified by the findings of post-merger 
psychological contracts, Bligh and Carsten (2004: 501), who found managers:
‘.... spoke primarily of two broad types of psychological contracts: contracts 
with supervisors and top management (upward contracts), and contracts 
with their employees (downward contracts).
This dual role, created by the manager being ‘caught in the middle’ (Coyle-Shapiro,
2001), may be a source of tension, as the manager may face difficulties in satisfying 
the terms of the psychological contract with the employee and, at the same time, 
fulfilling their own priorities. A related observation is adopted by Hallier and James, 
(1997: 706) who note that:
‘.... Situations may also arise where fulfilling the subordinates contract is 
seen by managers as an appropriate means of responding to perceived 
unfairness in their own relationship with top management.’
Regardless of whether the individual’s psychological contract is with the organisation 
(impersonal), with an agent (personal), or a combination of the two across different 
dimensions, it can still be argued that the contract is founded on the individual’s 
perception of, rather than the actual, mutuality and reciprocity (Rousseau and 
Tijoriwala, 1998); each employee will construct their own vision of reality regarding the 
state of the relationship, the expectations the employee and organisation might have of 
each other and whether these are met (Schein, 1978; Sparrow and Cooper, 1998).
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Thus, any changes in the employee-employer relationship and the psychological 
contract are likely to be viewed differently by each individual.
3.6 Psychological Contract Categorisation
Following the lead provided by Macneil (1985), psychological contracts have 
traditionally been divided into two main dimensions, ‘relational’ and ‘transactional’ by 
numerous authors (Rousseau, 1989; 1990a; Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993; 
Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau, 1994). However, a broader perspective is adopted by 
Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande (2004) in their ‘nomological network’ approach 
which argues that psychological contracts are comprised of six dimensions (Figure
3.7). The research follows an input-output approach, along the lines of Guest and 
Conway (1997) and Guest (2004), and looks at the influence of the contract formality 
and duration, along with HR practices, on the psychological contract dimensions and 
the way these, in turn, influence outcomes.
Figure 3.7: Nomological network to validate psychological contract
dimensions 
Formal contract
Outcomes
*  Affective commitment 
Perceived personal control
HR practices x
Participation (employee influence)
Internal career ladders (HR flows)
Job autonomy (work systems)
Pay for performance (reward systems)
Source: Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande, 2004: 25
The tangibility (intangibility) dimension refers to the degree of clarity surrounding the 
contract and the information provided to the employee. The Scope dimension refers to 
the division between work and other aspects of the employee’s life and the; a strict
Contract type 
Contract duration Psychologicalcontract
dimensions
Tangibility 
Scope 
Stability 
Time frame 
Exchange symmetry 
Contract level
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division between work and personal life would be regarded as narrow scope, whereas 
an employer’s concern for the employee beyond work would be defined as broad 
scope. The stability dimension is concerned with the degree of stability or flexibility in 
the contract; whether it may be regarded as static or evolving and the extent to which it 
can ‘change without an implied renegotiation of the terms’ (Sels, Janssens and Van 
Den Brande, 2004: 467). The fourth dimension, time frame, deals with the perceived 
duration of the contract; whether it is regarded as long-term, with the associated job 
security, or short-term with, perhaps, a lower level of commitment by both parties. The 
exchange symmetry dimension refers to the perceived degree of mutual (equal) 
reciprocity in the relationship and, as Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande 2004: 467), 
not ‘the degree to which the employee perceives the unequal employment relationship 
as acceptable’. The final dimension, contract level, refers to the employee perceptions 
of the individual versus collective nature of the regulation of the contract. Collectively 
regulated contracts are characterised by generally applicable rules and homogeneity of 
treatment, whereas individually regulated contracts are rather more idiosyncratic and 
might deviate from established norms. As Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande (2004) 
observe, numerous cross-cultural studies have discovered national/cultural differences 
across each of these six dimensions (Rousseau and McLean-Parks, 1993; Freese and 
Schalk, 2000; Kabanoff, Jimmieson and Lewis, 2000; Rousseau, 2000b). According to 
Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande (2004), the way the contract is initially formed is 
influential in the way in which it later evolves; formal relationships tend to lead to 
clearer, more tangible mutual obligations over a longer time frame.
A simpler, more traditional, approach is adopted by Rousseau and McLean Parks 
(1993: 10), who place the psychological contract on the relational-transactional 
continuum and describe it thus:
‘Anchoring at one end of the continuum is the transactional contract 
comprised of short-term monetizable agreements with limited involvement 
of each party in the lives and activities of the other. Temporary 
employment, commission sales, and independent contracting are all 
examples of transactional contracts. At the other end of the continuum, 
relational contracts characterize agreements based upon exchanges of 
both socioemotional (loyalty, support) and monetizable elements (pay for
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services), duration which is open-ended and long term, and a high degree 
Of flexibility.’
This is an important statement as, by stating categorically that the transactional and 
relational psychological contracts occupy opposing ends of a continuum, Rousseau 
and McLean Parks appear to be suggesting these are not separate contracts but sub­
divisions or components of a larger phenomenon, thereby creating a situation in which 
an increase in one component (e.g. relational) must result in a decrease in the other 
(e.g. transactional). This approach also seems to assume a single psychological 
contract whereas it may simply be one of many concurrent contracts (Crossman,
2002).
Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993) distinguish between transactional and relational 
contracts using five contractual characteristics; these are set out in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: From the transactional to the relational characteristics of the
contractual continuum
Contract
Characteristics
Transactional Contracts Relational Contracts
Focus Economic Economic
Extrinsic Socio-emotional
Intrinsic
Time Frame Close-ended Open-ended
Specific duration Indefinite duration
Stability Static Dynamic
Scope Narrow Pervasive and comprehensive
Tangibility Public Subjective
Easily observable Understood
Source: Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993: 11
One might argue that one of the main drawbacks with this transactional/relational 
continuum stance is the assumptions that appear to be made. For example, although 
some close-ended contracts may be transactional (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) this 
is not necessarily always the case, as some short-term workers may quickly develop a 
more relational contract (Crossman and Lee-Kelley, 2002).
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In later work Rousseau (1995; 1998b; 2000a), departs from the dichotomous approach 
and adds two further dimensions, ‘balanced’ and ‘transitional’. It is interesting to note 
that Rousseau describes these ‘types’ of psychological contract as ‘sub-divisions’, 
implying that they are parts of a greater whole, the overall psychological contract. The 
four types, or sub-divisions, are then applied on the basis of the duration of the 
employment relationship and the degree of specificity of performance terms (Figure
3.8).
Figure 3.8: Types of psychological contract
Performance Terms 
Specified Not Specified
Short-term
Duration
Long-term
Transactional Transitional
Balanced Relational
Source: Rousseau, 2000a: 40
The Psychological Contract Inventory (Rousseau, 1998b; 2000) is based upon the four 
types of psychological contract, described above, with each dimensions being sub­
divided into a range of specific components as set out in Table 3.2 below:
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3.6.1 The relational contract
The ‘relational’ psychological contract is primarily a socio-emotional relationship 
between the individual and the organisation, with emphasis on long-term mutual 
commitment, obligations and fairness of processes rather than outcomes. Thus, as 
Herriot and Pemberton (1996) note, procedural equity is likely to be important. In their 
research into contractual differences between permanent employees and contractors, 
Millward and Hopkins (1998) found a relationship between employment status and the 
relational psychological contract, insofar that, overall, permanent employees are more 
relational than contractors, who tend to be more transactional. However, a comparison 
of the scores on the relational and transactional sub-scales produces an interesting 
finding. According to Millward and Hopkins (1998: 1545):
‘.... full-time employees are significantly more relational in their contractual 
orientation than are part-time employees, irrespective of differences in job 
tenure, but they do not differ in how transactional they are.’
The relational score for full-time employees was x= 96.0 and the score for part-timers 
x= 83.4. The transactional score was x= 49.8 for full-time employees, whereas the 
score for part-time employees was x= 51.7 (Millward and Hopkins, 1998:1545).
This presents an interesting departure from the polarised relational-transactional 
position and suggests that contracts might be measured on two independent scales.
3.6.2 The transactional contract
The ‘transactional’ psychological contract, on the other hand, is, according to 
Rousseau (2000a) short-term, based on limited worker involvement and focused on 
the economic exchange relationship. Indeed, Millward Purvis and Cropley, (2003: 233- 
234) found that, ‘transactional considerations .... were more likely to be discussed 
explicitly than relational considerations’. According to Herriot and Pemberton (1996: 
672), the emphasis ‘will probably be whether the outcomes are a fair exchange: they 
will concentrate on distributive equity’. Thus the issue of pay, and satisfaction with pay, 
might be particularly relevant in the degree to which a transactional contract may be 
constructed. In this respect, Lester and Kickul (2001: 20) found pay to be one of the 
greatest areas of discrepancy between what people expected and what they actually 
received; their results suggest:
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‘.... employees have very little tolerance for even the smallest 
discrepancies when it comes to receiving the extrinsic rewards they expect.’
Consequently there may be a link between the duration of the employment 
relationship, permanent or temporary, and the type of psychological contract held. For 
example, Millward and Brewerton (1999: 266) found the psychological contracts of 
contingent workers (temporary or permanently employed agency contractors) ‘were 
more likely to be transactional in orientation and to hold a short-term view of their 
future with the company’, thus contingent workers are less likely to be committed to 
the organisation, mirroring the lack of commitment by the organisation, and engage in 
organisational citizenship behaviour. Interestingly, the predominance of the 
transactional orientation did not seem to inhibit the contractors from working ‘beyond 
contract’ without pay; according to Millward and Brewerton (1999: 266) a potential 
explanation lies in agency contractors linking their identity with the client company, 
using it ‘as a vehicle for self-ascribed worth and identity’.
McDonald and Makin (2000: 90) found that temporary employees’ psychological 
contracts were not predominantly transactional and were ‘in many respects similar to 
permanent employees’. However, a more utilitarian relationship between employment 
status and citizenship behaviour appear in the findings of Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 
(2002a: 92-93) which suggest that:
‘.... contingent employees may be adopting a contingent view of the 
exchange relationship whereby their contributions in terms of citizenship 
behaviour is contingent upon what they receive from their employer.’
So it would appear there is a degree of variability and uncertainty surrounding the 
relationship.
3.6.3 The balanced contract
The ‘balanced’ contract is dynamic, open-ended and contingent on the economic 
success of the firm. There is a mutuality of benefit as the worker and firm contribute to 
each other’s learning and development (Rousseau, 2000a). There is the opportunity for 
internal advancement, but likewise employees are able to develop their skills and 
competencies to maintain employability in the external labour market, thus the
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utilisation of the company as a career resource, as implied by Super (1986) appears to 
be particularly relevant.
3.6.4 The transitional contract
The ‘transitional’ contract, according to Rousseau (2000a: 4):
‘....is not a psychological contract form itself, but a cognitive state reflecting 
the consequences of organizational change and transitions that are at odds 
with a previously established employment arrangement’.
There is an overarching sense of uncertainly in terms of reciprocal obligations and 
inconsistency in the signals and information transmitted by the organisation, thus a 
high degree of mistrust exists. Given the nature of the above statement and that 
change is a constant reality within organisations, managers and structures changing, it 
seems curious that such a fluid concept has been awarded ‘contract’ status.
3.7 Changing the Psychological Contract
According to Boddy (2000a), it is not the negotiated contract of employment that 
causes problems in the workplace, but rather that which has not been discussed or 
negotiated, the psychological contract. It is generally accepted that where, as a result 
of some change, expectations are not met a perceived psychological contract breach 
may occur, as no identified by Morrison and Robinson (1995), where the contract is 
fulfilled, or even enhanced, more positive outcomes will be produced; as Conway and 
Briner (2002: 297) note:
‘Broken promises were found to be significantly related to emotions of 
betrayal and hurt: exceeded promises were found to be significantly related 
to emotions of self-worth, care for, and surprise.’
In recent years the changing employer-employee relationship has come under 
sustained pressure, as organisations down-size, outsource and in-source parts of their 
operations in pursuit of increased organisational agility, flexibility and performance. 
Consequently the notion of employment security in return for good service is 
perpetually undermined. Commenting on the changing nature the changing 
employment relationship, Cooper (1999: 118) poses a simple yet fundamental
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question: ‘can organizations....continue to demand commitment from employees they 
do not commit to?’
The potential impact of the changing relationship at work on the psychological contract 
is identified by Sparrow and Cooper (1998 368):
1. What we want out of work and how we maintain individuality in a world where 
we face a choice between more intense employment or no employment at all;
2. Our relationships with other individuals in a work process that can be altered in 
terms of social interactions, time patterns, and geographical location;
3. The cooperative and competitive links between different internal and external 
constituents of the organization in their new more flexible forms; and
4. The relationship between key stakeholders and institutions such as
governments, unions, and managers
Evidence suggests that, in the light of the changing nature of the employer-employee 
relationship, the long-term relational psychological contract, founded on trust, loyalty 
and job security, is being replaced by one which is more short-term and transactional - 
hard work in return for high pay and training/development - as employees amend their 
work horizons. As Smithson and Lewis (2000: 694) note, there is evidence:
‘.... to support the view that younger workers’ expectations of employers 
are changing and that they do not always perceive insecure work as a 
violation of the psychological contract, as older, established workers appear 
to do.’
The way in which the psychological contract is altered may present problems for either 
party and a certain amount of confusion exists in the literature regarding the 
negotiation of terms. Wright, Larwood and Doherty (1996: 216), for example, argue, 
‘....changes to the psychological contract are best made through mutual negotiation 
and consent’. Likewise, in his article on negotiating the psychological contract, Boddy 
(2000b), advocates negotiation and provides a formal checklist to be completed by the 
employee in advance of re/negotiations with the employer to correct any shortfalls that 
exist. However, in adopting this systematic approach Boddy (2000b) appears to miss 
the psychological and perceptual aspects entirely and, in doing so, reduces the
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relationship to one that is overt and clear with every component negotiable, yet, as 
Blau (1964: 93) notes, ‘the nature of the return cannot be bargained about but must be 
left to the discretion of the one who makes it’. Furthermore, if, as Wright, Larwood and 
Doherty (1996) and Rousseau (1989) suggest, the contract exists only in the mind of 
the individual, then the notion that it can be negotiated, with explicit consent being 
given for any changes, is a highly tenuous position to adopt.
The literature suggests that instability or conflict arises when there is a perception, by 
one party or the other, that the psychological contract has been unilaterally varied 
resulting in a breach or violation; when, for example the ‘employee and the agent(s) 
have different understandings about a promise’ (Morrison and Robinson, 1997: 231), 
where ‘empowerment may create beliefs that cannot be met’ (Paul, Neihoff and 
Turnley, 2000: 472).
As Herriot, Manning and Kidd (1997: 152) suggest ‘....it is not only the content of the 
organization’s settlement with employees which is important to them; it is also the 
process by which the contract was terminated or broken’, thus both procedural and 
distributive equity are relevant concepts in shaping employee perceptions. The issue of 
psychological contract breach and violation is discussed further in the following sub­
section.
3.7.1 Psychological contract breach and violation
It could be argued that there is a preoccupation with the negative aspects of the 
psychological contract, as a large proportion literature is concentrated on breach and 
violation (Robinson, 1996; Braun, 1997; Morrison and Robinson 1997; Turnley and 
Feldman, 1999a and 199b; Pate and Malone, 2000; Thompson and Bunderson, 2003), 
whereas the positive aspects associated with contract enhancement, where the deal is 
better than anticipated as demonstrated by Herriot, Manning and Kidd (1997), attract 
little attention. However, the perceived breaking of a contract and the subsequent 
emotions that are triggered appears to be a more common occurrence and, as such, 
perhaps more important and worthy of more attention.
According to Robinson (1996: 576), a psychological breach is:
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‘.... a subjective experience based not only (or necessarily) on the 
employer’s actions or inactions but on an individual’s perception of these 
actions or inactions within a particular social contact.’
Whilst the terms psychological contract ‘breach’ and ‘violation’ are often used 
conterminously or interchangeably, Morrison and Robinson (1997) are careful to 
distinguish between the two on the ground that one is cognitive and the other 
emotional. Morrison and Robinson (1997: 230) argue that a breach is:
‘.... the cognition that one’s organization has failed to meet one or more 
obligations, within one’s psychological contract’.
In contrast, according to Morrison and Robinson (1997: 242), a violation is an:
‘....affective and emotional experience of disappointment, frustration, anger 
and resentment that may emanate from an employee’s interpretation of a 
contract breach and its accompanying circumstances.’
Consequently, a psychological contract breach may not necessarily lead to a 
perception of violation.
It may not only be unmet personal entitlements that lead to perceptions of a 
psychological contract breach and/or violation, they may result from the organisation 
deviating from an espoused cause or ideological position. As Thompson and 
Bunderson (2003: 571) observe:
‘.... psychological contract violations need not originate solely from 
perceptions of direct personal mistreatment by an organization, as implied 
in most psychological contract research, but also from a perception that the 
organization has abandoned an espoused principle or cause.’
This might be particularly relevant to employees or voluntary workers in an 
organisation that promotes a certain ethos but behaves in a contrary manner. 
Thompson and Bunderson (2003) present a propositional model (Figure 3.9 below) 
which sets out the basis for contract breach and violation. The intentional reneging
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refers to the deliberate actions of the organization in deviating from the cause. As 
Morrison and Robinson (1997: 244) argue:
‘.... if the employee perceives that an organizational agent was aware that 
an agreement was being broken and that the breach was a purposeful act 
(rather than an honest oversight), feelings of violation will be intensified.’
The incongruence component refers to the potential mismatch in the expectations of 
the individual and the reality owing to misconception on the part of the individual or, as 
suggested by Thompson and Bunderson (2003 579) an ‘aspiration rather than reality’ 
on the part of the organisation. This view is supported by that of Morrison and 
Robinson (1997: 244), who note:
‘If an employee perceives that a breach was due to his or her own 
misperceptions, the employee is less apt to ‘blame’ the organization for the 
apparent breach and will experience less intense feelings of violation.’
An individual might perceive a psychological contract breach on the basis of perceived 
goal displacement owing to the organisation focusing on administrative efficacy rather 
than on the espoused cause. Similarly, individuals may experience perceived value 
interpenetration if the organisation forges relationships with other organisations which 
are not committed to the same ideology or values.
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Figure 3.9: A model of ideological breach and violation
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Source: Thompson and Bunderson, 2003: 579
In terms of the ideological breach -  violation components, Thompson and Bunderson 
(2003: 581) argue that, unlike the short-term perspective applied to transactional and 
relational contracts, ideological contracts are characterised by employees being 
prepared to ‘wait out a short-term breach, if they believe the organization remains 
committed to the long-term objective’. The contextual attributions component relates to 
the cause of the breach and may act as a moderator; if employees view the breach as 
being beyond the control of the organisation they are less likely regard it as a violation, 
this view is shared by Morrison and Robinson (1997). This is consistent with the view 
of Crossman (2002, who argues that changes in the external environment may reduce 
the negative perceptions of violation. Similarly, Crossman (2002) suggestion that the 
treatment of colleagues and their observed psychological contracts might act as a 
reference point seems to be consistent with the peer organization consensus 
component in the model.
It could be argued that whether the organisation has actually breached the contract by, 
for example, failing to keep its promises, is not of paramount importance, whether the
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violation is real or imagined may be irrelevant. If, as Turnley and Feldman (1999b) 
suggest, individuals’ process information in idiosyncratic ways, then, as noted by 
numerous authors (Robinson, 1996; Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998; Sparrow and 
Cooper, 1998) it is the individual’s perception of reality that is important. Evidence 
suggests that when the psychological contract has been perceived as violated, there is 
a negative impact on the individual’s attitudes and behaviours. As Lemire and Rouillard 
(2005: 160) note, not only do people:
'.... become disillusioned and disenchanted, but breach of the 
psychological contract also prompts behaviors that undermine 
organizational effectiveness’.
Trust has also been identified as an explicit element in the psychological contract by a 
number of authors (Herriot and Pemberton, 1996; Robinson, 1996, Braun, 1997; Guest 
and Conway, 1997). In her analysis of the relationship between psychological contract 
breach, trust, and blame, Robinson (1996: 593), in common with other theory found 
that ‘psychological contract breach led to a loss of trust’. Interestingly, Robinson (1996: 
594) also identifies [prior] trust as a moderating variable in the psychological contract 
and notes that:
‘Employees with low prior trust were more likely than those with high prior 
trust to blame their employer for the perceived breach.’
Thus, employees who trusted their employer were more forgiving when it came to 
psychological contract transgressions by their employer.
Of course, as was argued earlier in the chapter, the psychological contract does not 
exist in an organisational vacuum. Contrary to some models (e.g. Guest and Conway, 
1997), there are a number of external factors which impact on the psychological 
contract and which might act as moderating effects. This is demonstrated by Turnley 
and Feldman (1999b: 377), who argue that labour market forces may moderate 
between psychological contract violations and employee responses, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.10 below.
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Figure 3.10: A discrepancy model of psychological contract violations
Psychological contract Violations
Moderating Variables 
Individual Differences 
Organizational Practices 
Labor Market Forces
Employee Responses 
Turnover
Reduced In-Role Performance 
Reduced Extra-Role Performance 
Antisocial Behaviours
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The evidence suggests that not all negative acts by the employer will be regarded as 
psychological contract breaches; much depends on the circumstances surrounding the 
breach and the way these are perceived by individuals. Likewise, for similar reasons, 
not all breaches in the psychological contract will be regarded as violations.
3.8 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter, which built on the previous chapter on the authoritarian climate, has 
presented a discussion of various aspects related to the psychological contract. After 
the opening introductory section, the second section presented an exploration of the 
essence and fabric of the psychological contract. This section identified the imprecise 
and unstable nature of the psychological contract and the role of assumptions when 
individuals form views, opinions and expectations based upon incomplete information.
The third section explored the literature concerning the way in which psychological 
contracts are defined; this section extended the discussion surrounding mutuality, 
discussed in the previous section, and addressed the issue of reciprocity of obligations. 
The section also addressed the issue of how implied and psychological contracts are 
distinguished from each other, and the way that individuals infer promises in a unique 
and idiosyncratic manner.
The fourth section investigated the conceptual basis for the psychological contract. 
This section contained a number of theoretical models and frameworks for 
understanding the construct. From the literature reviewed in this section a number of
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other conceptual areas, related to but distinct from the psychological contract, 
emerged. These included: social exchange theory, social comparison theory, 
organisational climate, organisational justice perceptions, trust, organisational 
commitment, organisational citizenship behaviour, job satisfaction. The section 
highlighted the problematic nature of psychological contract modelling on the basis that 
for models to be constructed assumptions need to be made about the assumptions 
individuals might make in creating their psychological contracts.
The fifth section explored the way in which psychological contracts are initiated and 
developed; the section investigated the various motives for individuals and 
organisations to enter into an exchange relationship and the information they draw 
upon to build their expectations; in particular this section addressed the role of 
assumptions and the underlying reasons for these being used to fill any information 
gaps which might exist. There was a discussion of the dynamic nature of the 
psychological contract and the way in which social comparisons between individuals, 
the way in which other conterminous psychological contracts might impact on the 
psychological contract, and what actions might be taken to overcome any perceptions 
of a mismatch between expectations and reality.
In the sixth section the categorisation of psychological contracts was investigated. The 
section identified the relational, transactional, balanced and transitional contracts, with 
particular emphasis on the economically-driven nature of the transactional. The 
relational contract relates to the long-term socio-emotional relationship between the 
individual and the organisation, in which mutual obligations, fairness and [affective] 
commitment are the desired outcomes. The transactional contract, in contrast, is 
characterised by a short-term horizon, with the primary focus on economic exchange 
whereby the individual’s contributions are limited and specific, with no long-term 
commitment to the firm.
The seventh and penultimate section, which precedes this summary, contained a 
review of the literature regarding changes to the psychological contract, for example, 
owing to organisational restructuring. The section addressed the issue of the reduction 
of commitment between organisations and individuals and the potential move away 
from the longer-term relational contract toward one which is short-term and 
transactional. There was a discussion of psychological contract renegotiation as a
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means of redressing any perceived inequity, the section closed with consideration of, 
and distinction between, psychological contract breach and violation.
There are a number of factors that emerge from the authority and psychological 
contract literature which are relevant to, and inform, this particular research.
The first of these concerns the identification and categorisation of the psychological 
contract. Two clear approaches in psychological contract research can be identified 
from the literature, these might be described as two opposing schools of thought. On 
the one hand there is the ‘Holistic School’, which takes the psychological contract in its 
entirety and is reflected in the work of Conway and Briner (2005), Guest, (1998a, 
1998b, 2004), Guest and Conway (1997, 2000), Grant (1999), McLean Parks, Kidder 
and Gallagher (1998), Meckler, Drake and Levinson (2003) and Morrison and 
Robinson (1997). On the other hand there is what might be termed the ‘Categorical 
School’ which seeks to differentiate between the potentially different types of 
psychological contract. This approach is reflected ion the work of Macneil (1985), 
McDonald and Makin (1999), Millward and Brewerton (1999), Millward and Hopkins 
(1998), Millward Purvis and Cropley (2003), all of which focus on the 
relational/transactional approach. Within the categorical view there is a clear stance 
that the relational and transactional elements are located at opposite ends of a 
continuum (Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993: 10). The implication of this is that a 
reduction in one element results in a proportionate increase in the other; if a 
psychological becomes more transactional it must, of necessity, become less 
relational. One might question whether this is necessarily the case and, instead, adopt 
an alternative view, one which might be termed a Herzbergian perspective, which 
treats the relational and transactional as being separate and distinct from each other. 
This would create a perspective whereby an increase in one does not automatically 
lead to a decrease in the other.
Secondly, whether one accepts the holistic or the categorical approach, the way that 
the relational and transactional psychological contracts are measured appears to be 
worthy of further scrutiny. For example, Millward and Hopkins conducted a factor 
analysis which produced transactional and relational factors. An investigation of the 
Millward and Hopkins (1998) 20-item scale transactional scale may reveal a more 
complex structure than suggested to date. If, as Crossman (2002) suggests,
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individuals construct numerous concurrent and multi-layered psychological contracts, 
then the transactional components might be clustered to reflect these various, small 
contractual elements.
Thirdly, there may be a stronger relationship between organisational climate, 
particularly the management style adopted, and the psychological contract than has 
hitherto been investigated and identified. Although some authors include the balance 
of power (Herriot and Pemberton, 1996) or involvement climate (Guest and Conway, 
1997; Sels, Janssens and Van Den Brande, 2004) in their psychological contract 
modelling, the attention paid to it seems woefully understated, leaving it worthy of 
further investigation. The other factor which seems to be neglected in the 
psychological contract research appears to be the importance attached to pay and the 
individual’s satisfaction with it as a potentially mediating variable. As noted in the 
previous chapter, there is an absence of literature surrounding authoritarian 
management and subordinate pay satisfaction, which represents an opportunity to 
reduce the knowledge gap in some way.
The next chapter describes the way in which the research was conducted. It sets out 
the methodological approach that was adopted from the distillation of the salient points 
from the literature reviews and the formulation of the broad research question, the 
exploratory studies and the refinement of the research question and the propositions, 
through the pilot studies and the main data collection and data analysis.
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters the literature surrounding and underpinning authority in 
organisations and the psychological contract identified a number of key aspects in 
relation to each conceptual area.
The literature review on authority identified the relationship between power and 
authority and the way in which each may be regarded as legitimate or illegitimate, 
depending on the manner in which each is exercised by the superior over the 
subordinate. Excessive use of power and authority may be considered an abuse of 
status or position and be perceived as tyrannical or bullying behaviour engendering 
fear among those subjected to it. The literature review on the psychological contract 
set out the antecedents to the concept -  social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) -  and the 
way in which individuals build notions of reciprocity and expectations in relation to their 
relationships with and within the organisation.
Throughout their employment the individual engages in a variety of ill-defined, dynamic 
reciprocal exchange relationships, or set of implicit understandings (Schein, 1978), with 
the organisation and its agents (Argyris, 1960). This relationship is based upon 
assumptions, made by the individual and the organisational agents from the outset, 
and is characterised by the psychological engagement between the individual and the 
organisation/agents and the degree of perceived reciprocity and obligation that exists 
between them. The way in which the organisation behaves towards employees, 
through its’ management among other things, and the climate this engenders might 
influence the construction and ongoing reconstruction of an individual’s psychological 
contract. The literature review identified the key differences between the ‘relational’ and 
‘transactional’ psychological contract, the former representing a more open-ended 
socio-emotional relationship, the latter, on which this research is focused,
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predominantly short-term, narrow focus and economically driven with an implicitness of 
‘I’m only in it for the money’ (see Crossman and Lee-Kelley (2004).
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the methodological approach and 
the research methods adopted for the research and to provide a justification for their 
selection. The chapter sets out the objectives for the research and the subsequent 
research question propositions which were developed from the reviews of the literature 
on authority and psychological contract. The chapter provides an account of the 
procedure that was followed for obtaining ethical approval to conduct the exploratory 
studies and the main data collection. The methods and justification for the two-stage 
qualitative exploratory studies, a self-complete and follow-up in-depth interview, are 
discussed in detail (the results are discussed in the next chapter). Within the chapter 
there is a discussion and justification for the change of methodology from qualitative, 
used in the exploratory studies to quantitative adopted for the main study, and the 
design and development of the research process and the data collection instrument.
According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002:11-12):
‘.... scientific research is done systematically and is based on logic and not
beliefs: therefore, we stress a logical relationship’.
It has also been suggested that a sound methodological approach is the most 
important component in the written dissertation (Riley et al, 2000). Following this 
advice, this research is deliberately designed to be exploratory in nature in order to 
investigate the relationship, if any, between the perceived [overarching] management 
style (level and style of authority exercised) and [transactional] psychological contract, 
with an additional investigation of the potential impact of the reported level of pay 
satisfaction and pay expectations and whether these act as a mediating or moderating 
variables. An overview of the full methodological approach adopted in model form is set 
out in Figure 4.1 below.
The field research is conducted in three stages; the first stage is a qualitative 
exploratory study, the second stage a second, confirmatory qualitative exploratory 
study with a slightly revised method, and the third stage the main data collection which
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deviates from the method adopted in the exploratory studies and employed a 
quantitative data collection method.
The methodological transition from qualitative to quantitative is considered appropriate 
as, according to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002: 88),
‘It is generally accepted that, for inductive and exploratory research, 
qualitative methods are most useful, as they can lead to hypothesis building 
and explanations. According to this view, qualitative and quantitative 
methods are suitable at different stages or levels of research.’
Throughout the research the primary unit of analysis is the individual, although given 
the nature of managerial style and the potential for variation between organisations, 
there was the potential for using the organisation as the secondary unit of analysis. 
Initially the research follows a critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) using 
emotional triggers to indicate how and when critical incidents at work invoked a 
consciousness of the psychological contract. The rationale for the event-emotion focus 
was that published evidence suggests a relationship between experienced emotion and 
attitudes and behaviours displayed by people at work (Herriot and Pemberton, 1996; 
Ashkanasy and Daus, 2002), both of which are regarded by Guest and Conway (1997) 
as consequences of the psychological contract.
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The rationale for the exploratory studies is to investigate and confirm the relevance, if 
any, of the key themes identified in the literature review and to identify the main issues 
on which to focus in the main data collection phase. Both of the exploratory studies 
were conducted within the Automobile Association (Centrica), which provided the 
necessary support and facilities for data collection. The first study was carried out at 
the Automobile Association offices at Southwood (near Farnborough) and the second 
study at the Automobile Association Head Office at Basingstoke. A qualitative data 
collection method was adopted in order to identify the nature of the respondents’ 
psychological contract, their perceptions of the dominant management style and their 
level of pay satisfaction.
4.2 The Broad Research Question and Exploratory Research
Following the reviews of the literature on authority in organisations and the 
psychological contract, the initial research idea was refined and the following broad 
research question was formulated:
Is there a relationship between authoritarian management, employee
satisfaction with pay and the psychological contract?
Having conducted reviews of the literature on authoritarianism in organisations and 
individuals and on the psychological contract, it was decided to conduct exploratory 
research. The purpose of the exploratory studies was to investigate and identify a 
number of issues: First, the way in which employees perceived their relationship with 
their organisation. Secondly, the way in which management behaved. Thirdly, whether 
pay, and satisfaction with it, was an important factor. Lastly, the way these issues might 
impact on the individuals’ psychological contracts.
After an appraisal of potential methods for data collection, the method adopted was a 
combination of self-complete diary (see Appendix A) in which participants recorded the 
emotions they experienced during the study period and the incidents or events that 
triggered these emotions followed by an in-depth face-to-face interview. The emotional 
response approach was derived from a number of the psychological contract authors; 
referring to the work of Robinson and Rousseau (1994), Turnley and Feldman (1998) 
and Wewick and Bunker (1996), Pate and Malone (2000) suggest that emotional
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responses to psychological contract violation may ‘manifest themselves through 
feelings such as anger, resentment, frustration or hopelessness’.
The diary-interview combination is regarded by Zimmerman and Wieder (1977) as an 
approximation to the participant observation technique. Although the diary method is 
normally used to record behaviour rather than emotion (Bell, 1992), it has been used 
successfully in the field of psychological contract research (Conway and Briner, 2002), 
thus the diary method was deemed appropriate as it is regarded as a reliable research 
method (Bell, 1992) and the nature of the participants employment necessitated they 
be of a sufficient educational level and literacy to complete the task (Bell, 1992; Corti, 
*1993). Furthermore, the diary is a recognised as a legitimate and useful preliminary to 
interviews (Burgess, 1981) where guidance is sought on the ‘right questions’ to ask 
during the interview itself (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977).
4.2.1 Ethical Approval
Approval to proceed with the exploratory research was granted by the School of 
Management Ethics Committee on 27 March, 2003. Participants were assured at the 
outset that any information collected would be treated as confidential and that any 
quotes which might appear in any subsequent document would be un-attributed (Corti, 
1993). Participants were also advised that anyone who wished to do so could withdraw 
from the research programme at any time without submitting a reason.
Post-research psychological support, in the form of counselling, was offered to 
participants who might experience psychological harm as a result of the intrusive 
nature of the research. This support was made available, upon request, through either 
the University of Surrey Counselling Service or the Guildford Institute Counselling 
Service. At no point either during or after the studies did any participant request 
support; those participants who commented on the experience were very positive and 
complimentary about the experience as it had helped them to think about their 
relationships at work.
4.2.2 Data collection: self-complete diaries
The diary contained detailed completion instructions, as recommended by Corti (1993) 
to assist the participants in the study; it also contained an example entry of potential 
emotions and the incidental triggers. The diary also included questions to ascertain if
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the events recorded represented ‘normal daily life’ at work, if the records were 
contemporaneous or retrospective and whether the process influenced the participant’s 
behaviour. Diaries were distributed to participants by e-mail during the week prior to the 
study period. The diaries were completed over a two-week period, as evidence 
suggests this is sufficient to capture sufficient behavioural data without jeopardising the 
validity of the success of the research by making the task burdensome (Corti, 1993).
Diaries were submitted by participants periodically by e-mail according to their 
individual frequency preference (see Appendix B). The only imposed requirement was 
at least a return at the end of each week; the short period was specifically designed to 
enable quick data capture and scrutiny. In practice some participants submitted daily 
and others weekly.
4.2.3 Data collection: in-depth semi-structured interviews
The purpose of the in-depth interview was to explore in detail the events recorded in 
the diary and to probe for additional information to identify and isolate what in particular 
made these incidents critical and to warrant recording. The interview also provided the 
opportunity to collect situational information, such as the participant’s state of mind at 
the time or about external events, unrelated to work, which might have caused them to 
respond in a particular way to organisational incidents.
All in-depth interviews were audio tape recorded. An interview was arranged with each 
participant in the first exploratory study on Monday 23 June 2003. Exceptionally two 
interviews were conducted on a later date as the participants were not available at the 
scheduled time; the delay did not appear to inhibit the data collection nor did it reduce 
the richness of the interview data. The interviews for the first exploratory study were 
conducted, following an interview schedule (see Appendix C), by the researcher, the 
researcher’s principal supervisor, Professor Michael Riley, and secondary supervisor 
(at the time), Dr Olympia Kyriakidou, all with considerable experience of research 
interviewing.
4.3 The First Exploratory Study
The first exploratory study ran from Monday 9 June to Friday 20 June 2003, the 
location was the Automobile Association/Centrica at Southwood near Farnborough. 
The sample for the first exploratory study was nine junior managers and administrators;
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this was a smaller sample than anticipated and desired, but there was a general 
reluctance from employees to participate, consequently, the decision was made to 
continue with the study despite the small sample size. The research process followed 
was as set out in Figure 4.2 below.
Figure 4.2: The research process -  first exploratory study
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Each participant was briefed individually by e-mail; the individual format was designed 
to preserve anonymity although participants were free to divulge their involvement to 
others. The electronic format was adopted at the specific insistence of the host 
organisation, although it is generally recognised that a face-to-face meeting with 
participants yields better results. As Bell (1992: 80) observes:
‘... it is essential to meet the people who will be giving up their time, so that 
you can explain the purpose of the exercise fully, inquire about the likely 
problems and, if possible, resolve them’.
One participant withdrew during the first week of diary completion owing to pressure of 
work; the remaining eight completed the study.
4.3.1 Methodological issues
The method of briefing (e-mail) proved less reliable than anticipated for two reasons. 
First, it did not allow a relationship of trust to develop between the researcher and 
participants; the first face-to-face contact occurred at the in-depth interview which was 
a critical stage in the research. Secondly, it did not provide an adequate means of 
developing a dialogue regarding the nature of the issues to be recorded. Consequently 
some diary entries appeared trivial and irrelevant, although they may have appeared 
very relevant to the individual at the time. This confirms the view expressed by Bell 
(1992) on the importance of meeting participants face-to-face.
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4.3.2 Substantive issues
The results of the first exploratory study are particularly interesting as the two data 
collection methods appeared to generate different types of issues. The majority of diary 
entries were concerned with what can be described as ‘job satisfaction’ issues, such as 
workload, deadlines, change of task briefings and IT problems. One participant (P1KR) 
made the following entries against the emotional descriptor:
• Achievement: Trainees on an induction course that I designed are doing well’
• Fatigue/boredom: The training course is going on a bit too long. It perhaps 
should have been a day and a half rather than two days’.
• Anxious: ‘I have a personal review to do with a member of staff who can be 
quite difficult’.
And another participant (P1GM) entered:
• Enthusiasm: ‘I solved a query for the head of department who said I had done 
well’.
• Stress: Told that once I have finished my current project there is another big 
project to start work on’.
In contrast the in-depth interviews produced evidence of concerns among the 
participants about the authoritarian style of management, which raises issues about 
‘organisational justice perceptions’ regarding how colleagues appeared to be treated. 
There were examples where procedural equity was questioned; one participant (P1KR) 
made the following comments during her interview:
• ‘ if I were to do that with my sort of team, I would be hauled across the coals’.
• ‘....you shouldn’t give someone a job just because they go out drinking with 
someone’.
• ‘We have never had any disciplinaries and there should have been a couple’. 
Similar comments were made by another participant (P1GM):
• ‘she gets away with absolute murder’.
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• ‘I think the fact she is getting away with it rather than she is not pulling her 
weight’.
One explanation for the differences might be confusion over what was expected of the 
participants in terms of diary entries, because there was no face-to-face briefing. 
Alternatively it could have been owing to a reluctance to enter this information in written 
form, potentially implying a lack of trust with management. However, it was considered 
inappropriate to speculate as to the underlying reason, although the issue was 
explored in the main study research.
A common theme running through the interviews was that rates of pay were considered 
good and generally better than the norm. From psychological contract perspective, 
there was no evidence of what could be termed violation or breach, despite some level 
of dissatisfaction being expressed by participants with the treatment they received from 
management or observed differential treatment compared with colleagues and 
suggested by Crossman (2002). The conclusion one might draw from this is that the 
perception of good pay causes the psychological contract to be ‘suspended’ or ‘put on 
ice’ and that potential breaches are ignored or overlooked, either consciously or 
subconsciously, as employees appear to adopt a holistic or ‘macro’ rather than ‘micro’ 
perspective regarding the relationship.
Whilst the results might appear very small, in relation to the extent of the exploratory 
research, they were considered to be significant and requiring further scrutiny and 
research. The next stage of the research was to conduct a second exploratory study 
with a more specific face-to-face briefing and an exploration of more contextual issues 
such as organisational climate (management style), trust in management, and 
perceptions of fairness of treatment.
4.4 The Second Exploratory Study
The second exploratory study ran from Monday 26 January to Friday 6 February 2004 
and was, once again, conducted at the Automobile Association/Centrica, but at the 
Basingstoke office. The sample for the second exploratory study was fourteen junior 
managers and administrators. The research process followed was as set out in Figure 
4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The research process -  second exploratory study
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In contrast to the first exploratory study, a face-to-face briefing was conducted with 
twelve of the participants, the remaining two, who were unable to attend owing to work 
commitments, were briefed by telephone and e-mail. Early in the second exploratory 
study, despite the face-to-face briefing, participants experienced difficulty in articulating 
their emotions and requested examples, consequently a list of emotional descriptors 
was sent to each participant by e-mail. One participant withdrew from the study during 
the first week owing to pressure of work and another was made redundant during the 
second week of the study and withdrew as a result.
The majority of the interviews for the second exploratory study took place between 
Monday 9 and Friday 13 February 2004. However, some participants were not 
available at this time and the interviews were, of necessity, conducted later, either on 
27 February or 12 March, these interviews were conducted by the researcher.
Each interview lasted between forty-five and sixty minutes; the tapes were transcribed 
by an external agency prior to manual analysis (see Appendix D). Observers of the 
diary method caution against the assumption that diarists will remain uninfluenced by 
the diary activity (Oppenheim, 1966); participation in recording behaviours may cause 
participants to alter the behaviours they are recording. Likewise, participants may be 
seduced by the novelty of entering critical incidents early in the research. 
Consequently, the records of incidents on the first day were disregarded for evaluation 
purposes to eliminate the ‘first day effects’ (Corti, 1993).
4.4.1 Methodological issues
The data collection method for the second exploratory study proved more reliable than 
that of the first. The success appears to be owed mainly to the early face-to-face 
briefing of prospective participants, which provided the opportunity for them to raise 
issues and to ask questions about the content and process of the research, thus 
confirming Bell’s (1992) view. This approach also appeared to facilitate a relationship of
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trust between the participants and the researcher, which revealed itself through the 
apparent ease of the participants during the in-depth interview stage. Early in the 
second study two participants expressed difficulty in articulating their emotions at work; 
consequently a list of forty four emotional descriptors (Table 4.1) was e-mailed to all 
participants as aide memoir.
Table 4.1 Glossary of emotions
Aggrieved Disliked Hatred Optimistic
Angry Distrusted Ignored Pessimistic
Anxious Enthusiastic Injustice Resentful
Betrayed Euphoric Insecure Secure
Bullied Exploited Interested Shocked
Contented Fairness Isolated Surprised
Disappointed Frustrated Insulted Supported
Discontented Guilty Joyous Satisfied
Disillusioned Happy Justice Trusted
Disinterested Harassed Manipulated Valued
Distressed Helpless Overwhelmed Worried
4.4.2 Substantive issues
There was evidence of some emotional triggers, but not as many as anticipated. 
Initially this was attributed to participants finding it difficult to identify and articulate the 
emotions they experienced at work. However, a different explanation was identified; 
close scrutiny of the in-depth interview transcripts for the second exploratory study 
revealed a number of common factors. First, without exception, the participants 
perceived management to be overtly authoritarian; in some cases overbearing, 
aggressive and bullying. This in itself is interesting as it suggests a similar 
[authoritarian] style of management in a difference geographical location, implying a 
organisation-wide authoritarian climate. Secondly, the majority of participants thought 
their pay was good and in some cases excessive for their effort. Thirdly, the majority of 
participants exhibited a low level of trust in management. Fourthly all participants 
demonstrated a perception of a lack of fairness from management (see Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2 Psychological contract dimensions from study 2
Respondent
Dimension EB TB JB PC LD DG LK LM JP KP SW CW
Authoritarianism ✓ S ✓ S S S ✓ S
Pay satisfaction S S S V S ✓ S
Low trust S S S S S S S S
Lack of fairness S S S S S S S S ✓ S
Ticked fields denote the dimension was reported during the interview.
Extracts from the interviews in respect of each of these four dimensions are set out in 
the following sub-sections (see Appendix D for examples of full interview transcripts).
4.4.2.1 Authority
There was support for the fact that authority and, more particularly authoritarianism, 
was a substantial factor in the participants’ perception of the organisation, this is 
evidenced by some of the interview comments from participants.
Participant P2JP:
‘...he threatened to put me on disciplinary and I said for what reason and he couldn’t 
come up with one he said I’ll have a think about it over the weekend and I’ll make a 
decision on Monday’.
Participant P2KP:
The expectation and timescales that were sent back to the business we were told 
were unacceptable by this particular manager and he then put a lot of pressure right 
the way up and down the chain of people who were trying to get the estimates for him. 
Unnecessarily so and that’s why I felt it was bullying ...’.
These two comments imply behaviours consistent with the research findings of Bies 
and Tripp (1998) of capricious actions or the obsession with obedience by superiors.
Participant P2PC:
‘You only .ever get a bollocking on a wrong decision when someone’s complained 
about it. You never get a pat on the back when you've made the right decision’.
133
Participant P2KP:
‘I wouldn’t have expected him to make those condescending, facetious remarks’.
Even though overt authoritarianism, to the extent of perceived bullying, was reported, 
employees still seemed content with their overall employment deal. This evidence is 
supportive of the notion that whilst authoritarianism may be an important factor within 
the organisational relationship, there may be other contributory factors, thus making the 
of investigation the role of managerial authoritarianism and the way in which 
participants have normalized and/or accepted the apparently predominant 
management style due to other contributory factors.
4.4.4.2 Pay satisfaction
There was support for the fact that ‘good’ pay was a significant factor in the 
participants’ psychological contract and it appears that pay may have a neutralizing 
effect on other dimensions such as authority. However, the extent to which pay 
satisfaction is an intervening variable cannot be determined from this study. However, 
the comments reported below indicate that authoritarian management (a negative work 
attribute) may be traded-off for good pay; this appears to be the reverse of the findings 
of Shapira (1981) and Riley and Szivas (2003), who found that positive work attributes 
may be trade off for low pay.
Participant P2LD:
‘...yeah I think we’re overpaid’.
The same participant also raised authority (regarding an altercation with her manager) 
as an issue during the interview reporting by saying:
‘I just got told that I was soft and I needed to toughen up’,
Participant P2JB:
‘...I know that if I went outside of this company I would have to in all probability reduce 
my salary ...’ and ‘...yes I do put up with a bit more because, erm, you know it’s a 
reasonably good salary.’
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Participant P2DG:
‘I feel very lucky to get that sort of pay for a job I enjoy’.
She went on to say:
everything I’ve heard seems to come down to we’re a company mate we’re making 
money. We don’t have time for people’.
Participant P2KP:
‘Personally I think that the organisation pay and package is very good’ She went on to 
talk about an incident which described as ‘unnecessary and therefore almost bullying’.
Participant P2SW:
‘... to be brutally honest I think we are well paid’.
Participant P2SW went on to describe a situation where IT people, previously 
employed by the Automobile Association, were making suggestions to Centrica 
managers were told ‘...shut up, what are you talking about, we bought you” . It seems 
that a change of organisational ownership (the Automobile Association being acquired 
by Centrica) had brought with it a change of culture as management as a whole 
became more demanding.
4.4.4.3 Trust
Participant P2TB:
‘He broke that trust on me in the first year when he offered my job to someone else’. 
Participant P2LM:
‘...one of the other senior managers who I spoke to around Christmas has stolen all my 
ideas’. ‘I feel betrayed I suppose really that you know someone you trusted, has gone 
and pinched your ideas’.
Participant P2CW:
‘I don’t trust some of them [management] but I do trust others’.
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Participant P2DG:
‘...I don’t trust managers anymore’. The use of the plural rather than singular 
terminology should be noted here.
4.4.4.4 Fairness
Participant P2PC:
‘Almost an apology to the person they had a go at, but at the same time lets have a go 
at everybody and not pull that one person to the side again, so I just think we were 
being treated unfairly because I don’t think it related to everybody it was more...’.
Participant P2KP:
‘I think this particular incident also sort of hit on my sense of fairness’.
Participant P2CW:
‘...but yes I do think from the general perspective that I do think it’s unfair that IT get 
criticised so much and the HR function doesn’t seem to’.
4.5 Conclusions from the Exploratory Studies
The initial focus of the research was to identify the potential relationship between 
management style, pay satisfaction and the transactional psychological contract. The 
exploratory studies drew upon emotional responses by employees in relation to 
incidents at work as indicators of their psychological contract consciousness and its 
variable state. In contrast to the psychological contract literature, which suggests a 
complex and multi-faceted psychological contract, the contracts of the study 
participants appeared to be rather less complicated. The findings also suggest that 
employee emotions at work are less prominent than anticipated. A number of recurrent 
themes were identified from the in-depth interviews:
• One consistent view of management as being authoritarian
• A narrow range of psychological contract dimensions
• A widespread use of the trust dimension
• A constant use of the fairness dimension
• A propensity not to apportion blame
• A high level of pay satisfaction supported by a general perception of being well- 
paid, even over paid.
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A number of broad conclusions were drawn from the exploratory studies:
• There was a norm of acceptance of management behaviour.
o Management is seen authoritarian, tough, and target-driven.
• Satisfaction with pay might act as a neutralizing agent for the authoritarian 
approach. This confirms the view that pay may act as a mediating variable 
between authoritarianism and the transactional psychological contract.
• Management as a whole was not trusted.
• A limited perception of psychological contract violation.
Participants displayed an affinity with the Automobile Association as an organisation 
and, as such, demonstrated a relational psychological contract at the organisational 
and impersonal level, even though there appeared to be a change in the behaviour of 
strategic and operational management. Conversely, employees also demonstrated a 
largely transactional psychological contract at the personal level with management in 
general and their immediate manager/supervisor in particular, which is consistent with 
the views of Crossman (2002). On the whole it would appear that the psychological 
contract of those studied had few dimensions which might be indicative of indifference 
on the part of employees.
4.6 Refinement of the Research Objectives
The overall objective of this [exploratory] research is to establish the extent of the 
relationship between the amount of authority exercised by management (the 
overarching managerial climate rather than the style adopted by individual managers) 
and employees’ pay satisfaction, and whether the latter impacted on the transactional 
dimension of the psychological contract, as defined by Rousseau (1990), displayed by 
the employee.
Supported by the literature reviewed in chapters two and three and the results from the 
two exploratory studies, the following assumptions were made:
• The psychological has two elements, transactional and relational, 
these are located on a continuum and more of one results in less of 
the other.
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• The impact of authoritarian management is mainly on the 
transactional element; the higher the authoritarianism exhibited, the 
more transactional the relationahip.
• Good pay can be traded off against authoritarian management.
• The elements of a job that make up satisfaction, such as satisfaction 
with promotion, communication, co-workers, and the work itself are 
not all negotiable against authoritarianism.
On the basis of this the following research objectives, questions and propositions were 
formulated:
4.6.1 Research objective 1
The first objective is to test the relationship between perceptions of authoritarianism 
and the transactional psychological contract and to investigate the magnitude of the 
transactional element. Thus the first research question is:
Is there a relationship between the level of perceived authoritarianism and 
the transactional psychological contract?
Here the expected relationship would be that the greater the perceived authoritarianism 
the greater will be the magnitude of the transactional element of the psychological 
contract. Consequently the first proposition was conceived:
Proposition 1
Perceptions of high management authoritarianism will lead to a high 
transactional psychological contract.
4.6.2 Research objective 2
The second research objective is to analyse the component structure of transactional 
psychological contract. Although considered a single dimension it is possible that this 
element of the psychological contract has differential meaning in relation to managerial 
authoritarianism. Consequently the second research question is:
Is the transactional psychological contract a single dimension or can it be 
sub-divided into component parts?
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From this research question the second proposition was developed:
Proposition 2
The transactional element of the psychological contract (as measured by 
the Millward and Hopkins scale) is comprised of smaller factors.
4.6.3 Research objective 3
The third research objective is to test whether pay satisfaction has any effect upon the 
relationship between perceived authoritarianism and the transactional psychological 
contract. Of particular interest is the way in which an individual’s satisfaction with pay 
might have some mediating or moderating impact on the degree of perceived 
authoritarianism and the resultant transactional psychological contract, which might 
change the outcome in the relationship between an authoritarian management style 
and the transactional psychological contract.
Although the terms ‘mediating’ and ‘moderating’ variable are frequently used liberally 
and interchangeably, Baron and Kenny (1986: 1174; 1176) (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) are 
careful to distinguish between the two, insofar that:
‘Mediators explain how external physical events take on internal 
psychological significance. Whereas moderator variables specify when 
certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur.’
Figure 4.4: Mediator variable model
Mediator
variable
Independent
variable
Outcome
variable
Source: Baron and Kenny (1986:1176)
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Figure 4.5: Moderator variable model
Predictor
Moderator
Outcome
variable
Moderator
Predictor
Source: Baron and Kenny (1986:1174)
On the basis of these different approaches, the line of investigation to be pursued here 
is two separate analyses of Total Pay Satisfaction as a potential mediator or moderator 
between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract. Thus, the third research question is:
Does pay satisfaction act as a mediating or moderating variable between 
perceived authoritarianism and the transactional psychological contract?
This question was then transformed into two further more focused propositions:
Proposition 3a
Pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
Proposition 3b
Pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
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4.7 Main Study - Methodology and Data Collection
As a result of the findings from the exploratory studies, the decision was made to 
transfer from a qualitative to a quantitative approach to data collection for the main 
study. The rationale for the change being that, whilst the qualitative method proved 
valuable in determining the key issues in relation to, and which might impact on the 
transactional psychological contract, a quantitative method would prove more 
expedient in terms of time and enable the collection of data from a larger sample and, 
thus, facilitate a greater generalization of the results; the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods at different stages has been recognised as appropriate (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2002), as was noted earlier.
The data for the main study were collected from nine (subsequently eight) 
organisations during October, November and December 2005. The data collection 
method adopted was a self-administered quantitative questionnaire and which, as far 
as possible, utilised pre-tested and reliable instruments or scales (see Appendix E). 
There were a number of reasons for this approach. First, a quantitative method would 
allow for a larger sample than a quantitative method, such as an interview or interview- 
administered questionnaire, which is more time consuming, but which provide greater 
opportunity to explore issues in more depth and produces a higher response rate 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). Secondly, questionnaires are considered 
particularly appropriate for analytical or explanatory research in which the researcher 
seeks to ‘examine and explain the relationships between variables, in particular 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:282). Thirdly, the adoption of pre-tested questions 
or banks of questions is more efficient than self-developed questions and provides the 
opportunity for comparison with other studies (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003) 
and the internal reliability of the questions is known.
The original intention was to adopt a single-organisational approach in order to avoid 
potential multi-organisation bias created by variables such as organisational size, 
culture, ownership; the proposed sample was to be representative of the organisational 
population and include high and low paid employees of long and short tenure. 
However, difficulty in recruiting participant organisation of sufficient size resulted in a 
multi-organisational approach being adopted and the data collection instrument was 
amended to capture more detailed demographic and organisational data.
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4.7.1 Ethical Approval
Approval to proceed with the main data collection was granted by the School of 
Management Ethics Committee on 23 February, 2005.
4.8 Instrument Design
Tenure data was collected using the four-band scale ( 0-5, 6-10, 11-20, 21+) adopted 
by Sarker, Crossman and Chinmeteepituck (2003), which was considered suitable on 
the basis of previous results, as it provides sufficient range to capture short/long 
tenure, without the range of categories being so broad that validity might be 
compromised by low numbers in any single category.
Pay level data was collected using a scale guided by a combination of data from the 
New Earnings Survey, the Labour Force Survey and the Office of National Statistics. 
Sloane and Theodossiou (1998a) (as discussed in Asplund, Sloane and Theodossiou, 
1998) and Sloan and Theodossiou (1998b), observe that there are no international 
standards for measuring pay and this should be decided by the researcher based on 
the needs of the research and the resources available to the researcher. This advice 
provides useful guidance and the banded scale, running from <£10k to >£50k, was 
considered to fit well with the employee population for this research.
4.8.1 Concepts and measures
The exploratory studies indicated that management climate (authoritarianism) and 
satisfaction with pay might impact on the transactional psychological contract. 
Consequently measures were sought for each of these concepts. A range of measures 
were reviewed for each and their suitability for this particular research was assessed.
4.8.1.1 Authoritarian managerial style
A clear distinction is necessary for the purpose of this research between management 
style, the overarching managerial climate, and the style adopted by individual 
managers. Whilst the style adopted by the individual manager may reflect the 
managerial climate it might also deviate from it. Furthermore, as individual managers 
join, leave and are transferred in the organisation individual management styles are 
likely to be more transitory, whereas the overarching managerial climate is more likely 
to be embedded in the organisational culture and less susceptible to frequent change.
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In seeking a suitable measure for management style a range of instruments was 
reviewed. Initially scales relating to authoritarianism were reviewed, as these, at first 
view, appeared relevant. Those reviewed were the F-Scale (Adorno et al, 1950), the 
General Attitudes Toward Authority Scale (Rigby, 1982), The Submissiveness to 
Authority Scale (DeZoort and Roskas-Ewoldsen, 1997), the Rahim Organizational 
Conflict Inventory (Rahim, 1983), the Compliance With Supervisor’s Wishes scale 
(Rahim, 1988), and the Social Desirability Scale (Crown and Marlow, 1960). Close 
scrutiny of these instruments and scales revealed a primary focus on and 
measurement of individual predisposition or submissiveness to authority, rather than 
the degree of authority exercised. Indeed one of the most popular, Adorno et al’s 
(1950) F-Scale, has been criticised by Ray (1990) as not predicting authoritarian 
behaviour.
Having made the decision to move away from submissiveness toward authority to a 
measure of authoritarianism in management style a viable measure was sought. 
Initially the instrument designed by Likert (1967) was reviewed, as was the more recent 
Climate of Fear scale (Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003). The Likert instrument was in 
principle, suitable as divided it management style into four categories (exploitative 
authoritative; benevolent authoritative; consultative, participative). However, the Likert 
instrument is comprised of 43 items which, given the management style scale was to 
be combined with other scales, was considered too long and the scale could not be 
shortened without losing its reliability which would have required considerable re­
testing. In contrast the Climate of Fear scale by Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003) 
proved to be a highly suitable alternative. The instrument is comprised 13 items, loaded 
onto a single factor, which relate to organisational climate in terms of authoritarian 
management style (see Figure 4.6). The scale has been successfully used in 
conjunction with scales measuring ‘innovative leadership’ and ‘communication culture’. 
The items are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ‘strongly agree’ (7) and 
‘strongly disagree’ anchors (1). The instrument has an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha 
score of .79, suggesting instrument reliability.
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Figure 4.6: Climate of Fear scale
1 = Strongly disagree (SD); 2 = Disagree (D); 3 = Undecided, but inclined to disagree (UD); 4  = Quite 
undecided (U); 5 = Undecided, but inclined to agree (UA); 6 = Agree (A); 7 = Strongly agree (SA).
Q
1
SD
2
D
3
UD
4
U
5
UA
6
A
7
SA
1 I feel people aren’t totally truthful with me 
because they worry about what they have to 
tell me.
2(r) I feel that I can be totally honest with 
management on all work-related issues.
3 I feel fearful or anxious when I am at work.
4(r) I feel comfortable about giving suggestions 
-  they aren’t treated as criticism.
5 I feel uneasy at work because I do not 
receive all the information I need to do my 
job properly.
6(r) When I make a mistake, I am confident 
about telling co-workers and would never lie 
about it.
7 I dread repercussions at work because they 
are unpredictable.
8(r) I do not feel apprehensive about discussing 
sensitive work issues with management.
9 I feel anxious about speaking up in this 
organization, because you have to be able 
to prove all your remarks.
10(r) I feel at ease in the workplace because 
punishment is only applied to those who 
have done something wrong.
11 I feel so fearful when I make a mistake, that 
I would hide it from or lie about it to 
management.
12(r) I feel safe discussing sensitive work issues 
with co-workers.
13 I feel afraid at work because management 
comes down hard on mistakes as an 
example to others.
4.8.1.2 Pay satisfaction
There are a number of measures of pay satisfaction. These include the Love of Money 
Scale (Tang, Luna-Arocas and Whiteside, 1997, 2003), the Pay Satisfaction 
Questionnaire (Heneman and Schwab, 1985), and the pay elements of the Job 
Satisfaction Survey (Spector, 1997). During the preliminary studies pay was identified 
as an overarching concept; there was no distinction drawn between base pay, other 
forms of incentive or merit payments. Consequently, the decision was made to 
measure pay satisfaction by way of a ‘blunt’ instrument and each of the scales referred 
to above was reviewed to assess their suitability.
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The Love of Money Scale (Tang, Luna-Arocas and Whiteside, 1997, 2003), contains 
fifteen items arranged into five factors (budget, evil, equity, success, motivator) and is 
more concerned with the perceptions of the value of money from an ideological 
perspective and not restricted to pay in relation to the reward-effort bargain. Fifteen 
items was considered excessive and as such might reduce the response rate.
The modified Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire (Heneman and Schwab, 1985) is 
comprised of eighteen items arranged into four factors (level, benefits, raises, 
structure/administration). The Items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale with ‘very 
satisfied’ (1) to ‘very dissatisfied’ (5) anchors. In contrast to the Love of Money Scale all 
items are related to the reward-effort bargain and, as such, more appropriate for this 
study. In addition the study has proved reliable in a range of cultural/organisational 
settings (Lam, 1998; Mulvey, Miceli and Near, 1992). However, eighteen items is 
perhaps unnecessarily complex for a simple concept and it might be more appropriate 
to adapt the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire and to ask one overarching question (e.g. 
to what extent are you satisfied with your pay?) and/or one supplementary question for 
each factor (e.g. to what extent are you satisfied with the level of your pay?). This 
would provide the ‘blunt’ instrument approach, but would also enable which aspects of 
the pay concept are most/least important.
The four questions from the Job Satisfaction Survey are uncomplicated and use a six- 
point Likert scale, ranging from ‘disagree very much’ to ‘agree very much’, and focus 
on satisfaction with fairness of reward, frequency of raises, pay reflecting the amount 
the individual feels appreciated by the organisation, and chances of salary increases.
Having considered the merits, advantages and disadvantages of each instrument and 
the associated measures, the decision was made to adopt a simplified form of the Pay 
Satisfaction Questionnaire (Heneman and Schwab, 1985), as outlined above, to 
measure satisfaction in relation to pay (see Figure 4.7). The level of satisfaction was 
measured across the four dimensions set out by Heneman (level, benefits, raises, 
structure/administration) with a single question for each facet. This was designed to 
provide flexibility for the measurement of each individually or for a combined overall 
pay satisfaction score to be generated.
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Figure 4.7: Pay Satisfaction scale
1 = Strongly disagree (SD); 2 = Disagree (D); 3 = Neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = Agree (A); 5 = 
Strongly agree (SA). i_________________________   ' ______ ______ _ ____
Q
1
SD
2
D
3
N
4
A
5
SA
1 I am satisfied with the level of my gross pay
2 I am satisfied with the benefits I receive
3 The structure/administration of the pay system is fair
4 I am satisfied with the frequency of raises in my pay
4.8.1.3 Total expectations
Given the role of expectations on the construction of the psychological contract, a 
single overarching item was added to the end of the Climate of Fear (CF) scale, the 
Pay Satisfaction scale (PS) and the Transactional Psychological Contract (TPC) (see 
Figure 4.8). This question was designed to measure, in very blunt terms, whether 
participants’ expectations had been met in terms of management behaviour, pay level 
and administration, and their relationship with their organisation.
Figure 4.8: Total Expectation scale
1 = Strongly disagree (SD); 2 = Disagree (D); 3 = Undecided, but inclined to disagree (UD); 4  = Quite 
undecided (U); 5 = Undecided, but inclined to agree (UA); 6 = Agree (A); 7 = Strongly agree (SA)
Q
SD D UD N UA A SA
CF All things considered, the management of 
my organization behaves just as I 
expected it to.
1 2 ■ 3 ■ 4 5
PS All things considered my pay and benefits 
are as I expected them to be
1
2 ■ 3 ■ 4 5
TPC All things considered, I feel that my 
relationship with my organization is as I 
expected it to be
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.8.1.4 Transactional psychological contract
Two psychological contract measures were considered, the Psychological Contract 
Inventory by Rousseau (1998b, 2000) and the derivative instrument adopted by 
Millward and Hopkins (1998). The Psychological Contract Inventory by Rousseau 
(1998b, 2000) is based upon four types of psychological contract, ‘relational’, 
‘balanced’, ‘transactional’ and ‘transitional’. Each of these four dimensions is sub­
divided into a range of specific components by Rousseau (2000), each containing five 
employer and five employee items, with responses on a 5-point scale. Although the
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Psychological Contract Inventory has proved to be a sensitive and reliable instrument, 
with 100 items it was considered to large to be integrated with other measures into a 
single combined instrument. Furthermore, as the focus of the research was specifically 
the transactional psychological contract, the other sub-divisions, although relevant to 
other research, were considered somewhat superfluous in this particular context.
The Psychological Contract Scale developed by Millward and Hopkins (1998) is, in 
contrast to the Psychological Contract Inventory, a simpler instrument in terms of 
design and more concise. Following the approach of Rousseau (1989), Robinson, 
Kraatz and Rousseau (1994) and Rousseau (1990), Millward and Hopkins divide the 
psychological contract into two dimensions; ‘relational’ and ‘transactional’, which are 
used as factors for factor analysis. The relational scale contains 13 items and the 
transactional scale 20 items, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale with ‘strongly 
agree’ (1) to ‘strongly disagree’ (5) anchors. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability scores for 
the relational and transactional items were 0.86 and 0.88 respectively in one study 
(Millward and Hopkins, 1998) and 0.84 and 0.80 respectively in another (Millward and 
Brewerton, 1999). Given the propositions for this research relate to the transactional 
dimension of the psychological contract, the transactional section of the Psychological 
Contract Scale instrument made it highly suitable and this was finally adopted (see 
Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9: Transactional Psychological Contract scale
1 = Strongly disagree (SD); 2 = Disagree (D); 3 = Neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = Agree (A); 5 = 
Strongly agree (SA)_________________________ ________________________ ______ ______ ^ >
Q *Q
1
SD
2
D
3
N
4
A
5
SA
1 1 I do this job just for the money.
2 2 I prefer to work a strictly defined set of 
working hours.
3 3 I do not identify with the organization’s goals.
4 4 It is important not to get too involved in your 
job.
5 5 I expect to be paid for the overtime that I do.
6 6 I come to work purely to get the job done.
7(r) 7(r) I intend to stay in this job for a long time (i.e., 
over 2 to 3 years).
8 8 My long-term future does not lie with this 
organization.
9 9 My loyalty to the organization is defined by my 
contract of employment.
10 10 I only carry out what is necessary to get the 
job done.
11 11 As long as I reach the targets specified in my 
job, I am satisfied.
12 12 I work only the hours set out in my contract 
and no more
13 14 It is important not to get too attached to your 
place of work.
14 15 I work to achieve the purely short-term goals 
of my job.
15 16 My commitment to this organization is defined 
by my contract.
16(r) 18(r) My long-term future lies with this organization.
17 (r) 19(r) I will work for this company indefinitely.
18(r) 26(r) My job means more to me than just a means 
of paying the bills.
19(r) 31 (r) It is important to be flexible and to work 
irregular hours if necessary.
20(r) 36(r) I am heavily involved in my place of work.
* Original question numbers used by Millward and Hopkins (1998)
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4.9 Pilot Study
Numerous authors have recommended the use of a pilot study to test the research 
instrument (Moser, 1961; Bell, 1992; Cuming, 1992; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002; 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). According to Bell (1992: 65) a questionnaire:
should be piloted to test how long it takes recipients to complete, to 
check that all the questions and instructions are clear and to enable you to 
remove any items that do not yield usable data.’
Similarly, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003: 308), suggest the purpose of the pilot 
study is to:
‘.... refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in 
answering the questions and there will be no problems in recording the 
data.’
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002: 100) also suggest questionnaires are subjected to a pre­
test in order to check that issues such as:
‘.... understanding, the level of difficulty, the willingness to answer 
sensitive questions and the time it takes to answer the questionnaire are 
as we wish.’
Prior to the main data collection, a pilot study was conducted, even though, as stated 
earlier, the ‘climate of fear’ and transactional psychological contract scales adopted for 
the main instrument were already validated and demonstrated strong reliability scores. 
A pilot was considered necessary as, in contrast to previous usage, the scales were 
being combined into a single instrument and the two additional scales to measure 
overall expectations and pay satisfaction were developed specifically for this research 
and as such were not previously tested.
The pilot study took place on Wednesday 27* July 2005 and was conducted in an 
organisation of similar characteristics to those being sought for the main data 
collection; a call centre operation providing business services. The organisation was 
based in Andover and provided customer support and sales as part of its’ insurance
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broking business. The instrument was tested on twenty individuals to ascertain the time 
required for completion and the sequencing of sections. The results indicated the time 
required for completion ranged from 10 to 15 minutes, which was deemed acceptable. 
The section sequencing was considered logical and no changes were made to the 
instrument as a result of the pilot. The Cronbach alpha scores generated from the pilot 
study indicated strong reliability, as set out in table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3: Pilot study reliability scores
Cronbach’s alpha
Scale Pilot Published
Total Perceived Authoritarianism 0.85 0.791
Total Pay Satisfaction 0.82 n/a
Total Transactional Psychological Contract 0.86 0 .882 /0.803
Total Expectation 0.78 n/a
1. Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003
2. Millward and Hopkins, 1998
3. Millward and Brewerton, 1999
The reliability score used to measure perceived authoritarianism (‘climate of fear’) of 
0.85 faired better in the pilot study than the original published score of 0.79 by 
Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003). The transactional psychological contract score for 
the pilot study of 0.86 fell between the published scores of 0.88 (Millward and Hopkins, 
1998) and 0.80 (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) and, as such, demonstrated a sound 
reliability score well in excess of the recommended 0.70. The scores for the new scales 
to measure pay satisfaction and total expectation at 0.82 and 0.78 respectively were 
likewise well above 0.70 and considered reliable.
4.10 Sampling
The sampling method adopted was based on organisation self-selection insofar that 
the organisations approached chose to participate or not. Within these organisations a 
census was conducted of every employee in the participating location. It is recognised 
however, that the process of self-selection might create bias as those who decide to 
participate may have done so solely because of the extreme views they might hold. 
Consequently the data were scrutinised for potential skewness and distribution.
The rational for this particular approach was that the difficulty experienced with 
recruiting participating organisations and the sensitive nature of the instrument did not 
make probability sampling, such as simple random, stratified random, systematic, or
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cluster sampling a viable option, as obtaining lists of employee names and delivering 
questionnaires to identified individuals was considered to reduce the response rate. 
Where, for practical reasons, a more systematic sampling approach is not realistic, 
other forms of sampling may be a last resort (Fisher, 2004). Consequently, a 
considered judgment was made to adopt the census sampling, whilst the limitations of 
the non-probability approach, argued by numerous authors (Kerlinger, 1986; Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2002; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003; Fisher, 2004) in terms of 
reliability and generalization, were noted.
Owing to the initial difficulty in recruiting a single organisation of sufficient size, the 
decision was made to recruit a number of organisations with a common characteristic. 
The rationale for choosing call centres was twofold: First, the common characteristic of 
the call centre would facilitate technological equivalence and variable control. 
Secondly, according the evidence, call centres are frequently characterised by an 
authoritarian regime (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998) that individuals within them tend to 
work under sustained pressure for relatively low pay and exhibit a propensity to quit 
(Taylor and Bain, 1999). The sampling approach for the multi-organisational study is 
set out below.
The first step was to contact the Call Centre Association, which agreed to run a ‘call for 
assistance’ in the Call Centre Association’s fortnightly online update, the Email Sharing 
Knowledge and Information (ESKI). This generated interest and subsequent 
participation from four organisations. The second step was to write to fourteen 
organisation listed in a Thompson Directory call centre mailing list, which resulted in 
interest and participation from two organisations. The third step was to write to each of 
the four contact centres for the Automobile Association (the host organisation for the 
exploratory studies, albeit a different division), which resulted in one agreeing to 
participate. The fourth step was to conduct a search of the internet for contact/call 
centres and to write to each, this resulted in a further four organisations agreeing to 
participate which, ultimately, gave a total of nine participating organisations.
In return for their participation, all organisations were offered an executive summary of 
the findings for whole sample, preserving organisational anonymity, with their own 
statistics being identifiable in a separate section. These executive summaries were
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distributed electronically to the eight organisations that finally participated after the 
initial data analysis.
4.10.1 Research context: organisational background
A brief account of each of the participating organisations is given in Appendix G. The 
majority of the information provided was obtained from the organisations’ own web 
sites and in-house publications, thus there is a strong likelihood that the information 
provided might contain organisational bias. However, the purpose of this section is to 
provide the reader with an indication of the main characteristics of the organisations 
involved merely as a background to the research and to a context against which to 
view the results and analysis.
4.11 Distribution of Questionnaires
A total of 1,672 questionnaires were distributed to the nine participating organisations 
by post between the beginning of October 2005 and the end of January 2006. Each 
participating organisation was sent a pack of questionnaires with a covering letter and 
freepost return envelope for each employee. Internal distribution of the questionnaires 
to individual employees was delegated to the organisational representative with whom 
the initial contact had been made. While the lack of control over distribution is 
recognised there was no viable alternative owing to the geographical dispersion of the 
organisations and desire to retain respondents’ anonymity. Participants were given 
approximately one month to return their completed questionnaires.
4.11.1 Response rate
Of the 1,672 questionnaires distributed a total of 486 were returned giving an overall 
response rate of slightly above 29% (see Table 4.4). However, there was also a very 
low response rate from one particular organisation (LEGO) which, according to the 
contact centre manager, was owing to a majority of contact centre employees 
emanating from Eastern Europe who were suspicious of the survey and reluctant to 
participate. The response rate was also adversely affected by one organisation (West 
Bromwich Building Society) deciding to withdraw from the study on the day data 
collection was due to commence, leaving insufficient time for a replacement 
organisation to be found.
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In order to increase the accuracy of the results the data were subjected to close 
scrutiny and cleaning. The four organisations with low responses (LEGO, Market 
Makers, Thames Valley Housing Association and ZOMAX) were excluded from the 
analysis for comparative organisational analysis. In addition, a large proportion of the 
responses contained missing high numbers of values, either in the demographic 
section or those pertaining to authoritarianism, pay satisfaction and psychological 
contract. As a result these were also excluded, which reduced the data set for the 
analysis from 486 to 256 (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Survey Response Rate -  main study
Org ID Organization
Dist
N=
Full 
Data Set 
n= %
Reduced 
Data Set 
n= %
01 Automobile Association 150 77 51.33 56 21.9
02 Glasgow City Council Access Centre 100 48 48.00 27 10.5
03 iResponse 320 108 32.18 51 19.9
04 LEGO Direct 100 10 10.00
05 MGt pic 800 210 26.25 122 47.7
06 Market Makers 30 14 46.66
07 Thames Valley Housing Association 12 9 75.00
08 West Bromwich Building Society 130 0 00.00
09 ZOMAX 30 10 33.33
Total 1672 486 29.06 256 100.0
Organisations in italics were removed to create the reduced data set for the final analysis
Whilst this procedure significantly reduced the data set, it was considered a better 
alternative than the ‘exclude cases listwise’, ‘exclude cases pairwise’ or ‘replace with 
mean’ options available within SPSS as the data would be more reliable for analysis.
4.12 Data Analysis
The data from the questionnaires were coded (see Appendix F) and inputted into SPSS 
v.12. Descriptive and comparative analysis was conducted to generate means, 
standard deviations and frequencies. More sophisticated tests, such as exploratory 
factor analysis and correlations, were performed on the data, the results of which are 
presented and discussed in the findings and analysis chapter.
4.13 Reliability Testing -  Main Study
The reliability for each scale was tested using Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 4.5). The 
reliability score for Total Perceived Authoritarianism of 0.87 was higher than those of 
the pilot study (0.85) and the original published score of 0.79 (Ashkanasy and
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Nicholson, 2003). The Total Transactional Psychological Contract reliability score for 
the main study of 0.89 was also higher than those of the pilot study (0.86) and the 
published scores of Millward and Hopkins (1998) (0.88) and Millward and Brewerton 
(1999) (0.80). The reliability score for Total Pay Satisfaction was 0.85 which was also 
higher than that of the pilot study (0.82). Consequently these three scales, with scores 
well in excess of the recommended 0.70, were considered highly reliable. The reliability 
test for the fourth scale, Total Expectations, produced a score of 0.60, which was lower 
that the pilot study (0.78) which was a disappointing result.
Table 4.5: Main study reliability scores
Cronbach’s
Scale alpha
Total Perceived Authoritarianism 0.87
Total Pay Satisfaction 0.85
Total Transactional Psychological Contract 0.89
Total Expectation 0.60
The data were also subjected to an inter-item/item-total correlation for each of the three 
main scales and for the composite Total Expectation scale; the full results are set out in 
Appendix I. For Total Perceived Authoritarianism all the inter-item scores were all in 
excess of .3 (p=.000); for Total Pay Satisfaction all the inter-item/item-total scores were 
in excess of .6 (p=.000); for the Total Transactional Psychological Contract the inter­
item score were all in excess of .3 (p=.000), with two exception of two (Q2=.232 and 
Q5=.297); for the composite Total Expectation scale all the inter-item scores were in 
excess of .4 (p=.000).
4.14 Testing for Normality
The data in relation to the three main scales (Total Perceived Authoritarianism; Total 
Pay Satisfaction; Total Transactional Psychological Contract) and the single item 
measure for Pay Expectations were subjected to tests for normality using SPSS v12. 
The results of the normality tests for the four scales for the whole sample are 
summarised in Table 4.6 below.
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Table 4.6: Tests for data distribution normality -  total sample by scale
Total 
Perceived 
Measure Authoritarianism
Total
Pay
Satisfaction
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Pay
Expectation
Mean 41.1523 10.5352 63.8594 2.74
Trimmed Mean 40.4575 10.5252 63.7674 2.74
Minimum value 13.00 4.00 29.00 1
Maximum
value
91.00 20.00 100.00 5
Range 78.00 16.00 71.00 4
SD 14.28712 4.05147 12.39053 1.186
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic 0.068 0.097 0.053 0.203
d.f. 256 256 256 256
Sig. 0.006* 0.000* 0.077 0.000*
"indicates significant result - values not normally distributed
The test results generated significance values for three scales indicating that the data 
were not normally distributed; only the Transactional Psychological Contract scale was 
normally distributed.
Further normality tests were performed in order to identify if the non-normal distribution 
for the Total Perceived Authoritarianism scale related to the whole sample or whether 
there were differences by organisation (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7: Tests for data distribution normality - Total 
Authoritarianism by organisation ID
Perceived
Measure
OrglDI
Automobile
Association
OrglD2 
Glasgow City 
Council
OrglD3
iResponse
OrglD5
MGt
Mean 42.0714 45.4074 36.6275 41.6803
Trimmed Mean 41.6548 45.1337 36.0490 40.8953
Minimum value 14.00 20.00 13.00 15.00
Maximum value 85.00 76.00 81.00 91.00
Range 71.00 56.00 68.00 76.00
SD 13.72437 16.76135 12.83738 14.23897
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic 0.078 0.141 0.124 0.086
d.f. 56 27 51 122
Sig. 0.200* 0.181 0.048**. 0.027**
* indicates lower bound of true confidence
^indicates significant result - values not normally distributed
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The results generated significance values for two organisations (Automobile 
Association and Glasgow City Council) which indicate the data were normally 
distributed, but there were non-normal distributions for the remaining two (iResponse 
and MGt).
Similarly, further normality tests were performed in order to identify if the non-normal 
distribution for the Total Transactional Psychological Contract scale related to the 
whole sample or whether there were differences by organisation (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8: Tests for data distribution normality - Total Transactional
Psychological Contract by organisation ID
Measure
OrglDI
Automobile
Association
OrglD2 
Glasgow City 
Council
OrglD3
iResponse
OrglD5
MGt
Mean 58.1250 65.3333 64.0196 66.0984
Trimmed Mean 58.1111 64.9959 64.4303 65.8388
Minimum value 32.00 40.00 36.00 29.00
Maximum value 84.00 97.00 81.00 100.00
Range 52.00 57.00 45.00 71.00
SD 12.43172 13.93115 9.24660 12.46974
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic 0.057 0.091 0.101 0.075
d.f. 56 27 51 122
Sig. 0.200* 0.200* 0.200* 0.089
* indicates lower bound of true confidence
The results indicate that the data were normally distributed for all four organisations for 
the Total Transactional Psychological Contract scale.
Whilst the lack of a normal distribution provided confirmation that statements had been 
successfully constructed to avoid neutral responses, the lack of normal distribution in 
three of the four scales dictated that the data should be subjected to non-parametric 
tests, which, in contrast to their parametric equivalents, do not make assumptions 
about the shape of population distributions. However, whilst nonparametric tests are 
generally considered not as powerful as parametric tests and the incidence of a type II 
error (the rejection of a false hypothesis) is more difficult when using nonparametric 
tests (Grimm 1993), some authors (Kerlinger, 1992; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) argue 
that many parametric tests are robust enough to cope .with some violation of test 
requirements, particularly if a sample size is sufficiently large compared to the
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population size (Grimm 1993). Therefore, whilst non-parametric tests were performed 
on the data in relation to the Total Perceived Authoritarianism, Total Pay Satisfaction, 
and Total Transactional Psychological Contract scores, the equivalent parametric test 
was also applied were possible and appropriate to confirm the nonparametric scores.
4.15 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an account of the methodological approach to the research 
from design through to execution. The chapter has described the way in which the 
reviews of the literature on managerial authoritarianism and the psychological contract 
informed the research and formed the basis for the research questions, objectives and 
propositions. There was an account of the two exploratory studies which were used to 
identify the salient issues in relation to perceptions of management behaviour and the 
way these impacted on the psychological contract; the chapter has also provided an 
explanation of, and rational for, the methodological shift from qualitative to quantitative, 
as a result of the exploratory studies.
The chapter has provided an explanation of the data collection method for the main 
study and provided a justification for the selection and adoption of the existing Climate 
of Fear scale (Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003) to measure Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the transactional component from Millward and Hopkins’ (1998) 
psychological contract scale to measure Total Transactional Psychological Contract. 
There is also a justification for the creation of a simple Total Pay Satisfaction scale, 
derived from Heneman and Schwab (1985) and the even simpler three-item Total 
Expectation scale.
An account was provided of the pilot study through which the data collection instrument 
was tested and validated, with favourable Cronbach’s alpha scores for the Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract indicating 
strong reliability. Details of organisational and individual access and sampling 
procedures were explained, as was the response rate for each organisation. Likewise 
an explanation was provided for the initial data analysis in terms of normality testing, 
inter-item-correlations and the selection of parametric and non-parametric tests for the 
main data analysis.
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The next chapter gives a detailed account of the descriptive and inferential statistics, it 
presents the results of the main study and discusses the results of tests that were 
performed on the data in relation to each of the three research objectives.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: MAIN STUDY
5.1 Introduction *
This chapter presents the results of the investigation into each of the three research 
objectives set out earlier in the Methodological Approach chapter, and with a view to 
meeting the research objectives by exploring the research questions and testing the 
propositions, also set out in the same chapter. The chapter provides an account of the 
way in which the data were ordered, manipulated and analysed. Chapter guides are 
presented periodically (Figure 5.1) to assist chapter navigation.
Figure 5.1: Chapter guide
Research Objectives
Descriptive Statistics
Sample Profile
Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 1 
Correlation Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
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The chapter commences with an overview of the sample profile by organisational 
characteristics; respondent distribution by participating organisation, whether the 
ownership is public or private, respondent distribution by organisational size, and 
whether trade unions are recognised. This is followed by sample profile information by 
individual demographic characteristics; gender, age, job tenure, organisation tenure, 
employment status, job category, and pay level.
The Descriptive Statistics section provides statistical information (mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, range) relating to the three main scales used 
in the research (Total Perceived Authoritarianism, Total Pay Satisfaction, Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract). This is followed by details of independent- 
samples t-tests conducted for each of the organisational and demographic categories 
for each of the three main scales.
The focus of the chapter then turns to the three research objectives and the related 
research questions. The first research objective relates to the relationship between 
perceptions of managerial authoritarianism, using the ‘climate of fear’ scale 
(Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003) to measure Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
the Total Transactional Psychological Contract using the 20-item scale from Millward 
and Hopkins (1998). This section provides details of the tests for correlation and 
regression, and independent-samples t-tests, which were performed on the full data 
set and on sub-sets arranged by organisational ID, gender, organisational tenure, 
employment status, and job category.
The second research objective is concerned with the composition of the transactional 
psychological contract. The focus of investigation is whether the 20-item Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract scale is the best measure or whether it can be 
sub-divided into smaller factors. This section provides an account of the data analysis 
using Generalised Least Squares Factor Analysis for Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract as a single factor and the three sub-factors derived subsequently from the 
analysis (Organisational Disengagement, individual Disengagement, and Legal 
Contract). There is also a sub-section in which the first research objective is revisited in 
the light of the findings from the factor analysis in relation to the second research 
objective; this section provides details of the tests for correlation and regression which
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were performed in relation to Total Perceived Authoritarianism and each of the sub­
factors.
The third research objective is divided into two components; the first to identify whether 
Total Pay Satisfaction acts as a mediating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Total Transactional Psychological contract, and the second to 
identify whether it acts as a moderating variable. This section presents the results of 
the tests of correlation and partial correlation, along with the systematic regression 
analyses which were performed on the full data set and, where appropriate, on the 
organisational data sets.
5.2 Sample Profile
As detailed the previous chapter, although the full response rate was 486 
questionnaires from eight organisations, as discussed in the Methodological Approach 
chapter, those from small organisations were removed, as were all questionnaires with 
missing values. Consequently the data set was reduced to 256.
Figure 5.2: Chapter guide
Descriptive Statistics
Research Objectives
Sample Profile
Research Objective 1 
Correlation Analysis
Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
)
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Analysis of the sample by organisation (Table 5.1) highlighted some interesting 
characteristics. One organisation (MGt pic) dominated in terms of proportion with over 
47% of the respondents in the sample. The sample was predominantly private sector, 
with just over 10% of respondents employed in the public sector. The vast majority 
(89.5%) of respondents worked in organisations with more than 200 employees. The 
number of respondents employed in unionised workplaces (52.3%) was similar to 
those in non-union workplaces (47.7%).
Table 5.1: Sample profile data by organisation
n= %
Employee distribution by organisation
ID1: Automobile Association 56 21.9
ID2: Glasgow City Council Access Centre 27 10.5
ID3: iResponse 51 19.0
ID5: MGt pic 122 47.7
Total 256 100.0
Ownership (sector)
Public 27 10.5
Private 229 89.5
Total 256 100.0
Organisation size (by number of employees)
2 5 -4 9 0 0.0
5 0 -9 9 27 10.5
1 0 0 -1 9 9 0 0.0
2 0 0 -4 9 9 107 41.8
500 or more 122 47.7
Total 256 100
Trade Union recognition
Yes 134 52.3
No 122 47.7
Total 256 100.0
Analysis of the sample by individual characteristics (Table 5.2) indicated a number of 
interesting points. The proportion of female respondents in the sample (55.9%) was 
higher than males, which is not surprising given the nature of call-centre work. The 
majority of respondents (68.7%) were aged between 16 and 30, suggesting a 
dominance of younger people, although there were a number of employees in the other 
age categories. Just under one fifth (19.5%) of respondents had job tenure of than six 
months or less and almost 70% (68.8%) had job tenure of two years or less. Eighteen 
per cent of respondents reported organisational tenure of six months or less and 197 
(77%) reported organisational tenure of two years or less. Thus the data indicate a high 
rate of labour turnover. Over three quarters of the respondents (78.5%) described
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themselves as full-time employees and just over half (51.6%) described their job 
category as ‘skilled’. Well over half of the respondents (57.8%) reported their pay as 
being between £10,000 and £14,999 per annum. If the mean of this band (x=£12,500) 
is divided by 52 weeks divided by 40 hours this produces an hourly rate of £6.00, which 
at the time was less than £1 above the National Minimum Wage (NMW=£5.05 at the 
time of data collection) suggesting that call-centre work is not that well paid, thus 
confirming the views of Rose and Wright (2005). Even if the same calculation is made 
taking the upper limit of the band (£14,999), the hourly rate is still only £7.21 for a 
‘skilled’ employee.
Table 5.2: Sample profile data by individual (total sample)
n= % n= %
Gender Employment Status
Male 113 44.1 Full-time Employee 201 78.5
Female 143 55.9 Part-time Employee 49 19.1
Total 256 100.0 Agency Worker 4 1.6
Temporary Worker 2 .8
Age Total 256 100.0
16-20 70 27.3
21-30 106 41.4 Job Category
31-40 29 11.3 Manager 9 3.5
41-50 29 113 Supervisor/Team Leader 11 4.3
51-60 20 7.8 Technical 19 7.4
61-70 2 0.8 Skilled 132 51.6
Total 256 100.0 Unskilled 85 33.2
Total 256 100.0
Job Tenure
^ 6 months 50 19.5 Pay Level (£)
> 6 months 206 80.5 <10,000 47 18.4
Total 256 100.0 10,000-14,999 148 57.8
15,000-19,999 39 15.2
£ 2 years 176 68.8 20,000-24,999 16 6.3
> 2 years 80 31.3 25,000-29,999 6 2.3
Total 256 100.0 >30,000 0 0.0
Total 256 100.0
Organisation Tenure
^ 6 months 46 18.0
> 6 months 210 82.0
Total 256 100.0
^ 2 years 197 77.0
>2 years 59 23.0
Total 256 100.0
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5.3 Descriptive statistics
This section provides an account of the descriptive statistics in relation to each of the 
three main scales used in the research.
Figure 5.3: Chapter guide
Research Objectives
Descriptive Statistics
Sample Profile
Research Objective 1 
Correlation Analysis
Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
The descriptive statistics for the three scales for the total sample are displayed in Table 
5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. For the Total Perceived Authoritarianism scale the mean 
score is 41.15, the median 39.00, the minimum score for the scale is 13 and the 
maximum 91, with a range of 78. The mean score for Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract scale is 63.86, the minimum score 29, the maximum score 100, and the range 
71. For the Pay Satisfaction scale the mean score is 10.54, the minimum score 4, the 
maximum score 20, and the range 16.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics - Total Perceived Authoritarianism (total
sample, n=256)
Statistic Std. Error
Total Perceived Mean 41.1523 0.89295
Authoritarianism
95%  Confidence Lower Bound 39.3939
Interval for Mean
Upper Bound 42.9108
5% Trimmed Mean 40.4575
Median 39.0000
Variance 204.122
Std. Deviation 14.28712
Minimum 13.00
Maximum 91.00
Range 78.00
Interquartile Range 18.00
Skewness 0.712 0.152
Kurtosis 0.599 0.303
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics - Total Pay Satisfaction (total sample, n=2
Statistic Std. Error
Total Pay Satisfaction Mean 10.5352 0.25322
95% Confidence Lower Bound 10.0365
Interval for Mean
Upper Bound 11.0338
5% Trimmed Mean 10.5252
Median 10.0000
Variance 16.414
Std. Deviation 4.05147
Minimum 4.00
Maximum 20.00
Range 16.00
Interquartile Range 6.00
Skewness -0.087 0.152
Kurtosis -0.975 0.303
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics - Total Transactional Psychological Contract
(total sample, n=256)
Statistic Std. Error
Total Transactional Mean 
Psychological Contract
63.8594 0.77441
95%  Confidence Lower Bound 
Interval for Mean
Upper Bound
62.3343
65.3844
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
63.7674
63.0000
153.525
12.39053
29.00  
100.00
71.00  
16.75 
0.141 
0.370
0.152
0.303
In the first instance the data were subjected to a range of independent-samples t-tests 
to ascertain if any of the demographic or organisational variables or characteristics had 
any impact on the three main scales (Total Perceived Authoritarianism; Total Pay 
Satisfaction; Total Transactional Psychological Contract). For the purpose of this 
particular analysis the data were categorised as follows:
Age: £30yrs; £31yrs 
Gender: Male; Female 
Industrial Sector: Public; Private
Trade Union recognition in workplace: Recognised; Not Recognised
Job Category: Manager and Supervisor; Technical, Skilled, and Unskilled
Job Tenure: <2years; >2years
Organisational Tenure: <2years; >2years
Organisational size: £499 employees; >500 employees
Pay: Lower <£14,999; Higher >£15,000
5.3.1 Total Perceived Authoritarianism -  total sample
In the independent-samples t-tests for Total Perceived Authoritarianism, none of the 
organisational or demographic variables produced a statistically significant result (see 
Appendix J). The results of the t-tests are as follows:
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Age, result not statistically significant, ^30yrs x= 41.06, SD=14.80, £31yrs x=41.36, 
SD=13.18, f(254)=-0.158, p=0.87. Gender, result not statistically significant, Males 
x=41.83, SD=14.82, Females x =40.62, SD= 13.88 f(254)=0.676, p=0.50. Industrial 
Sector, result not statistically significant, Private x=40.65, SD= 13.92, Public x=45.41, 
SD=16.76, f(254)=-1.64, p=0.10. Trade Union Recognition, result not statistically 
significant, Recognised x =40.67, SD=14.37, Not Recognised x=41.68, SD=14.24, 
f(254)=-0.56, p=0.57. Job Category, result not statistically significant, Manager and 
Supervisor x =43.20, SD=17.38, Technical, Skilled and Unskilled x =40.98, SD=14.02, 
f(254)=0.67, p=0.5. Job Tenure, result not statistically significant, <2years x =40.72, 
SD=13.90, >2years x =42.59, SD= 15.52, f(254)=-0.88, p=0.38. Organisational Tenure, 
result not statistically significant, ^2years x =40.20, SD=13.92, >2years x =43.25, SD 
14.95, f(254)=-1.59, p=0.11. Organisational Size, result not statistically significant, 
<499 x =40.67, SD=14.37, >500 x=41.68, SD=14.24, f(254)=-0.56, p=0.57. Pay, result 
not statistically significant, Lower =x40.68, SD=14.41, Higher x =42.66, SD=13.90, 
f(254)=-0.941, p=0.35.
These findings are interesting insofar that none of the differences between the groups 
compared are statistically significant. The expectation was that some differences would 
be statistically significant, in particular those relating to the Manager/Supervisor and 
Technical, Skilled and Unskilled groups. These findings seem to suggest that, for the 
total sample, managerial authoritarianism is not the dominant style.
5.3.2 Total Pay Satisfaction -  total sample
In the independent-samples t-tests for Total Pay Satisfaction, only one of the 
organisational or demographic variables produced a statistically significant result (see 
Appendix J). The results of the t-tests are as follows:
Age, result not statistically significant, ^30yrs x=10.61, SD=4.03, >31yrs x=10.35, 
SD=4.12, f(254)=0.492, p=0.62. Pay, result not statistically significant, Lower 
(<£14,999) x=10.50, SD=4.12, Higher (>£15,000) x=10.65, SD=3.84, t{254)=-0.27, 
p=0.79. Gender, result not statistically significant, Males x=10.02, SD=3.74, Females 
x=10.94, SD=4.25, f(254)=-1.83, p=0.07. Industrial Sector, result statistically 
significant, Private x=10.78, SD=4.00, Public x= 8.44, SD=3.96, f(254)=2.88, p=0.00. 
The magnitude of the differences in the means was small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared 
=0.03). Union Recognition, result not statistically significant, Recognised x=10.94,
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SD=3.98, Not Recognised x=10.09, SD=4.09, t(254)=1.68, p=0.09. Job Category, 
result not statistically significant, Manager and Supervisor x=10.75, SD=3.84, 
Technical, Skilled and Unskilled x=10.51, SD=4.07, f(354)=0.25, p=0.81. Job Tenure, 
result not statistically significant, <2years x =10.82, SD=3.86, >2years x=9.59, 
SD=4.53, f(254)=2.05, p=0.06. Organisational Tenure, result not statistically significant, 
<2years x=10.68, SD=3.89, >2years x=10.21, SD=4.40, f(254)=0.86, p=0.39. 
Organisational Size, result not statistically significant, £499 x=10.94, SD=3.98, >500 
x=10.09, SD=4.09, f(254)=1.68, p=0.09.
A statistically significant difference between public and private sectors was expected on 
the basis that pay is perceived to be lower in the public sector than in the private. Other 
differences were expected, particularly in relation to the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pay groups 
and the job category groups; in both cases the lack of difference might be attributed to 
the respondents’ expectations being met.
5.3.3 Total Transactional Psychological Contract -  total sample
In the independent-samples t-tests for Total Transactional Psychological Contract, all 
bar one of the organisational or demographic variables produced a statistically 
significant result (see Appendix J). The results of the t-tests are as follows:
Age, result statistically significant, <30yrs x= 65.37, SD=11.88, >31yrs x=60.54, 
SD=12.91, t(254)=2.94, p=0.00. The magnitude of the differences in the means was 
small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared = 0.032. Gender, result statistically significant, 
Males x= 65.73, SD= 12.15, Females x=62.38, SD 12.42, f(254)=2.17, p=0.03. The 
magnitude of the differences in the means was very small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared 
=0.018). Industrial Sector, result not statistically significant, Public x =63.69, SD=12.22, 
Private x =65.33, SD=13.93, f(254)=-0.65, p=0.51. Union Recognition, result 
statistically significant, Recognised x=61,82, SD=12.00, Not recognised x =66.09, 
SD=12.47, f(254)=-2.80, p=0.00. The magnitude of the differences in the means was 
very small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared =-0.03). Job Category, result statistically 
significant, Manager and Supervisor x =52.90, SD= 13.87, Technical, Skilled and 
Unskilled x=64.79, SD=11.83, f(254)=-4.26, p=0.00. The magnitude of the differences 
in the means was moderate (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared =-0.076). Job Tenure, result 
statistically significant, £2 years x =64.74, SD=11.81, >2years x=60.91, SD=13.86, 
t(254)=2.09, p=0.04. The magnitude of the differences in the means was small (Cohen,
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1988) (eta squared =0.017). Organisational Tenure, result statistically significant, £2 
years x= 65.56, SD= 11.63, >2years x=60.13, SD=13.25, f(254)=3.31, p=0.00. The 
magnitude of the differences in the means was small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared 
=0.041). Organisational Size, result statistically significant, <499 x=61.82, SD=12.00, 
£500 x=66.10, SD=12.47, f(254)=-2.76, p.=0.00. The magnitude of the differences in 
the means was small (Cohen, 1988) (eta squared =0.032). Pay, result statistically 
significant, Lower x =65.23, SD=11.97, Higher x =59.49, SD=12.81, t(254)=3.21, 
p=0.00. The magnitude of the differences in means was small (Cohen, 1988) (eta 
squared = 0.039).
These results are interesting because of the number of significant differences between 
the groups compared, although it should be noted that in most cases the magnitude of 
the difference was either very small or small.
The other point of interest is the inverse relationship between the results for Total Pay 
Satisfaction and Total Transactional Psychological Contract; for the latter the only non­
significant difference was Industrial Sector, whereas in the former it was the only item 
for which a significant difference was identified. The strongest (moderate) difference 
was between the Manager and Supervisor group and the Technical, Skilled and 
Unskilled group. This is perhaps not surprising as one might expect individuals in more 
senior positions to be less transactional in their orientation; this is consistent with the 
findings of Millward and Hopkins (1998).
5.4 Investigating the Research Objectives
Having presented the descriptive statistics in the previous section, the following three 
sections present the data analysis related to each of the three research objectives, 
questions and propositions.
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Figure 5.4: Chapter guide
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Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
5.5 The First Research Objective
To reiterate, the first research objective is concerned with the relationship between 
perceptions of managerial authoritarianism and the magnitude of the transactional 
element in the psychological contract.
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Figure 5.5: Chapter guide
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The first research question was:
Is there a relationship between the level of perceived authoritarianism and 
the transactional psychological contract?
To reiterate, the expected relationship would be that the greater the perceived 
authoritarianism the greater will be the magnitude o f the transactional element of the 
psychological contract.
Proposition 1
Perceptions of high management authoritarianism will lead to a high 
transactional psychological contract.
Initially the data were subjected to a simple analysis of the mean of the mean scores; 
this was calculated by dividing the total mean score for each scale by the 
number of items in the scale, thus creating the mean of the means. The minimum 
and maximum possible scores and the mid-point for each scale, along with the mean
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for each organisation (indicated by the blue -x- line) are displayed in Figures 5.6 to 5.9 
below.
The first observation made of the data was that whilst some individual respondents 
reported a very high or very low Total Perceived Authoritarianism, Total Pay 
Satisfaction and Total Transactional Psychological Contract score (as shown in Tables
5.3 to 5.5 above) this was not reflected in the total scores for each organisation. In 
none of the organisations was there a Total Perceived Authoritarianism score above 
the mid-point and whilst three organisations returned Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract scores were above the mid-point, these were only marginally above.
Figure 5.6 Minimum, mid-point, maximum and mean scores - Automobile 
Association (n=56)
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Figure 5.6 displays the total scores for the scale maximum, mid-point and minimum for 
the three scales, along with mean for each for the Automobile Association. The mean 
for Total Perceived Authoritarianism (x=3 .2 ) is markedly below the mid-point and those 
for Total Pay Satisfaction (x=2 .9) and Total Transactional Psychological Contract 
(x=2 .9 ) are very close to the mid-point.
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Figure 5.7 Minimum, mid-point, maximum and mean scores - Glasgow City
Council (n=27)
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Figure 5.7 displays the total scores for the scale maximum, mid-point and minimum for 
the three scales, along with mean for each for Glasgow City Council. The mean for 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism (x=3 .5 ) is just below the mid-point, the mean for 
Total Pay Satisfaction (x=2 .1 ) is markedly below the mid-point and the mean for Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract (x= 3 .4 ) is slightly above the mid-point. The V- 
shape relationship suggests that the low Total Pay Satisfaction score might be 
influencing the higher transactional psychological contract.
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Figure 5.8 Minimum, mid-point, maximum and mean scores -  iResponse
(n=51)
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Figure 5.8 displays the total scores for the scale maximum, mid-point and minimum for 
the three scales, along with mean for each for iResponse. The mean for Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism (x=2 .8 ) is well below the mid-point, the mean for Total Pay 
Satisfaction (x=2 .8 ) is marginally below the mid-point and the mean for Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract (x=3 .2 ) is slightly above the mid-point.
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Figure 5.9 Minimum, mid-point, maximum and mean scores - MGt pic (n=122)
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Figure 5.9 displays the total scores for the scale maximum, mid-point and minimum for 
the three scales, along with mean for each for MGt pic. The mean for Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (x= 3 .2 ) is markedly below the mid-point, as is the mean for Total Pay 
Satisfaction (x=2 .5). The mean for Total Transactional Psychological Contract (x=3 .3 ) 
is slightly above the mid-point. The V-shaped relationship suggests that the low Total 
Pay Satisfaction score might be influencing the higher transactional psychological 
contract.
In the first statistical analysis, the relationship between Total Perceived
Authoritarianism, measured by the ‘Climate of Fear’ scale, and the Transactional 
Psychological Contract was investigated using Spearman’s Rank Order correlation 
(rho). This particular nonparametric test was selected as the preliminary data analysis 
indicated the assumptions of normality required for the performance of Pearson 
Product-Moment Correlation had been violated in relation to the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism score (Table 5.6). The interpretation of the strength of the correlation 
followed the guidelines provided by Cohen (1988):
r= 0.00 to r= 0.29 or r=-0.00 to r= -0.29 small (or weak)
r= 0.30 to r= 0.49 or r=-0.30 to r= -0.49 medium (or moderate)
r= 0.50 to r= 1.00 or r=-0.50 to r= -1.00 large (or strong)
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Table 5.6: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Total
Transactional Psychological Contract (total sample)
Total
Total Transactional
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Psychological
Contract
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
1.000 0.373**
0.000
N 256 256
Total Psychological 
Contract
Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.373**
0.000
1.000
N 256 256
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The test produced a medium, positive correlation between the two variables (rho=0.37, 
n=256, p=0.00), with a moderate level of Total Perceived Authoritarianism associated 
with a moderate level of Transactional Psychological Contract. This result was lower 
than anticipated as the literature seemed to suggest that higher levels of 
authoritarianism might lead to a more transactional relationship.
Given that the Transactional Psychological Contract score did not violate the 
assumptions of normality required for the performance of a Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation, the data were also subjected to this test. The result, a medium, positive 
correlation between the two variables (r=0.40, n=256, p=0.00), was similar to that 
generated by the Spearman’s test, albeit marginally stronger (see Appendix H).
The data were subjected to further scrutiny to ascertain if the strength of correlation 
between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract varied according to whether authoritarianism was perceived to be ‘higher’ or 
lower’. The sample was split into two groups (Higher/Lower), with the cut point 
being at the sample mean for Total Perceived Authoritarianism (x=41.15).
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Total Transactional 
Contract scores for the Higher and Lower Total Perceived Authoritarianism groups (see 
Appendix J). There was a significant difference in the scores for the Lower group 
(x=60.45, SD=11.15) and the Higher group (x=67.38, SD=12.66); f(254)=-4.66, 
p=0.00. The magnitude of the difference in the means was moderate (Cohen, 1988)
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(eta squared =0.09), meaning that 9% of the variance in the Total Transactional 
Psychological Contracts score is explained by perceptions of authoritarianism.
A Spearman Rank Order correlation test was performed on each sub-set 
independently. The results displayed below (Table 5.7) indicate a weak correlation 
(rho=0.22, /7=130, .p=0.01 between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract, for the Lower Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
group, compared to a medium correlation (rho=0.35, n - 126, p=0.00) for the Higher 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism group. This suggests that a high Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism is associated with a high Transactional Psychological Contract and 
vice versa.
Table 5.7: Correlations - Higher/Lower Perceived Authoritarianism groups
with Total Transactional Psychological Contract (total sample)
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Lower Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.219*
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012
N 130
Higher Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.351**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 126
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The data were subjected to a test to evaluate the level of significance of the difference 
between the Higher/Lower Total Perceived Authoritarianism groups. The Spearman rho 
scores for the two groups were converted to z scores (Lower z=0.224, Higher z=0.365). 
The test produced a zobs value of 1.11 which, being within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, 
indicates there is no statistically significant difference in the correlation scores for the 
two groups. Thus, the level of Total Perceived Authoritarianism (Higher/Lower) does 
not explain the variance in the level of Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
The data were subjected to a similar test to evaluate the level of significance of the 
difference between the Higher/Lower Total Transactional Psychological Contract
1 8 2
groups. The sample was, again, split at the sample mean for Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract (x=63.86).
A further independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism scores for the Higher and Lower Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract groups (see Appendix J). There was a significant difference in the scores for 
the Lower group (x=36.25, SD= 11.66) and the Higher group (x=46.13, SD= 15.01); 
f(254)=-5.89, p=0.00. The magnitude of the difference in the means was strong 
(Cohen, 1988) (eta squared =0.16), meaning that 16% of the variance in Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism is explained by the level of the Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract.
The results of the subsequent correlation test, displayed below in Table 5.8, indicate a 
weak correlation (rho=0A2, n -129, p=0.19) between the Total Transactional
Psychological Contract and Total Perceived Authoritarianism for the ‘Lower’
Transactional Psychological Contract group, compared with a slightly stronger, but still 
weak, correlation (rho=0.23, /r=127 p=0.01) between the Total Transactional
Psychological Contract and Total Perceived Authoritarianism for the ‘Higher’
Transactional Psychological Contract group.
Table 5.8: Correlations - Perceived Authoritarianism with High and Low Total
Transactional Psychological Contract groups (total sample)
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Lower Total Transactional Correlation Coefficient 0.115
Psychological Contract Spearman’s rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.194
N 129
Higher Total Transactional Correlation Coefficient 0 .227*
Psychological Contract • Spearman’s rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.010
N 127
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
In order to check the significance of the differences between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ Total Transactional Psychological Contract 
groups, the Spearman rho scores for the two groups were converted to z scores 
(Lower z=0.116, Higher z=0.229). The test produced a zobs value of -0.90 which, being .
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within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, indicates there is no statistically significant 
difference in the correlation scores for the two groups.
The data were also analysed to ascertain whether the level of Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism can be used to predict the level of Transactional Psychological 
Contract, a standard multiple regression was performed between the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism score as the independent variable and the Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract as the dependent variable. The analysis was performed using 
SPSS Regression and SPSS Explore for evaluation of assumptions. The data were 
evaluated for normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. The Normal Probability Plot 
indicated the data lay in a straight diagonal line from bottom-left to top-right, suggesting 
no major deviations from normality. The Standardized residuals scatterplot confirmed 
that the majority of the scores were concentrated around the 0 point. The plot showed 
no curvilinear pattern and contained only one outlier beyond the 3.3 boundary (case 
number 34), this was investigated further; the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract score for case number 34 was 96.00 against a predicted score of 56.51. 
Reference to the Cook’s Distance indicated a value of 0.077 which, being below 1, 
suggested no major problem with the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Pallant, 2005) 
and, as a consequence, no further corrective action was taken.
The correlation between the two variables, Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract (r=0.40), was discussed earlier. Table 5.9 
displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression 
coefficients ((3), the semipartial correlations, the R2, and adjusted R2.
The R for regression was significantly different from zero, F(1, 254) = 48.52, p=0.00, 
with R2 at 0.160 and 95% confidence limits from 45.29 to 53.84. The (3 value was 0.40. 
The adjusted R2 value of 0.157 indicates that approximately 16% of the variability in the 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism.
184
03
D(D
T 3CD'3
CLCD3
<032
CD'
c r
—I o
03
3
CO03O
o '
3
Q3_
"0
CO
o
3 "O
o
CQ
Oo
3
CX)
CJ1
M
odel
Total Perceived 
A
uthoritarianism
(C
onstant)
0.347
49.566
03
0
0CD
3
c
3
CO
5T
3
0
0cn
0 Z
LV
Z
Std. Error
O
CD'
3
CO
03
-1
Q.
n ‘CD
Q.
0
0
0
B
eta
C
oefficients
S
tandardized
9
9
6
9
22.825
- 00
CD
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sig.
0
CD
3
£aT
0.249
45.290
Low
er 
B
ound
CO
cnVp0s
OO
3=nQ.CD
3OCD
0.446
53.843
Upper 
B
ound
3
CD
2
9L
o'—1
03
0
0
0
Zero-
order
C
orrelations
0
0
0
P
artial
0
0
0
P
art
cr Q)
O *D
•§ I
CD ~
=3 2.
C L o  
CD = ! 
3  CO *
oT Oo — =j coO' Xi
CD
2- h
Q3_ O
H §L
03 " 0  
3  CD 
CO 3  
03 O  
O  2 .
I I
*u c
CO 5
3 1=r £:
o _  03
«g S-
0  §5"03_ W
o
o
3—5
03
Ca3 CO
CD N3 0 3
u 0 0 DO
O ) ~vl
CO CD CD
CO 0 0 Oco 00 cnco 0 0 0
0 3
N3
N> -v l
CD CO
O
O cn
CO 0 0
S 3
CD O  
CO - *
T|
c r  03 
D  73nCD —  
3  O
S' 0CD —1
3
£ 0
. o 
s ‘ mO  Xt 
* ■ §CD
—I
2- H
03_ O
H  §L
03 "U  
3  CD 
CO -30) o
a -•
o ' o5 3 Q.
■0 aCO 5
i !
0 _  Q3
g  §■ 
S " i '
o 3O
3
3O
M
odel
0
-£>.
0
0
33
&
0.160
R 
S
quare
M
odel S
um
m
ary(b)0.157
Adjusted 
R
 
S
quare
3 s £2CD q.
m ‘co m
CO-Jcn 00 —x
3  s
la
03
2
CD
cn
<0
0  C/>
1 I
-i Q .  0) Q)
a 3. 
?  3r*
"  &
(0 73
|  O
■o ©
(D <Q
3
in
in
o'
3
0)
3
2L
*<
in
in '
H
O
w
"0
CD■r
o
CD
< '
o
a .
>cr*1
3*
O
H
O
0)
0)
3
(/>
0)
o
o'
3
0)
TJ
0)
*<
O
3*
O
O
(O'
o '
fi)
5.5.1 Analysis by individual organisation
Thus far the data have been presented and analysed for the whole sample. However, 
given that management style is likely to be the subject of organisational differentiation 
further analysis was conducted for each organisation individually. Indeed the mean 
score for Total Perceived Authoritarianism did vary according to organisation; the 
highest perception of authoritarianism was found in the Glasgow City Council 
(x=45.41, SD=16.76) and the lowest in iResponse (x=36.63, SD= 12.84). Similarly the 
mean score for and Total Transactional Psychological Contract, also varied by 
organisation; the highest being MGt pic (x=66.10, SD=12.47) and the lowest being the 
Automobile Association (x=58.13, SD=12.43).The descriptive statistics for the each 
scale, for each organisation are presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 below.
Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics - Total Perceived Authoritarianism by
individual organisation
Measure
OrglDI
Automobile
Association
OrglD2 
Glasgow City 
Council
OrglD3
iResponse
OrglD5
MGt
Mean 42.0714 45.4074 36.6275 41.6803
Median 42.0000 45.0000 36.0000 39.5000
Minimum value 14.00 20.00 13.00 15.00
Maximum value .85.00 76.00 81.00 91.00
Range 71.00 56.00 68.00 76.00
SD 13.72437 16.76135 12.83738 14.23897
Count 56 27 51 122
Table 5.11: Descriptive statistics - Total Transactional Psychological Contract
by individual organisation
Measure
OrglDI
Automobile
Association
Org!D2 
Glasgow City 
Council
OrglD3
iResponse
OrglD5
MGt
Mean 58.1250 65.3333 64.0196 66.0984
Median 58.0000 64.0000 63.0000 64.0000
Minimum value 32.00 40.00 36.00 29.00
Maximum value 84.00 97.00 81.00 100.00
Range 52.00 57.00 45.00 71.00
SD 12.43172 13.93115 9.24660 12.46974
Count 56 27 51 122
The data were subjected to a Spearman Rank Order correlation to identify if there were 
any differences in correlation between Total Authoritarianism and Total Psychological
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Contract according to organisational ID, in order to evaluate any organisation effects on 
the Total Transactional Psychological Contract (Table 5.12). The Automobile 
Association exhibited a strong, positive correlation (rho=0.52), whilst the remainder 
exhibited medium, positive correlations of between rho=0.33 and rho=0A6. The high 
correlation between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract is interesting, as this not only confirms the results of the 
exploratory studies, which were conducted in the same organisation but different 
divisions and locations, and seems to suggest the presence of an overarching 
management climate which permeates throughout the organisation.
Table 5.12: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by individual organisation
Organisation ID
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
OrglDI: Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.519**
Automobile Association Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 56
OrglD2: Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.349
Glasgow City Council Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.074
N 27
OrglD3: Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.461**
•iResponse Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
N 51
OrglD5: Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.331**
MGt pic Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 122
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Once again the data were scrutinised in more depth to identify the level of significance 
of the differences between Total Perceived Authoritarianism for each organisation and 
the Total Transactional Psychological Contract, In order to check the significance the 
organisations were placed in descending rank order by their Spearman rho scores -1 , 
Automobile Association; 2, iResponse; 3 Glasgow City Council; 4, MGt pic.
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The Spearman rho scores for the four groups were converted to z scores and 
compared with each other in pairs. The results of the test are displayed in Table 5.13 
below.
Table 5.13: Z scores - Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by individual organisation
Automobile
Association iResponse
Glasgow City 
Council MGt pic
Automobile Association -
iResponse 0.40 -
Glasgow City Council 0.86 -0.53 -
MGt 1.41 -0.90 0.10 -
All the pairings produced zobs values within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, indicating no 
statistically significant difference in the correlation scores for the different organisations.
5.5.2 Analysis by respondent demographic characteristics
Just as organisations vary according to characteristics such as climate, culture, size, 
and managements style, so individuals vary in terms of the idiosyncratic way in which 
they perceive management behaviours to be fair or unfair, acceptable or unacceptable 
(Rousseau, 2001b). Consequently the data were analysed further using the individual 
as the unit of analysis. The rationale for this shift in focus being that individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender and tenure, might have an impact on perceptions 
of authoritarianism, satisfaction with pay or the transactional psychological contract.
The data were analysed to evaluate if respondents’ gender had any effect on 
perceptions of authoritarianism and the Transactional Psychological Contract (Table 
5.14). The results displayed in indicate a medium, positive correlation for both males 
(rho=0A0) and females (rho=0.33).
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Table 5.14: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by respondents’ gender 
(total sample)
Gender
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Males Total Perceived Authoritarianism Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.395**
0.000
113
Females Total Perceived Authoritarianism Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.332**
0.000
143
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
In order to check the significance of the differences between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism male and female groups and the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract groups, the Spearman rho scores for the two groups were converted to z 
scores (males z=0.418; females z=0.343). The test produced a zobs value of 0.60 
which, being within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, indicated no statistically significant 
difference in the correlation scores for the two groups, which is consistent with the 
findings of Millward and Hopkins (1998).
Following on from this, the data were evaluated further to identify if respondents’ 
organisational tenure had any effect on Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Transactional Psychological Contract. It was expected that those with shorter tenure 
would exhibit a higher Transactional Psychological Contract as the relationship with the 
organisation would contain uncertainty, whereas those with a longer tenure would have 
cemented their relationship. The results displayed in Table 5.15 indicate a strong, 
positive correlation for both the up to 6 months group (rho=0.56) and a medium 
correlation for the more than 6 months group (rho=0.34).
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Table 5.15: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by respondents’ 
organisation tenure (total sample)
Organisational
Tenure
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Up to 6 months Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.562**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 46
More than 6 months Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.337**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 210
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The data were scrutinised further to check the significance of the differences between 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism for the ‘Up to 6 months’ and ‘More than 6 months’ 
tenure groups and the Total Transactional Psychological Contract groups, the 
Spearman rho scores for the two groups were converted to z scores (up to 6 months 
z=0.633; more than 6 months z=0.337). The test produced a zobs value of 1.77 which, 
being within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, indicated no statistically significant difference 
in the correlation scores for the two groups.
The data were then analysed to evaluate if respondents’ Employment Status had any 
effect on their Total Perceived Authoritarianism scores and the Transactional 
Psychological Contract. The expectation was that full-time employees would exhibit a 
lower Transactional Psychological Contract than any of the other employment status 
group and those with a more tenuous relationship with the organisation would exhibit a 
higher Transactional Psychological Contract.
The results displayed in Table 5.16 indicate medium, positive correlations for full-time 
employees (rho=0.35) and part-time employees (rho=0.37). The correlations for agency 
and temporary workers, whilst high as expected, were disregarded from further 
analysis due to the small number of individuals in each of these categories.
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Table 5.16: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by respondents’ employment
status (total sample)
Employment Status
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Full-time employee Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.351**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 201
Part-time employee Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient .0369**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009
N 49
Agency worker Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.800
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.200
N 4
Temporary worker Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 1.000**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) -
N 2
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The significance of the differences between full-time and part-time employees in 
respect of their Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract scores was conducted by converting the Spearman rho scores for the two 
groups to z scores (full-time z=0.365; part-time z=0.388). The test produced a zobs 
value o f -0.01 which, being within the -1.96 and +1.96 bounds, indicated no statistically 
significant difference in the correlation scores for the two groups.
The data were analysed to evaluate if respondents’ Job Category had any effect on 
their Total Perceived Authoritarianism scores and the Transactional Psychological 
Contract (Table 5.17).
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Table 5.17: Correlations - Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by respondents’ job ,
category (total sample)
Job Category
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Manager Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.197
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.611
N 9
Supervisor Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.609*
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.047
N 11
Technical Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.171
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.483
N 19
Skilled Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.375**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 132
Unskilled Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 0.340**
Authoritarianism Spearman's rho
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
N 85
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The results indicate a weak, positive correlation for Managers (rho=0.20) and Technical 
employees (rho=0A7); a medium, positive correlations for Skilled {rho=0.38) and 
Unskilled (r/7o=0.34). There was a strong correlation for the Supervisor group 
{rho=0.61).
The results of this test are interesting; Managers have the lowest Transactional 
Psychological Contract, yet those closest to them, Supervisors, have the highest. This 
seems to suggest a poor relationship between management and those interacting 
directly with them. However, whilst this result should be treated with some caution due 
to the small number of subjects in the two categories of interest, it is consistent with the 
earlier findings of Millward and Hopkins (1998: 1543) who also found that those in 
skilled manual jobs were ‘more transactional in their psychological contract orientation’.
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The data were scrutinised further to check the significance of the differences between 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism for the five Job Category groups and the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract (Table 5.18).
Table 5.18: Z scores - Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Total
Transactional Psychological Contract by job category (total 
sample)
Manager Supervisor Technical Skilled Unskilled
Manager -0.95 0.48 . -0.47 -0.37
Supervisor - - 1.24 0.86 0.96
Technical - - - -0.84 -0.67
Skilled - - - - 0.29
Unskilled - - - - -
The Spearman rho scores for the five groups were converted to z scores (Manager 
z=0.198; Supervisor z=0.708; Technical z=0.370; Skilled z=0.394; Unskilled z=0.354) 
and compared with each other in pairs. The tests produced zobs values within the -1.96 
and +1.96 bounds, indicating no statistically significant difference in the correlation 
scores for any of the pairings.
5.5.3 Summary of the first research objective and proposition
The first research objective was to investigate the relationship between managerial 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological contract. The 
guiding proposition here was:
Perceptions of high management authoritarianism will lead to a high 
transactional psychological contract.
The data were subjected to a bank of tests for the whole sample and by organisational 
ID. For the whole sample analysis the results revealed only a moderate correlation 
between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract, which was lower than anticipated. Further analysis of the data was conducted 
in an attempt to identify an explanation for the less than expected relationship. The 
results of the analysis of the relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism for 
the Higher and Lower groups and Total Transactional Psychological Contract, 
suggested that higher perceived authoritarianism is associated with a higher
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transactional psychological contract, but that low perceived authoritarianism is not as 
strongly associated with a lower transactional psychological contract. The results of a 
regression analysis indicated that Total Perceived Authoritarianism is not a strong 
predictor of Total Transactional Psychological Contract, as only 16% of the variance in 
the latter was explained by the former.
Having analysed the data for the whole sample, the focus then turned to an 
investigation by each organisation. As anticipated, there were differing strengths of 
correlation between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract, reflecting the potential differences in respondents’ perceptions 
of management style; although further scrutiny revealed that the differences in the 
correlation scores were not significantly significant.
Analysis of the data by demographic characteristics revealed no differences in the 
relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract by gender. There was a difference according to organisational 
tenure, with shorter-tenure respondents exhibiting a stronger Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract. Similarly there were differences in the strength of the 
relationship according to employment status, with full-time employees exhibiting a 
weaker Total Transactional Psychological contract than other status groups; although 
the small count in two groups reduces the ability to be confident about generalising this 
result. Similarly there were differences in the strength of the relationship according to 
job category. Managers exhibited the weakest Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract, while those immediately below them, supervisors, exhibited the strongest. 
This implies that managers have a relationship with the organisation which goes 
beyond the short-term monetizable, yet those reporting directly to them seem to be 
there out of necessity; although, once again, the small count in these two groups 
reduces the ability to be confident about generalising this result.
In terms of testing the first proposition, the results of the numerous analyses suggest 
that it is not a simple ‘A leads to B’ causal relationship. Whilst in some cases there was 
a relationship between the level of Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract, this was not consistent and varied according to 
organisation. The conclusion drawn from this is that if the relationship is as varied as it
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is, then other factors must be influencing the state of the individuals’ transactional 
psychological contracts.
5.6 The Second Research Objective
To reiterate, the second objective concerns the component structure of Transactional 
Psychological Contract.
Figure 5.10: Chapter guide
Sample Profile
Research Objectives
Descriptive Statistics
Research Objective 1 
Correlation Analysis
Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
The second research question is:
Is the transactional psychological contract a single dimension or can it be 
sub-divided into component parts?
Although considered a single dimension it is possible that this element of the 
psychological contract has differential meaning in relation to Managerial 
Authoritarianism.
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Proposition 2.
The transactional element of the psychological contract (as measured by 
the Millward and Hopkins scale) is comprised of smaller factors.
As the 20 item scale adopted to measure the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract had been used relatively infrequently, the 20 items were subjected to an 
exploratory General Factor Analysis using SPSS Version 12, to identify if it was in fact 
a single factor with 20 items loading or whether this was comprised of other factors.
The decision to perform General Factor Analysis rather than Principal Components 
Analysis was that the former does not assume equal error variance across all the 
variables, whereas the latter does. The impact of this is particularly important if there is 
a large error variance related to some components, which is then distributed across all 
other components, thus distorting the result. In contrast General Factor Analysis 
removes the error variance leaving the true variance and, for this reason, is regarded 
as a more precise measure.
Prior to performing the factor analysis the suitability of the data was assessed. 
Although, according to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) samples of >300 are desirable, 
both Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) and Pallant (225) concede that a lower number may 
be acceptable, if the there are several variables with loadings above .8. Indeed, 
Comrey and Lee (1992) provide a guideline for sample sizes (50 = poor; 100=poor; 
200=fair; 300=good; 500=very good). The total sample size {n=256) combined with a 
number of high loading variables appears to satisfy the initial requirements (Pallant, 
2005).
Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of 0.3 
and above. The Kaiser-Mayer-Oklin value was 0.88, which exceeded the 
recommended value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) and the Bartlett’s (1954) Test of 
Sphericity reached statistical significance (p=0.00), supporting the factorability of the 
correlation matrix.
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The general factor analysis that was performed was purest form insofar that no 
predefined number of factors were set (see Table 5.19).
Table 5.19: Factor analysis - total variance for Total Transactional
Psychological Contract (total sample)
Total Variance Explained
Factor Total
Initial Eigenvalues
% of Cumulative 
Variance %
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
% of Cumulative 
Total Variance %
1 6.743 33.715 33.715 2.939 14.697 14.697
2 1.873 9.364 43.079 3.873 19.366 34.064
3 1.345 6.725 49.804 1.768 8.841 42.905
4 1.240 6.198 56.002 0.868 4.341 47.245
5 1.039 5.193 61.195 0.662 3.310 50.556
6 0.947 4.733 65.928
7 0.802 4.009 69.937
8 0.742 3.710 73.647
9 0.663 3.317 76.964
10 0.638 3.190 80.154
11 0.602 3.009 83.163
12 0.538 2.692 85.854
13 0.515 2.574 88.428
14 0.480 2.398 90.826
15 0.437 2.183 93.010
16 0.378 1.888 94.898
17 0.326 1.630 96.528
18 0.297 1.483 98.011
19 0.246 1.232 99.242
20 0.152 0.758 100.000
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares.
The analysis revealed the presence of five factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1, 
which explained 33.7%, 9.4%, 6.7%, 6.2 % and 5.2 % of the variance respectively.
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Although the factor analysis indicated five factors with eigenvalues above 1, an 
inspection of the scree plot (Figure 5.11) revealed a clear break after the third factor.
Figure 5.11: Scree plot - factor analysis - Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract (total sample)
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The data for the Total Transactional Psychological Contract were subjected to further 
analysis (Table 5.20).
Table 5.20: Factor analysis - Total Transactional Psychological Contract (five-
factor un-rotated)
______________________ Factor_Matrix3______________________
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
0.319
PSYCON04 0.999
PSYCON13 0.545
PSYCON10 0.464 0.359 0.358
PSYCON20 0.425 0.421
PSYCON14 0.424 0.417 0.338
PSYCON03 0.367
PSYCON05
PSYCON16 0.311 0.901
PSYCON08 0.325 0.746
PSYCON17 0.682
PSYCON07 0.666
PSYCON18 0.315 0.508
PSYCON01 0.471
PSYCON15 0.313 0.336 0.725
PSYCON09 0.341 0.668
PSYCON11 0.320 0.357
PSYCON06 0.329
PSYCON12 0.319
PSYCON19
PSYCON02
-0.330
0.400
0.306
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares, 
a 5 factors extracted. 12 iterations required.
Scrutiny of the loading onto each of the five factors revealed high (10) cross-loadings 
and low individual factor-loadings. Only three variables loaded exclusively onto Factor 
1 and Factor 2, and only one variable loaded exclusively onto Factor 3, Factor 4 and 
Factor 5. Two variables, PSYCON02 (I prefer to work a strictly defined set of working 
hours) and PSYCON05 (I expect to be paid for the overtime that I do), failed to load 
into any of the five factors.
Owing to the weak loading of Factor 3 and Factor 4 in Table 5.20 and Cattell’s (1966) 
scree test, it was decided to retain the three strongest factors for further investigation.
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A Monte Carlo Parallel Analysis, as advocated by Pallant (2005), was conducted, this 
produces 100 sets of random data of the same profile (variables and cases) as the 
actual data set and calculates the average eigenvalues from these (Table 5.21).
Table 5.21: Comparison of actual and randomly generated eigenvalues for
Total Transactional Psychological Contract (total sample)
Factor
Actual 
Eigenvalue from 
SPSS v12
Random 
Eigenvalue from 
Monte Carlo PCA Decision
1 6.743 1.5288 Accept
2 1.873 1.4321 Accept
3 1.345 1.3595 Reject
4 1.240 1.2933 Reject
5 1.039 1.2358 Reject
6 0.947 1.1816 Reject
7 0.802 1.1330 Reject
8 0.742 1.0872 Reject
9 0.663 1.0401 Reject
10 0.638 0.9958 Reject
11 0.602 0.9559 Reject
12 0.538 0.9144 Reject
13 0.515 0.8742 Reject
14 0.480 0.8344 Reject
15 0.437 0.7961 Reject
16 0.378 0.7547 Reject
17 0.326 0.7174 Reject
18 0.297 0.6693 Reject
19 0.246 0.6238 Reject
20 0.152 0.5726 Reject
The results of the Monte Carlo analysis revealed only two factors with eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly generated data matrix of 
the same size, e.g. 20 variables x 256 respondents. According to Pallant (2005) the 
eigenvalues obtained from the actual dataset should be compared with those randomly 
generated by the Monte Carlo Parallel Analysis; where the actual value is greater than 
the randomly generated on the factor is retained, where the actual value is lower then 
the factor should be rejected.
The results of the comparison required only to first two factors to be retained, however, 
as the resulting two-factor solution contained numerous cross-loadings, it was decided 
to retain the three strongest factors identified in the factor analysis (Table 5.20) and the 
scree plot (Figure 5.11).
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A second factor analysis was then conducted with 5 factors using Varimax rotation. 
The test produced better results (Table 5.22) with only five variables cross loading onto 
more than one factor.
Table 5.22: Factor analysis - Total Transactional Psychological Contract (five-
factor rotated)
Rotated Factor Matrix3
Variable 1 2
Factor
3 4 5
PSYCON16 0.930
PSYCON08 0.792
PSYCON07 0.704
PSYCON17 0.701
PSYCON18 0.435 0.320 0.354
PSYCON10 0.660
PSYCON11 0.610
PSYCON01 0.346 0.506
PSYCON06 0.494
PSYCON14 0.396 0.361
PSYCON05
PSYCON04 0.960
PSYCON13 0.479
PSYCON03
PSYCON15 0.830
PSYCON09 0.399 0.715
PSYCON12 0.550
PSYCON19 . 0.496
PSYCON20 0.384 0.427
PSYCON02 0.385
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization, 
a Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
Of the variables, only four loaded exclusively onto Factor 1, three loaded exclusively 
onto Factor 2 and Factor 5, and two loaded exclusively onto Factor 3. Only one 
variable loaded exclusively onto Factor 4. Two variables, PSCON03 (I do not identify 
with the organization’s goals) and PSYCON05 (I expect to be paid for the overtime that 
I do) failed to load onto any of the five factors.
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As a result of the above the factor analysis was performed again using three factors for 
the rotation (Table 5.23).
Table 5.23: Factor analysis - Total Transactional Psychological Contract
(three-factor -  rotated)
Rotated Factor Matrix3
Variable 1
Factor
2 3
PSYCON16 0.937
PSYCON08 0.803
PSYCON17 0.711
PSYCON07 0.702
PSYCON18 0.456 0.382
PSYCON01 0.394 0.330 0.311
PSYCON04 0.701
PSYCON13 0.542
PSYCON12 0.539
PSYCON20 0.401 0.521
PSYCON14 0.313 0.508 0.403
PSYCON10 0.493 0.462
PSYCON19 0.396
PSYCON03 0.325
PSYCON02
PSYCON09 0.883
PSYCON15 0.751
PSYCON11 0.416
PSYCON06 0.370
PSYCON05
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization, 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Despite the result from the Monte Carlo Parallel Analysis indicating the rejection of all 
but two variables, the best fit was obtained from adopting a three-factor approach, in 
which eight variables loaded onto Factor 1, ten variables loaded onto Factor 2, and 
seven variables loaded onto Factor 3. The test produced only five cross loadings. Four 
variables loaded exclusively onto Factor 1 and Factor 3, and five variables loaded 
exclusively onto Factor 2. Once gain, two variables PSYCON02 (I prefer to work a 
strictly defined set of working hours) and PSYCON05 (I expect to be paid for the 
overtime that I do), failed to load onto any of the factors.
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As a result of the factor analysis, three themes became apparent in relation to the 
respondents’ Transactional Psychological Contracts; as a consequence of this result 
the three factors were individually labelled.
5.6.1 The three-factor solution
Having identified the three factor solution, each of these factors was analysed further in 
an attempt to identify if any was significantly stronger in relation to Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism. The first stage was to remove all variables cross-loading onto more 
than one factor (see Table 5.23 above). This resulted in four variables in Factor 1, five 
in Factor 2, and four in Factor 3.
The items that loaded onto Factor 1 clearly indicated a lack of attachment by 
respondents to the organisation itself, there was evidence of a lack of emotional 
involvement with the organisation. As a result this factor was labelled ‘Organisational 
Disengagement’. The items loading onto Factor 1 are:
PSYCON16 (r) 
PSYCON08 
PSYCON17 (r) 
PSYCON07 (r)
My long-term future lies with this organization 
My long-term future does not lie with this organization 
I will work for this company indefinitely 
I intend to stay in this job for a long time (i.e., over 2 to 3 years)
The items that loaded onto Factor 2 were a little eclectic in composition, but indicated 
there was a focus by the individuals on the job and workplace, rather than the 
organisation; there was little evidence of any socio-emotional attachment to, or reward 
from, the job. As a result this factor was labelled ‘Individual Disengagement’. The items 
loading onto Factor 2 are:
PSYCON04 
PSYCON13 
PSYCON12 
PSYCON19 (r)
PSYCON03
It is important not to get too involved with your job
It is important not to get too attached to your place of work
I work only the hours set out in my contract and no more
It is important to be flexible and to work irregular hours if
necessary
I do not identify with the organization’s goals
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The items that loaded onto Factor 3 indicated the respondents’ relationship with the 
organisation was defined by the ‘legal contract’ of employment, short-term goals and 
targets. This factor was labelled ‘Legal Contract’. The items loading onto Factor 3 are:
PSYCON09 My loyalty to the organization is defined by my contract of employment
PSYCON15 My commitment to this organization is defined by my contract
PSYCON11 As long as I reach the targets specified in my job I am satisfied
PSYCON06 I come to work purely to get the job done
That two variables PSYCON02 (I prefer to work a strictly defined set of working hours) 
and PSYCON05 (I expect to be paid for the overtime that I do), failed to load onto 
Legal Contract is interesting, as they appear to be contract-related. The data were 
subjected to a Spearman’s Correlation between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
each of the sub-factors (Table 5.24).
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5.24: 
Correlations 
- 
Total 
Perceived 
Authoritarianism
 
and 
sub-factors 
(Individual 
Disengagem
ent, 
O
rganisational 
Disengagem
ent and 
Legal Contract) (total sam
ple, n=256)
The test produced a moderate correlation score between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Organisational Disengagement (rho=0.30) and weak correlations 
between Individual Disengagement (rho=0.27) and Legal Contract (rho=0.26). A 
second, confirmatory correlation was performed using Pearson’s Product-Moment, the 
scores generated were similar, but slightly stronger, with moderate correlations 
between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Organisational Disengagement (r=0.33) 
and Individual Disengagement (r= 0.32) and a weak correlation for Legal Contract 
(r=0.23).
Whilst this demonstrates a relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
the three sub-factors related to the Total Transactional Psychological Contract, as none 
of the correlations for the sub-factors (with cross-loadings removed) were stronger than 
the correlations between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract (rho=0.37lr=0A0), it was concluded that the total 20 item scale 
was a more efficient measure of the relationship between the two variables.
The data were also assessed for suitability for a regression analysis. The results 
indicated sufficient cases for a reliable equation and the data subjected to a multiple 
regression. The tables below (5.25 to 5.27) display the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (B), the standardized coefficients ((3), the R2 and the R2 adjusted, for each 
of the regressions.
For the first test, Total Perceived Authoritarianism with Organisational Disengagement 
(see Table 5.25), the R for regression was significantly different from zero, 
F(1,254)=31.21, p=0.00, with R2 at 0.110 and 95% confidence limits from 9.9 to 11.9. 
The adjusted R2 value of .11 indicates that 11% of the variability in the Organisational 
Disengagement variable is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism.
For the second test, Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Individual Disengagement 
(see Table 5.26), the R for regression was significantly different from zero, F(1, 
254)=28.69, p=0.00, with R2 at 0.101 and 95% confidence limits from 8.07 to 10.10. 
The adjusted R2 value of 0.10 indicates that 10% of the variability in Individual 
Disengagement is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism.
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For the third test, Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Legal Contract (see Table 
5.27), the R for regression was significantly different from zero, F(1, 254)=14.38, 
p=0.00, with R2 at 0.05 and 95% confidence limits of 9.57 to 12.06 indicates that 
approximately 5% on the variability in Legal Contract is predicted by Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism.
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5.6.2 Revisiting the first research objective
In the light of the findings for the second research objective presented above, the first 
research objective, to investigate the relationship between perceptions of managerial 
authoritarianism and the magnitude of the transactional element in the psychological 
contract, was re-examined. The data analysis confirms a relationship between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism with each of the sub-factors of Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract (Organisational Disengagement, Individual Disengagement, 
Legal Contract). However, the strength of the relationship between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and each of these, as evidenced by the test for correlation for each, is 
reduced. As a result of these findings it was concluded that the total 20-item scale was 
a more efficient and representative measure of the relationship between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
5.6.3 Summary of the second research objective and proposition
The second research objective was to analyse the component structure of the 
transactional psychological contract. The guiding proposition here was:
The transactional element of the psychological contract (as measured by 
the Millward and Hopkins scale) is comprised smaller factors.
The data for Total Transactional Psychological Contract (for the whole sample) were 
subjected to a number of General Factor Analyses which revealed a three-factor 
solution. The first factor was named Individual Disengagement, as it contained items 
which suggested the relationship between the individual and their job was restricted, 
insofar that it provided little intrinsic reward and amounted primarily to a source of 
income. The second factor suggested there was little emotional attachment by the 
individual to the organisation. This factor was named Organisational Disengagement. 
The third factor was comprised item which suggested the relationship was delineated 
by the contract of employment and, as a consequence, the factor was named Legal 
Contract.
Having constructed the new factors the data were subjected to further analysis to 
ascertain the strength of their relationship with Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The 
results indicated that whilst the three factors did correlate, the strength of the three 
relationships was weaker than that of the Total Transactional Psychological Contract
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and Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The overall conclusion drawn from this analysis 
is that the complete Total Transactional Psychological Contract scale is a more reliable 
measure.
5.7 The Third Research Objective
The third research objective is concerned with testing whether pay satisfaction has any 
effect on the relationship between Perceived Authoritarianism and the Transactional 
Psychological Contract.
Figure 5.12: Chapter guide
Sample Profile
Research Objectives
Descriptive Statistics
Research Objective 1 
Correlation Analysis
Research Objective 3 
Regression Analysis
Research Objective 2 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Analysis
The third research question is:
Does pay satisfaction act as a mediating or moderating variable between 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the transactional psychological 
contract?
The expectation was that Pay Satisfaction will have an effect on the relationship 
between the two variables, that where Perceived Authoritarianism is high and Pay
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Satisfaction is low, there will be a high Transactional Psychological Contract. As a 
consequence the following propositions were formulated:
Proposition 3a
Pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
Proposition 3b
Pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
In the first instance the total sample data were analysed to identify if Pay Satisfaction 
had any effect on the relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract. Initial analysis produced a medium, positive 
correlation (Spearman’s rho=0.373 and Pearson’s r=0.400) between these two 
variables, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, and provided the basis for 
further analysis.
A partial correlation was performed to explore the relationship between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract, while controlling for 
Pay Satisfaction. Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Although the normality 
assumption had been violated for Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay 
Satisfaction, as noted earlier, authors such as Kerlinger (1992) and Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007), argue that many parametric tests are robust enough to cope with some 
violation of test requirements. In addition, the results for the earlier Spearman’s and 
Pearson correlations were considered sufficiently close to warrant the partial 
correlation (using Pearson) being performed (Table 5.28).
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Table 5.28: Partial correlations -  Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract, controlling for Pay 
Satisfaction
Control
Variables
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
-none-(a) Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
1.000
0
0.400
0.000
254
0-.396
0.000
254
Total Correlation 0.400 1.000 -0.311
Transactional Significance 0.000 0.000
Psychological (2-tailed)
Contract df 254 0 254
Total Pay Correlation -0.396 -0.311 1.000
Satisfaction Significance 0.000 0.000
(2-tailed)
df 254 254 0
Total Pay Total Perceived Correlation 1.000 0.318
Satisfaction Authoritarianism Significance 0.000
(2-tailed)
df 0 253
Total Correlation 0.318 1.000
Transactional Significance 0.000
Psychological (2-tailed)
Contract df 253 0
'a Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
There was a medium, positive partial correlation between the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract (r= 0.32, n -254, 
p=0.00), with medium level of Total Perceived Authoritarianism being associated with a 
medium level of Total Transactional Psychological Contract. An inspection of the zero 
order correlation (r=0.40) suggested that controlling for Pay Satisfaction had some 
impact on the relationship between these two variables.
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Given that expectations form a part of the psychological contract, a further partial 
correlation was performed substituting Pay Expectations for Pay Satisfaction (Table 
5.29).
Table 5.29: Partial correlations -  Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional
Expectation
Psychological Contract, controlling for Pay
Control
Variables
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Pay
Expectation
-none-(a) Total Perceived Correlation 1.000 0.400 -0.296
Authoritarianism Significance 0.000 0.000
(2-tailed)
df 0 254 254
Total Correlation 0.400 1.000 -0.170
Transactional Significance .000 0.006
Psychological (2-tailed)
Contract df 254 0 254
Pay Expectation Correlation -.296 -.170 1.000
Significance .000 .006
(2-tailed)
df 254 254 0
Pay Total Perceived Correlation 1.000 0.372
Expectation Authoritarianism Significance 0.000
(2-tailed)
df 0 253
Total Correlation 0.372 1.000
Transactional Significance 0.000
Psychological (2-tailed)
Contract df 253 0
a Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
There was a medium, positive partial correlation between the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract (r= 0.37, a?=254, 
p=0.00), with medium level of Total Perceived Authoritarianism being associated with a 
medium level of Total Transactional Psychological Contract. An inspection of the zero 
order correlation (r=0.40) suggested that controlling for Pay Expectation had little 
impact on the relationship between these two variables.
The results of the two partial correlations indicate that while controlling for both Pay 
Satisfaction and Pay Expectation [separately] identified some impact, in both instances 
this was small, but Pay Satisfaction had a greater impact than Pay Expectation on the 
relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract.
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5.8 Assessing pay satisfaction as a mediating variable
In order to test if Pay Satisfaction acted as a mediating variable, separate regression 
analyses were performed, using standard multiple regression, according to the protocol 
advocated by Baron and Kenny (1986), Preacher and Hayes (2004) and Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007). The same regression analysis was not conducted for Pay 
Expectation owing to the lower significance in the result of the partial correlation.
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest a three-stage regression procedure: 1) the mediator 
is regressed onto the independent variable, 2) the dependant variable is regressed 
onto the independent variable, and 3) the dependent variable is regressed onto the 
independent variable and onto the mediator. Baron and Kenny (1986: 1177) stipulate 
that three conditions must hold if mediation is to be established:
“First, the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first 
equation; second the, the independent variable must be shown to affect the 
dependent variable in the second equation; and third, the mediator must 
affect the dependent variable in the third equation. If these conditions all 
hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of the independent variable 
must be less in the third equation than in the second. Perfect mediation 
holds if the independent variable has no effect when the mediator is 
controlled.”
The first equation was statistically significant F(1, 254)=47.18, p=0.00, R2 0.16 and 
95% confidence limits from 13.75 to 16.55. The (3 value was 0.40. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.15 indicates that approximately 15% of the variability in Total Pay 
Satisfaction is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism (see Table 5.30). The 
conclusion drawn from the results is that Pay Satisfaction is positively related to Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and making a significant contribution.
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The second equation was statistically significant F(1, 254)=48.52, p=0.00, R2 0.16, and 
95% confidence limits of from 45.30 to 53.84. The p value was 0.40. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.16 indicates that approximately 16% of the variability in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (see Table 5.31). The conclusion drawn form the results is that Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism affects the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
The third equation was also statistically significant F(2, 253) =29.30), p=0.00, R20.19, 
and 95% confidence limits from 50.93 to 65.00. The (3 value was 0.33. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.18 indicates that approximately 18% of the variation in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
combined with Total Pay Satisfaction (see Table 5.32).
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007: 160):
“ .... a variable is confirmed as a mediator if 1) there is a significant 
relationship between the IV and the DV, 2) there is a significant relationship 
between the IV and the mediator, 3) the mediator still predicts the DV after 
controlling for the IV, and 4) the relationship between the IV and the DV is 
reduced when the mediator is in the equation.”
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In the first test outlined above there was a significant relationship between the 
independent variable, Total Perceived Authoritarianism, and the mediator, Total Pay 
Satisfaction; thus the first of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions is met.
In the second test there was a significant relationship between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism, the independent variable, and Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract, the dependent variable; thus the second of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
conditions is satisfied.
In the third test the mediator, Total Pay Satisfaction, affected the dependent variable, 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract after controlling for the independent 
variable, Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The effect of the independent variable, 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism, was lower in the third test (p=0.33) than in the 
second test (p=0.40). Consequently, the final condition stipulated by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) is satisfied. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that Pay Satisfaction 
does act as a mediating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological contract. However, although the diminished relationship 
indicates that Pay Satisfaction acts as a very weak mediator between the two 
variables, the strength of the relationship is not reduced to zero, therefore mediation 
can only be considered ‘partial’, rather than full or ‘perfect’.
Given the different levels of Total Perceived Authoritarianism and reported Total Pay 
Satisfaction in each organisation (Automobile Association x =42.07, SD=13.72; 
Glasgow City Council x =45.41, SD= 16.76; iResponse x =36.63, SD=12.84; MGt pic 
x=41.68, SD=14.24) the same test for was performed to investigate if Pay Satisfaction 
acted as a mediating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract for each organisation independently (see Table 
5.33). The summary results are reported in the subsequent sections and the relevant 
data tables are displayed in Appendix K.
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Table 5.33: Descriptive statistics - Total Pay Satisfaction by organisation ID
Measure
OrglDI
Automobile
Association
OrglD2 
Glasgow City 
Council
OrglD3
iResponse
OrglD5
MGt
Mean 11.7500 8.4444 11.3725 10.0902
Median 12.0000 8.0000 11.0000 10.0000
Minimum value 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Maximum value 18.00 . 16.00 20.00 17.00
Range 14.00 12.00 16.00 13.00
SD 3.75742 3.96459 3.76277 4.09798
Count 56 27 51 122
5.8.1 Automobile Association
The data for the Automobile Association met the requirements for regression analysis, 
that there should be at least 15 subjects for each predictor, in this case with two 
independent variables a minimum of 30 cases is required and the total number of 56. 
The first equation was statistically significant F(1, 54)=15.88, p=0.00, R2 0.22 and 95% 
confidence limits from 14.34 to 20.14. The (3 value was -0.48. The adjusted R2 value of 
0.21 indicates that approximately 21% of the variability in Total Pay Satisfaction is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn from the results is 
that Pay Satisfaction is positively related to Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
making a significant contribution.
The second equation was statistically significant F(1, 54)=18.72, p=0.00, R2 0.26, and 
95% confidence limits of from 29.37 to 48.20. The (3 value was 0.51. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.24 indicates that approximately 24% of the variability in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn form the results is that Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism affects the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
The third equation was also statistically significant F(2, 53) =10.12), p=0.00, R2 0.28, 
and 95% confidence limits from 12.01 to 47.75. The (3 value was 0.58. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.25 indicates that approximately 25% of the variation in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
combined with Total Pay Satisfaction.
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In the third test the mediator, Total Pay Satisfaction, affected the dependent variable, 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract after controlling for the independent 
variable, Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The effect of the independent variable, 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism, was higher in the third test ((5=0.58) than in the 
second test ((3=0.51). Consequently, the final condition stipulated by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) is not satisfied. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that Pay 
Satisfaction does not act as a mediating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological contract in the Automobile 
Association.
5.8.2 Glasgow City Council
The data for the Glasgow City Council did not meet the requirements for regression 
analysis, that there should be at least 15 subjects for each predictor, in this case with 
two independent variables a minimum of 30 cases is required and the total number is 
27. out of interest, the regression was performed with the following results. The first 
equation was statistically significant F(1, 25)=4.65, p=0.04, R2 0.16 and 95% 
confidence limits from 8.38 to 17.02. The (3 value was -0.40. The adjusted R2 value of 
0.12 indicates that approximately 12% of the variability in Total Pay Satisfaction is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn from the results is 
that Pay Satisfaction is positively related to Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
making a significant contribution.
The second equation was not statistically significant F(1, 25)=3.42, p=0.08, R2 0.12, 
and 95% confidence limits of from 36.74 to 67.75. The (3 value was 0.34. The adjusted 
R2 value of 0.09 indicates that approximately 9% of the variability in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn form the results is that Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism does not significantly affect the Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract in the Glasgow City Council, this may be due to the small sub-sample size 
(n=27). As a consequence of the result in the second test, the full calculations for the 
third equation were not performed
5.8.3 iResponse
The data for the iResponse met the requirements for regression analysis, that there 
should be at least 15 subjects for each predictor, in this case with two independent
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variables a minimum of 30 cases is required and the total number if 51. The first 
equation was statistically significant F(1, 49)=6.07, p=0.02, R2 0.11 and 95% 
confidence limits from 11.86 to 18.02. The (3 value was -0.33. The adjusted R2 value of 
0.09 indicates that approximately 9% of the variability in Total Pay Satisfaction is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn from the results is 
that Pay Satisfaction is positively related to Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
making a significant contribution.
The second equation was statistically significant F(1, 49)=15.00, p=0.00, R2 0.23, and 
95% confidence limits of from 44.23 to 58.26. The (3 value was 0.48. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.22 indicates that approximately 22% of the variability in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by the Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn form the results is that Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism affects the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
The third equation was also statistically significant F(2, 48) =10.38), p=0.00, R2 0.30, 
and 95% confidence limits from 49.75 to 72.98. The [3 value was 0.39. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.27 indicates that approximately 27% of the variation in the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
combined with Total Pay Satisfaction.
In the third test the mediator, Total Pay Satisfaction, affected the dependent variable, 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract after controlling for the independent 
variable, Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The effect of the independent variable, 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism, was lower in the third test ((3=0.39) than in the 
second test ((3=0.48). Consequently, the final condition stipulated by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) is satisfied. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that Pay Satisfaction 
acts as a very weak mediating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
Total Transactional Psychological contract in iResponse; mediation is only ‘partial’, as 
the strength of the diminished relationship is not reduced to zero.
5.8.4 MGt pic
The data for the MGt pic met the requirements for regression analysis, that there 
should be at least 15 subjects for each predictor, in this case with two independent 
variables a minimum of 30 cases is required and the total number if 122. The first
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equation was statistically significant F(1, 120)=18.90, p=0.00, R2 0.14 and 95% 
confidence limits from 12.39 to 16.64. The p value was -0.37. The adjusted R2 value of 
0.13 indicates that approximately 13% of the variability in Total Pay Satisfaction is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The conclusion drawn from the results is 
that Pay Satisfaction is positively related to Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
making a significant contribution.
The second equation was statistically significant F(1, 120)=21.39, p=0.00, R2 0.15, and 
95% confidence limits of from 45.48 to 58.32. The (3 value was 0.39. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.14 indicates that approximately 14% of the variability in the Total
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by the Total Perceived
Authoritarianism (see Appendix K). The conclusion drawn form the results is that Total
Perceived Authoritarianism affects the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
The third equation was also statistically significant F(2, 119) =13.06), p=0.00, R20.18, 
and 95% confidence limits from 49.87 to 70.00. The (3 value was 0:32. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.17 indicates that approximately 17% of the variation in the Total
Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
combined with Total Pay Satisfaction.
In the third test the mediator, Total Pay Satisfaction, affected the dependent variable, 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract after controlling for the independent 
variable, Total Perceived Authoritarianism. The effect of the independent variable, 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism, was lower in the third test (p=0.32) than in the 
second test (p=0.39). Consequently, the final condition stipulated by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) is satisfied. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that Pay Satisfaction 
acts as a very weak mediating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and 
Total Transactional Psychological contract in MGt pic; mediation is only ‘partial’, as the 
strength of the diminished relationship is not reduced to zero.
Overall, the results for the third research question suggest that Pay Satisfaction can 
act as a mediator between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract, but it does so weakly and inconsistently.
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5.9 Pay satisfaction as a moderating variable
In order to test the effect of pay satisfaction as a moderating variable between 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Transactional Psychological Contract a slightly 
different analytical approach was adopted. The Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract scale contained six reverse scored items, all of which were ‘relational’ in style 
and used as controls against ‘transactional’ items in the scale. These items had 
clustered well in the earlier factor analysis and, as a consequence, were extracted and 
used to construct a short Relational Psychological Contract scale. The remaining 14 
items were used to create a Transactional Psychological Contract scale.
The two new scales were tested for reliability; the tests produced strong Cronbach’s 
alpha scores for both scales (Table 5.34). For the Relational scale all item-total 
correlations were above .3; the item-total correlations for the Transactional scale were 
all above .3 with the exception of item PSYCON02 (which had failed to load in the 
factor analysis), consequently the scales were considered reliable.
Table 5.34: Reliability scores
Items Cronbach’s
Scale n= alpha
Relational Psychological Contract 6 0.82
Transactional Psychological Contract 14 0.84
These two scales were then used separately to test the relationship between them and 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism to ascertain if pay satisfaction acts as a moderating 
variable for each. If, as Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993) suggest, that the 
relational and transactional contracts occupy opposing ends of a continuum, one might 
expect that a reduction in the Transactional Psychological Contract caused by Total 
Pay Satisfaction would be matched by a similar increase in the Relational 
Psychological Contract.
The first tests performed on the data were partial correlations between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism, Total Pay Satisfaction and the Relational and Transactional 
Psychological Contracts separately (Tables 5.35; 5.36).
2 2 6
Table 5.35: Partial correlations -  Total Perceived Authoritarianism and
Relational Psychological Contract, controlling for Total Pay
Satisfaction (total sample)
Control
Variables
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Relational
Contract
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
-none-(a) Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
1.000
0
-0.344
0.000
254
0-.396
0.000
254
Relational
Contract
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
-0.344
0.000
254
1.000
0
0.349
0.000
254
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
-0.396
0.000
254
0.349
0.000
254
1.000
0
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
1.000
0
-0.239
.000
253
Relational
Contract
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
-0.239
.000
253
1.000
0
a Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
As Table 3.35 shows, there was a small, negative partial correlation between the Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract (/■=-.24, n -253, 
p=0.00), with higher Pay Satisfaction being associated with a higher Relational 
Psychological Contract. An inspection of the zero order correlation (r=-0.34) suggested 
that controlling for Pay Satisfaction had only a small impact on the relationship between 
these two variables.
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Table 5.36: Partial correlations -  Total Perceived Authoritarianism and
Transactional Psychological Contract, controlling for Total Pay
Satisfaction (total sample)
Control
Variables
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Transactional
Contract
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
-none-(a) Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
1.000
0
0.384
0.000
254
-0.396
0.000
254
Transactional
Contract
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
0.384
0.000
254
1.000
0
-0.253
0.000
254
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
-0.396
0.000
254
-0.253
0.000
254
1.000
0
Total Pay 
Satisfaction
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
1.000
0
0.319
0.000
253
Transactional
Contract
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
df
0.319
0.000
253
1.000
0
a Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
As Table 5.36 shows, there was a small, negative partial correlation between the Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract (r=.32, n=253, 
p=0.00), with higher Pay Satisfaction being associated with a lower Transactional 
Psychological Contract. An inspection of the zero order correlation (/•=.38) suggested 
that controlling for Pay Satisfaction had, again, only a small impact on the relationship 
between these two variable.
If it is accepted that organisations vary according to their climates and managerial 
behaviour in terms of the style and degree of authoritarianism, then it seems apposite 
to investigate if pay satisfaction acts as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and both the Relational and Transactional psychological contracts in 
each organisation, rather than for the total sample, which has little meaning. 
Regression analyses were conducted, as depicted in Figure 5.13.
2 2 8
Figure 5.13 Hierarchical regression model -  relational and transactional
psychological contracts
Relational
Psychological
Contract
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism +
Total Pay 
Satisfaction +
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism 
/Total Pay 
Satisfaction
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
The results of the additional regression analyses for three of the organisational 
samples, the Automobile Association, iResponse and MGt pic, are presented in the 
following sections. Glasgow City Council was excluded as the sample size was not of 
sufficient size to perform a regression analysis.
5.9.1 Automobile Association
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed for the Automobile 
Association sample to test if Total Pay Satisfaction acted as a moderating variable 
between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract. 
Table 5.37 displays the correlations between the variables, the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression coefficients ((B), the semipartial 
correlations, the F? and adjusted ft2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was 
significantly different from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 F?=QA6, F( 1, 54)=10.11, p=0.002, the adjusted R2 value of 0.14 indicates 
that 14% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, f?2=0.17, F(2, 53)=5.48, p=0.007. The adjusted R2 value of 0.14 indicates 
that 14% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is predicted by Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change value of 0.014 
indicates that 1.4% of the variation in the Relational Contract is predicted by Total Pay 
Satisfaction. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that of the two variables only 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.46 p=0.002) makes a unique contribution to the 
Relational Psychological Contract; Total Pay Satisfaction was not significant (p=-0.13, 
p=0.352).
For the Transactional Psychological contract, Table 5.38 displays the correlations 
between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients.(8), the standardized 
regression coefficients ((3), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after 
entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the 
end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R^O.26, F(1, 54)=18.47, p=0.000, the adjusted R2 value of 0.24 indicates 
that 24% of the variance in the Transactional Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, R2=0.27, F(2, 53)=9.92, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of 0.25 indicates 
that 25% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change value of 
0.017 indicates that 1.7% of the variation in the Transactional Contract is predicted by 
Total Pay Satisfaction. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that of the two 
variables only Total Perceived Authoritarianism (P=-0.58 p=0.000) makes a unique 
contribution to the Transactional Psychological Contract; Total Pay Satisfaction was not 
significant (p=-0.15, p=0.265).
5.9.2 iResponse
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed for the iResponse sample to 
test if Total Pay Satisfaction acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract. Table 5.39 displays the 
correlations between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (S), the 
standardized regression coefficients (p), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different 
from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 F?=0.18, F(1, 49)=10.66, p=0.002, the adjusted R2 value of 0.16 indicates 
that 16% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, R*=0.36, F(2, 48)=13.60, p=0.000). The adjusted R2 value of 0.34 
indicates that 34% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change 
value of 0.183 indicates that 18.3% of the variation in the Relational Contract is 
predicted by Total Pay Satisfaction. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that both 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.27 p=0.031) and Total Pay Satisfaction 
(p=0.45, p=0.001) make a unique contribution to the Relational Psychological Contract.
For the regression analysis in relation to the Transactional Psychological contract, 
Table 5.40 displays the correlations between the variables, the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression coefficients ((3), the semipartial 
correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was 
significantly different from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R2=0.16, F(1, 49)=9.78, p=0.003, the adjusted R2 value of 0.15 indicates 
that 15% of the variance in the Transactional Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, F?2=0.17, F(2, 53)=4.9, p=0.012). The adjusted R2 value of 0.14 indicates 
that 14% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change value of 0.006 
indicates that 0.6% of the variation in the Transactional Contract is predicted by Total 
Pay Satisfaction. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that of the two variables 
only Total Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.38 p=0.009) makes a unique contribution 
to the Transactional Psychological Contract; Total Pay Satisfaction was not significant 
(p=-0.08, p=0.558).
5.9.3 MGt pic
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed for the MGt sample to test if 
Total Pay Satisfaction acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract. Table 5.41 displays the 
correlations between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the 
standardized regression coefficients (p), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different 
from zero at the end of each step.
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Relational Psychological Contract - 
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(continued)
After step 1 R^O.10, F(1, 120)=12.64, p=0.001, the adjusted R2 value of 0.09 indicates 
that 9% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in the 
equation, F?2=0.12, F(2, 119)=8.15, p=0.000). The adjusted R2 value of 0.10 indicates 
that 10% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is predicted by Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change value of 0.025 
indicates that 2.5% of the Relational Contract is predicted by Total Pay Satisfaction. 
Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that only Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
(p=-0.25 p=0.009) makes a unique contribution to the Relational Psychological 
Contract; Total Pay Satisfaction was not statistically significant (p=0.17, p=0.068).
For the regression analysis in relation to the Transactional Psychological contract, 
Table 5.42 displays the correlations between the variables, the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression coefficients (p), the semipartial 
correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was 
significantly different from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R2=0.15, F(1, 120)=21.78, p=0.000, the adjusted / lv a lu e  of 0.15 indicates 
that 15% of the variance in the Transactional Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, ^=0.18, F(2, 119)=12.92, p=0.000). The adjusted R? value of 0.17 
indicates that 17% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay Satisfaction. The F? change 
value of 0.025 indicates that 2.5% of the Transactional Contract is predicted by Total 
Pay Satisfaction. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that only Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (p=-0.33 p=0.000) makes a unique contribution to the Transactional 
Psychological Contract; Total Pay Satisfaction was not statistically significant (P=-0.17,
p=0.061)
Overall these results suggest that within each organisation Total Pay Satisfaction has 
no mediating effect between Total Perceive Authoritarianism and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract; this provides a clear indication as to the limited properties of 
pay as a mechanism for reducing the effects of other aspects of the employment 
relationship such as, in this case, the overarching style of management or 
organisational climate. There are clear links here with the work of Herzberg, Mausner 
and Snyderman (1959), who found that pay failed to provide a sustained source of 
satisfaction, but acted to prevent dissatisfaction.
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As a result of the findings that Total Pay Satisfaction did not consistently act as a 
mediating or moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Transactional Psychological Contract and, in the case of Proposition 3b, the Relational 
Psychological Contract, two further lines of enquiry were followed.
The first additional line of enquiry involved substituting item PAYSAT01 (I am satisfied 
with the level of my gross pay) for Total Pay Satisfaction and repeating the regression 
analyses. The results were very similar to the first regressions, with satisfaction with 
gross pay only making a significant contribution to Relational Psychological Contract in 
one organisation, iResponse.
In the second line of enquiry, Total Expectations were substituted as the [potential] 
moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational and 
Transactional Psychological Contract. The rational for this particular line of 
investigation was that numerous authors have identified employee expectations as an 
important component in the psychological contract (Levinson et al, 1962; Portwood and 
Miller, 1976; Rousseau, 1990a; Robinson, 1996; Guest and Conway, 1997). The 
results of these analyses indicated that Total Expectations acted as a consistent 
moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational 
Psychological Contract, but inconsistently as a moderating variable in relation to the 
Transactional Psychological Contract. The results of the regression analyses for each 
of the three organisations are reported below.
5.9.4 Automobile Association
Regression analyses were performed for the Automobile Association to ascertain if 
Total Expectations acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract; Table 5.43 displays the 
correlations between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the 
standardized regression coefficients ((3), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different 
from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R^O.16, F{ 1, 54)=10.11, p=0.002, the adjusted R2 value of 0.14 indicates 
that 14% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, F?=0.25, F(2, 53)=8.85, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of 0.22 indicates 
that 22% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is predicted by Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Expectation. The R2 change value of 0.093 
indicates that 9.3% of the variation in the Relational Contract is predicted by Total 
Expectations. The Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that both variables make a 
unique contribution to the Relational Psychological Contract; Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (p=-0.61 p=0.000) and Total Expectations (P=-0.37, p=0.013).
For the Transactional Psychological contract, Table 5.44 displays the correlations 
between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (£), the standardized 
regression coefficients ((3), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after 
entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the 
end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R^O.26, F(1, 54)=18.47, p=0.000, the adjusted R2 value of 0.24 indicates 
that 24% of the variance in the Transactional Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, F?=0A4, F(2, 53)=20.91, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of 0.42 
indicates that 42% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Expectations. The R2 change 
value of 0.186 indicates that 18.6% of the Transactional Contract is predicted by Total 
Expectations. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that both variables make a 
unique contribution to the Transactional Psychological Contract; Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (p=-0.81 p=0.000) Total Expectations (P=-0.53, p=0.000).
5.9.5 iResponse
Regression analyses were performed for iResponse to ascertain if Total Expectations 
acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Relational Psychological Contract; Table 5.45 displays the correlations between the 
variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression 
coefficients (p), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after entry of the 
two independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the end of each 
step.
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(continued)
After step 1 F?=0A8, F(1, 49)=10.66, p=0.002, the adjusted ft2 value of 0.16 indicates 
that 16% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, R*=0.30, F(2, 48)=10.17, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of 0.27 
indicates that 27% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Expectation. The R2 change 
value of 0.119 indicates that 11.9% of the variation in the Relational Contract is 
predicted by Total Expectations. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that of the 
two variables only Total Expectations (p=-0.43, p=0.006) makes a unique contribution 
to the Relational Psychological Contract; Total Perceived Authoritarianism (P=-0.61 
p=0.000) was not significant.
For the Transactional Psychological contract, Table 5.46 displays the correlations 
between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized 
regression coefficients (p), the semipartial correlations, the ft2 and adjusted R2 after 
entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the 
end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 R^O.16, F(1, 49)=9.58, p=0.003, the adjusted R2 value of 0.13 indicates \  
that 13% of the variance in the Transactional Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, F?2=0.16, F(2, 48)=4.70, p=0.014. The adjusted R2 value of 0.13 indicates 
that 13% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Expectations. The R2 change value of 0.000 
indicates that Total Expectations does not contribute to the prediction of the 
Transactional Contract. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that only Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.39 p=0.022) makes a unique contribution to the 
Transactional Psychological Contract; Total Expectations (p=-0.23, p=0.891) was not 
significant.
5.9.6 MGt pic
Regression analyses were performed for the Automobile Association to ascertain if 
Total Expectations acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Relational Psychological Contract; Table 5.47 displays the 
correlations between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the 
standardized regression coefficients ((3), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 after entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different 
from zero at the end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 F?=0.095, F(1, 120)=12.65, p=0.001, the adjusted R2 value of 0.088 
indicates that 9% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent 
variables in the equation, R^O.14, F(2, 119)=9.46, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of
0.12 indicates that 12% of the variability in the Relational Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Expectation. The R2 change 
value of 0.041 indicates that 4.1% of the variation in the Relational Contract is 
predicted by Total Expectations. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that both 
variables make a unique contribution to the Relational Psychological Contract; Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.17 p=0.094) and Total Expectations (P=-0.24, 
p=0.019).
For the Transactional Psychological contract, Table 5.48 displays the correlations 
between the variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized 
regression coefficients (p), the semipartial correlations, the R2 and adjusted R2 after 
entry of the two independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the 
end of each step.
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(continued)
After step 1 /?2=0.15, F(1, 120)=12.65, p=0.001, the adjusted / l  value of 0.15 indicates 
that 15% of the variance in the Relational Psychological Contracted is predicted by 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism. After step 2 with both the independent variables in 
the equation, R2=0.16, F(2, 119)=21.78, p=0.000. The adjusted R2 value of 0.12 
indicates that 12% of the variability in the Transactional Psychological Contract is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Pay Satisfaction. The R2 change 
value of 0.008 indicates that 0.8% of the variation in the Transactional Contract is 
predicted by Total Expectations. Scrutiny of the coefficients table revealed that only 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism (p=-0.33 p=0.001) makes a unique contribution to the 
Transactional Psychological Contract; Total Expectations (£=-0.11, p=0.283) was not 
significant.
These findings appear to support the views of Levinson et al (1962) and Portwood and 
Miller (1976) who suggest that expectations form an integral part of the Relational 
Psychological Contract, either as perceived promises or as a reference point against 
which the experienced reality can be assessed. The moderating effect of Total 
Expectations in this study suggests that expectations that have been met, or [inferred] 
promises that have been fulfilled, are indicative of a sound relationship between the 
individual and the organisation. This might be founded on the degree of honesty 
exercised at the beginning of the relationship and practised subsequently, leading to a 
high trust relationship between the contracting parties.
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5.10 Summary of the third research objective and propositions
The third research objective was to test whether Pay Satisfaction has a mediating or a 
moderating effect upon the relationship between Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Psychological Contract. To reiterate, the propositions here are:
Proposition 3a
Pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
and
Proposition 3b
Pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable between high 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological 
contract.
For Proposition 3a, the results of a partial correlation test indicated that, for the total 
sample, Total Pay Satisfaction reduced the strength of the correlation between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Transactional Psychological Contract, which 
suggests that pay satisfaction might act as a mediator. Further regression analysis was 
performed on the total sample, following the three-stage procedure laid down by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). The results of these tests indicated that Total Pay Satisfaction acts 
as a weak mediating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract. However give the differences in mean scores for 
each organisation for each of the three scales, further analysis was conducted to 
investigate if the result would be repeated in all cases. The results of the regression 
analysis for each organisation signified that Pay Satisfaction acted as a weak mediator 
in iResponse and MGt pic, but not in the Automobile Association and Glasgow City 
Council.
Further visual analysis (Figure 5.14) revealed clustering just below the mid-point for 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and just above the mid-point for Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract; in no case was there a mean score near the extremities of 
either scale.
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Figure 5.14 Means of mean scores for each variable by organisation ID
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This result is interesting as it revealed no consistent V-shape pattern between the three 
variables in the individual organisations, e.g. higher perceived authoritarianism, lower 
pay satisfaction, and a higher transactional psychological contract. However, as Figure 
5.13 indicates, the V-shape was present in two of the organisations.
Employees in Glasgow City Council reported the highest Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism score, the lowest Total Pay Satisfaction score, and the second highest 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract score. Employees in MGt pic reported the 
third highest Total Perceived Authoritarianism score, the second lowest Total Pay 
Satisfaction score, and the highest Total Transactional Psychological Contract score. 
This seems to suggest that factors other than Pay Satisfaction intervene between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and the Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
For Proposition 3b, a different approach was adopted insofar that the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract scale was divided to create Relational and 
Transactional Contract Scales. Overall the results indicated that Total Pay Satisfaction 
does not act as a moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and
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the Relational or Transactional Psychological Contracts. In the Automobile Association, 
iResponse and MGt pic, Total Perceived Authoritarianism made a statistically 
significant contribution to both the Relational and Transactional Psychological 
Contracts. Total Pay Satisfaction did not make a statistically significant contribution 
other than in iResponse where it accounted for 18% of the variability in the Relational 
Psychological Contract. Further scrutiny of the mean scores for each of the measures 
revealed that respondents in iResponse did not report the highest Total Pay 
Satisfaction score (see Table 5.33), although they did report the lowest Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism (see Table 5.10).
For Proposition 3b, the results of the regression analyses followed a different 
procedure, with a revised Transactional scale being adopted and a new (short) 
Relational scale being created. The results of the regressions indicated that Total Pay 
Satisfaction did not act as a consistent or significant moderating variable in all cases. In 
the Automobile Association, Total Pay Satisfaction was not significant in either the 
Relational or Transactional Contract; in iResponse it was significant in the Relational 
but not the Transactional Contract; in MGt pic it was not significant in either the 
Relational or Transactional Contract. Further regression analysis was conducted 
substituting Satisfaction with Gross Pay for Total Pay Satisfaction; once again in the 
Automobile Association, Total Pay Satisfaction was not significant in either the 
Relational or Transactional Contract; in iResponse it was significant in the Relational 
but not the Transactional; in MGt pic it was not significant in either the Relational or 
Transactional Contract.
Following on from this, an additional line of enquiry was pursued, in which Total 
Expectation was substituted for Total Pay Satisfaction and the Regression analyses for 
each organisation was repeated. The results were very interesting and shed new light 
on the psychological contract. In the Automobile Association Total Expectations had a 
significant moderating impact on both the Relational and the Transactional Contracts; 
in iResponse Total Expectations acted as a significant moderator in the Relational 
Contract but not in the Transactional; in MGt pic Total Expectations aced as a 
significant moderator in the Relational Contract but not in the Transactional. This is an 
important finding as it appears to suggest that the more realistic and firm employee 
expectations are, the better the state of the Relational Psychological Contract. From 
this it might be inferred that managing employee expectations, by among other things
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honesty and openness, the more likely they are to construct a positive psychological 
contract with the organisation. In addition, the degree of inconsistency with which each 
variable (total Pay Satisfaction; Gross Pay; Total Expectations) either mediated or 
moderated between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational and 
Transactional Psychological Contracts indicates they do not occupy opposing ends of a 
continuum but rather are separate and distinct.
5.11 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided a detailed account of the investigation into the relationship 
between perceptions of management authoritarianism, as measured by the ‘climate of 
fear’ scale (Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003), the transactional element in the 
psychological contract (and in the case or Proposition 3b, the Relational element), 
measured by the Total Transactional Psychological Contract scale derived from the 
Millward and Hopkins (1998) instrument, and the way in which satisfaction with pay, 
using the Total Pay Satisfaction scale adapted from Heneman and Schwab (1985), 
might act as a mediating or a moderating variable. The chapter has provided an 
account of the data analysis and the interpretation of the results of the various, 
systematic tests that were performed.
The results found an inconsistent relationship between the perceptions of 
authoritarianism, the transactional element in the psychological contract and 
satisfaction with pay as a mediating and/or a moderating variable. For the total sample 
there was a positive relationship between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Total Transactional Psychological Contract, furthermore, Total Pay Satisfaction 
appeared to operate as a very weak mediating variable. However, when the data were 
analysed by individual organisation the results were inconsistent; this suggests that the 
effects of authoritarian management cannot be ‘bought out’ by paying employees more.
In the second part of the proposition, Total Pay Satisfaction failed to act as a 
moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and both the Relational 
and Transactional Psychological Contracts at the organisational level. However, Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism made a statistically significant contribution to both contracts 
in the three organisations in the regression analysis. Additional analysis found that 
Total Expectations acted as a consistent moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Relational. Psychological Contract in each organisation.
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However, Total Expectations acted as a moderating variable between Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and the Transactional Psychological Contract in only one organisation 
(Automobile Association).
The next chapter provides a discussion of the results in relation to the theoretical 
foundations of the research and attempts to provide an explanation for the inconsistent 
relationship between the three variables.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this research has been to explore the relationship between the 
organisational climate and the emotional or psychological attachment that employees 
construct with that organisation and its’ agents, commonly referred to as the 
‘psychological contract’. The specific aim of the research has been to make a 
contribution to the existing body of organisational behaviour knowledge, by 
investigating a discrete part of organisational climate, the level of authoritarianism 
practiced, and a single element in the psychological contract, the ‘transactional’, 
taking account the extent to which the impact of the former upon the latter might be 
reduced by another factor, in this instance, the level of pay satisfaction.
The research was guided by three broad research objectives:
1. To test the relationship between perceptions of authoritarianism and the 
transactional psychological contract and to investigate the magnitude of 
the transactional element.
2. To analyse the component structure of transactional psychological 
contract. Although considered a single dimension it is possible that this 
element of the psychological contract has differential meaning in relation 
to managerial authoritarianism.
3. To test whether pay satisfaction has a mediating or moderating effect 
upon the relationship between perceived authoritarianism and the 
transactional psychological contract.
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These research objectives were then translated into three more focused research 
questions and the following three testable propositions:
1. Perceptions of high management authoritarianism will lead to a high
transactional psychological contract.
2. The transactional element of the psychological contract is comprised
smaller factors.
3a. Pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between high
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological
contract.
3b. Pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable between high
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological
contract.
The previous chapter presented the data and the results of the analysis that was
performed. This chapter presents a discussion of those results in relation to the
literature on which the research was based.
The substantive part of the chapter opens with a discussion of the results in general 
followed by a discussion in relation to each individual research objective. The 
penultimate section, prior to the closing remark, presents an evaluation and 
discussion of the contribution this research and the extent to which the overarching 
research aim has been achieved.
6.2 Discussion of the Results
Chapters 4 and 5 presented the results of the exploratory and main survey research. 
In Chapter 4 an account was given of the findings of the two exploratory studies, both 
of which followed a qualitative methodology. Although both studies were relatively 
small, the first exploratory study involved nine participants and the second study 
fourteen; they revealed employee awareness of the organisational/managerial climate 
and clear perceptions of an overtly authoritarian management style. The findings 
indicate that employees had grown accustomed to a particular style of management
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which might be, and in some instances was, termed ‘bullying’ (Participant P2KP), 
excessive and unjustified use of punishment, such as threatening disciplinary action 
without reason (Participant P2JP) and which in style was found to be remarkably 
similar to some of the practices identified by Byes and Tripp (1998), ‘capricious 
actions’ and an ‘obsession with obedience’. Similarly, the way in which one 
participant (Participant P2LD) was told to ’toughen up’, indicates a desire to foster a 
climate of authoritarianism and toughness in order to achieve targets. The interesting 
feature of the exploratory studies was the apparent contradiction between 
dissatisfaction with climate of the organisation, and the authoritarian style adopted by 
management, and the degree of affiliation the participants had developed towards the 
organisation itself. It was as if there was a clear division in the emotional or 
psychological attachment to the organisation; participants were clearly dissatisfied 
with the overarching management style, but there way an affinity with ‘the 
organisation’. This suggests that employees are capable, either consciously or 
subconsciously, of differentiating their psychological contracts into personal or 
impersonal and relational or transactional dimensions. However, whereas Crossman 
(2002; 2004) argues that the contract is likely to be personal and relational with the 
manager/agent and impersonal and transactional with the organisation, the 
relationships in the exploratory studies appear more complex. In this instance there 
appears to be a personal identification and a relational contract with the organisation 
and a personal and transactional relationship with the manager/agent, created largely 
by the authoritarian management style.
The exploratory studies also revealed a high level of reported pay satisfaction; some 
participants felt they were ‘well paid’ for what they did (Participant P2SW), while other 
felt they were overpaid (Participant P2LD). There was also a clear link between the 
perceptions of perceived good pay and pay satisfaction and the climate of the 
management style, or authoritarian climate; one participant (Participant P2JB) 
reported that ‘put up with a bit more because.... it’s a reasonably good salary’, the 
same participant also acknowledged that if she quit the company she would, in all 
probability have to take a pay cut elsewhere. This suggests that employees are 
prepared to trade-off negative work attributes for ‘good’ pay, particularly if they are 
financially ‘locked-in’ to the organisation by a sophisticated use of pay. It would 
appear that the argument put forward by Shapira (1981) and Riley and Szivas (2003) 
that positive work attributes may be traded-off for low pay appears to work in reverse
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as well. There is certainly something unappealing about this trade-off relationship; if 
there is a perception that employee mistreatment or mismanagement is acceptable as 
long as they are paid sufficiently well to retain them and ‘lock them in’ to the 
organisation. Of course, an employee who remains with the organisation out of 
circumstance rather than choice is unlikely to exhibit a high level of commitment. If 
commitment is demonstrated it is more likely to be of the continuance type, rather 
than affective (Meyer and Allen, 1991); that the employee will remain with the 
organisation until something better becomes available elsewhere. This confirms the 
important role alternative employment plays in the construction of the psychological 
contract, as suggested, albeit rather superficially, by Guest and Conway (1997).
A further finding was that individuals clearly used comparisons with the favourable or 
unfavourable treatment of others to re-evaluate their own psychological contracts e.g. 
participants P1KR stated ‘.... if I were to do that ...., I would be hauled across the 
coals’ and participant P1GM ‘she gets away with absolute murder’. This confirms the 
applicability of the ‘inter-contractual relationships and impacts’, as suggested by 
Crossman (2002; 2004) and demonstrated by the model set out in Figure 3.6, which 
suggests that the treatment of co-workers is observed, evaluated and judged by other 
individuals and provides evidence of the dynamic nature of the psychological contract 
and the way it is reconstructed over a relatively short time horizon.
The exploratory studies proved an invaluable part of the research process. Not only 
did they provide the opportunity to evaluate the relevance of management style to the 
organisational climate construct and the way in which this might affect the 
psychological relationship between the individual and the organisation, but they also 
revealed the importance of pay satisfaction and provided clear evidence for the 
proposition that pay satisfaction might act as a mediating or moderating variable 
between authoritarian management and the psychological contract, and the potential 
to advance our understanding in this area.
The findings of the exploratory studies initiated a review of the potential 
methodological approaches for the main data collection phase of the research. Whilst 
the continuation of a qualitative approach might have produced richer data and was 
itself rather appealing, the limitations of such an approach in terms of the time 
required and budgetary constraints, prompted a transfer to a quantitative
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methodology, with the opportunity to collect a larger quantity of data and to conduct 
detailed statistical analysis on a larger data set in relation to the research objectives 
and propositions.
6.2.1 The First Research Objective
The first research objective is to test the relationship between perceptions of 
authoritarianism and the transactional psychological contract and to investigate the 
magnitude of the transactional element. The proposition which emanates from this 
objective is that high perceived authoritarianism will lead to a high transactional 
psychological contract, in both cases ‘high’ is simply defined as being above the scale 
mid-point and ‘low’ as being below the scale mid-point.
The first finding was that, contrary to expectations, the data analysis failed to 
generate a ‘high’ Total Perceived Authoritarianism score for any of the participating 
organisations, indeed the mean score for each of the four organisations was below 
the scale mid-point. There are a number of potential explanations for this finding. 
First, organisations with highly authoritarian regimes may have declined the invitation 
to participate in the research; secondly, if individuals vary in their preference for 
freedom or to be controlled (Adorno et a/, 1950) and, as suggested by Schneider 
(1975), Schneider and Reichers (1983) and Schuler (1976), individuals working in 
these organisations may have been attracted to them owing to their own 
personalities and preferences for the style of management, thus minimising the 
perception of highly authoritarian management. Thirdly, the climates of the 
participating organisations may simply not be authoritarian in nature, although the 
presence of very high authoritarianism scores from individual respondents suggests 
this is not the case, although it might be that those reporting high scores were the 
subject of poor person-organisation fit in terms of their authoritarian personality. 
Fourthly, there may be some other intervening variable/s which reduces perceptions 
of high authoritarianism.
For the Total Transactional Psychological Contract score, a similar situation 
manifested itself. Although the scores for three of the organisations were above the 
scale mid-point, this was very marginal. Likewise the score of the organisation below 
the mid-point was also marginal. Again the clustering of transactional psychological 
contract scores was unexpected. There are a number of potential explanations for
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this. First, it could be a direct result of the low perceived authoritarianism, although 
the high scores for some individuals make this unlikely. Secondly, it could be owing to 
the ‘delivery of the deal’ (Guest and Conway, 1997) and a convergence between their 
expectations and the experienced reality, the evidence of Total Expectations being a 
significant moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the 
Relational Contract seems to support this. Thirdly, it could be owing to some other 
intervening variable.
For Total Pay Satisfaction the result was in line with that anticipated, the analysis for 
each of the four organisations generated scores below the mid-point, although two 
were only marginally below. Taken together these results are interesting insofar that 
one might expect low pay satisfaction to translate into a utilitarian response by 
individuals and a transactional psychological contract. Although it is possible that 
positive work attributes might counteract the perceptions of low pay (Shapira, 1981; 
Riley and Szivas, 2003), the relentless and repetitive nature of call centre work, as 
suggested by Taylor and Bain (1999) makes this an unlikely explanation. However, if 
one views call centre work as a form of assembly line (Taylor and Bain, 1999) and 
that some individuals are suited to and satisfied by the repetitive nature of the 
repetitive work, then there may be some positive job attributes for these particular 
individuals.
As a result of the lack of absolute high scores for independent variable, Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism, and the dependent variable, Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract, the research focus was revised to a measure of the relative 
relationships between the variables; thus ‘higher’ was substituted for ‘high’ and ‘lower’ 
substituted for ‘low’.
Tests for correlation between the two independent and dependent variables for the 
total sample produced a medium, positive correlation (rho=0.37), as did the test 
between the ‘higher’ Total Perceived Authoritarianism group and Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract (rho=0.35). The results of a regression analysis indicate that 
16% of the variability in the Total Transactional Psychological Contract score is 
predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism.
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The results of the correlation and regression tests seem to confirm, to some degree, 
the proposition that high perceived authoritarianism would lead to a high transactional 
psychological contract. An analysis of the data by individual organisation produced an 
interesting result; there were medium, positive correlations for three of the 
organisations and a strong, positive correlation of the remaining one. These findings 
indicate that there is a relationship between the level of perceived authoritarianism 
and the level of the transactional psychological contract, that the management style 
element of organisational climate directly effects the degree psychological attachment 
between the individual and their organisation. The significance of this is particularly 
important for organisations wishing to instil a ‘beyond contract’ attitude, or achieve a 
high level of affective commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991) from employees.
An analysis of the relationship between the same two variables by individual 
characteristic or demographic variables also produced interesting results. The results 
indicate that the more permanent the employment relationship the lower the level of 
the transactional element of the psychological contract. This again suggests that 
organisational commitment is a key factor in the construction of the transactional 
element in the psychological contract. Although this finding might be a reflection of a 
good person-job/person-organisation fit, from which longer tenure and stronger 
commitment is derived. However, on a cautionary note, the small sample sizes for 
some status categories should be taken into account. Similarly, initially a relationship 
was found between the level of perceived authoritarianism and the level of the 
transactional element in the psychological contract according to longevity of tenure; 
respondents with up to 6 months tenure displayed a stronger relationship (rho=0.56) 
than those with tenure of 6 months or more (rho=0.34). These results appear to be 
consistent with those of Millward and Brewerton (1999), who found the psychological 
contracts of contingent workers were more likely to be transactional, owing to a lower 
level of reciprocal commitment, however, the result independent samples t-test (zobs 
=1.77) indicates that the difference between the two tenure groups is not statistically 
significant.
One of the most interesting findings is the disparity in the correlation between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract for the 
Manager and Supervisor job categories. The Manager category produced the lowest 
correlation score (rho=0.20) and the Supervisor category produced the highest score
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(r/?o=0.61). One conclusion that might be drawn from this is that management are 
totally [affectively] committed (Meyer and Allen, 1991) to the organisation’s goals and 
targets and are focused on the achievement of them at any price and, as a 
consequence, adopt an authoritarian stance in dealing with supervisors in pursuit of 
those targets. A further investigation of the authority literature revealed a similar 
disparity between the perceptions of different levels of management in relation to 
authority. In a study of first-line managers and supervisors, Boyd and Jensen (1972), 
found consistent disagreement over the authority relationship. However, once again 
caution is required owing to the small sample size for the Manager and Supervisor 
groups and the fact that the independent samples t-test zobs value (-0.95) indicated no 
statistically significant difference in the two groups.
On the whole the evidence from the analysis of the total sample and by each 
individual organisation supports the first proposition that high[er] perceived 
authoritarianism will lead to a high[er] transactional psychological contract.
6.2.2 The Second Research Objective
The second research objective is to analyse the component structure of transactional 
psychological contract. The proposition which emanates from this objective is that the 
transactional element of the psychological contract is comprised smaller factors. The 
interest in the component structure of the transactional element was twofold; first the 
likelihood that a 2-item factor, as applied by Millward and Hopkins (1998) can be 
subdivided into smaller factors, which might provide greater insight into the true 
nature of the transactional element and, secondly, that there may be differences in 
the composition in relation to managerial authoritarianism.
A sequence of factor analyses indicated the presence of items loading onto smaller 
[sub] factors and ultimately revealed a three factor solution; the three factors were not 
as convincing as anticipated; after removing cross-loading items and with 2 items 
failing to load, 4 items loaded onto Factor 1, 5 items onto Factor 2 and 4 items onto 
Factor 3. The three factors, although weak, suggested the transactional element can 
be sub-divided into smaller factors which reveal more about the transactional element 
and suggest the presence of additional dimensions, that there are different 
relationships between the job and the organisation.
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The first factor, which was labelled Organisational Disengagement, suggested a 
transactional relationship between the individual and the job, that it was little more 
than a means of income providing little interest or intrinsic reward. The second factor 
was labelled Individual Disengagement, which indicates a lack of socio-emotional 
involvement by the individual or commitment to the organisation. This appears to 
suggest that individuals were not prepared to go the extra mile for the organisation. 
This is consistent with Rousseau’s (2000a) view of the narrow nature of the 
transactional element of the psychological contract, partly created by the lack of 
employer commitment. The third factor, labelled Legal Contract, reveals a relationship 
with the organisation which is delineated by the contract of employment, this might 
manifest itself by way of employee responses to instructions along the lines of ‘it’s not 
my job’ or ‘I’m not paid to do that’; providing evidence of a lack of willingness to adopt 
a ‘can do’ attitude and work ‘beyond contract’. Again, this is consistent with 
Rousseau’s (2000a:4-5) view of the narrow relationship in which employees ‘feel 
obligated to perform a limited set of duties as specified in the employment 
contract....’.
Although the expectation of the presence of smaller factors was confirmed, it was the 
number of items that loaded onto each that was less than anticipated, thus the overall 
the results of this part of the research were somewhat disappointing. There are 
numerous potential reasons for this: first, sample size, n=256 may simply be too small 
to achieve a stronger loading profile; secondly, the sample profile, with all employees 
coming from the same type of organisation; thirdly, the degree of neutrality in the 
transactional element of the psychological contract, as measured by the Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract scale, is considered to be the most likely cause. 
A sample with a higher proportion of ‘high’ transactional contract scores is considered 
more likely to give the three factors greater definition.
As far as this research is concerned, the full 20-item transactional scale (Millward and 
Hopkins, 1998) is a stronger measure of the transactional psychological contract. A 
regression analysis revealed that 16% of the variability in Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract is predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism. In contrast, 
the variability predicted by Total Perceived Authoritarianism for each of the three sub­
factors was lower, Organisational Disengagement 11%, Individual Disengagement 
10%, and Legal Contract only 5%. On the whole the evidence suggests the
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transactional psychological contract can be divided into smaller factors and, as such, 
supports the second proposition. However, further confirmatory research is necessary 
before drawing reaching such a conclusion with confidence and before making such a 
bold statement of fact. The question also remains as to whether this is a desirable 
direction to follow, as it appears to be following the ‘categorical’ approach rather than 
the ‘holistic’. It is likely that a greater understanding of the relationship between 
organisational climate in general and management style in particular and 
psychological contract can be achieved by adopting a broader perspective; it could 
well be that defining the components that make up the psychological contract through 
detailed analysis by a process of deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction might 
increase our understanding and ability to analyse the psychological contract construct 
in its broader form.
i
6.2.3 The Third Research Objective
The third research objective is to test whether pay satisfaction has effect on the 
relationship between perceived authoritarianism and the transactional psychological 
contract. The proposition which emanates from this objective is divided into two parts; 
the first part that pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological contract and the 
second part that pay satisfaction will act as a moderating variable. The motivation to 
investigate the potential relationship between [perceived] authoritarianism in 
management, satisfaction with pay, and the transactional psychological contract was 
the apparent lack of research in this particular area and the opportunity to explore 
new territory and to make a contribution in the field of organisational behaviour. 
Although there is a considerable literature on pay satisfaction and some of the 
psychological contract literature considers pay, particularly in relation to the 
transactional psychological contract (Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993; Herriot and 
Pemberton, 1996; Lester and Kickul, 2001), there is little research which connects the 
three. Consequently, this presents fertile ground for a research contribution.
6.2.3.1 Pay satisfaction as a mediating variable
The analysis of the data for the total sample revealed that satisfaction with pay had 
only a weak mediating effect on the transactional element on the psychological 
contract. The protocol followed for the test of mediation was that advocated by Baron 
and Kenny (1986), this requires a three-stage regression procedure. First, the
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mediator is regressed onto the independent variable and the independent variable 
must affect the mediator, which was found to be the case. Secondly, the independent 
variable is regressed onto the dependent variable and the former must be shown to 
affect the latter, again this was the case. Thirdly, the dependent variable is regressed 
onto the independent variable and onto the mediator and the mediator must be 
shown to affect the dependent variable, which again was the case, as evidenced by 
the lower beta value in the third test (p=0.33) than in the second test (P=0.40) (see 
p.221). The first conclusion that might be drawn from this is that the proposition that 
pay satisfaction acts as a mediator holds, but only very weakly. However, to check if 
this was the case, the data were analysed in the same way but for each organisation 
separately, as this provides a more appropriate and meaningful unit of analysis.
In the case of the largest organisation, MGt pic (n= 122), a comparison of the beta 
values revealed a lower value in the third test (p=0.32) than in the second test 
(P=0.39), thus confirming that pay satisfaction acts as a weak mediating variable. 
Interestingly, MGt pic exhibited the highest mean score for Total Transactional 
Psychological Contract (x=66.10) and a relatively low score for Total Pay Satisfaction 
(x=10.09). The score for Total Perceived Authoritarianism (x=41.68) although 
ranked third, was towards the higher end of the mean scores range. Even though the 
results confirm that pay satisfaction acts as a weak mediator, it is not sufficiently high 
to counteract the negative affect of perceived authoritarianism on the transactional 
psychological contract and one might speculate that a lower Total Pay Satisfaction 
score might result in a higher Total Transactional Psychological Contract.
In the second largest organisation, the Automobile Association (n=56), a comparison 
of the beta values revealed a higher value in the third test (p=0.58) than in the second 
test (P=0.51), thus confirming that pay satisfaction does not act as a mediating 
variable. This is an interesting result, as the Automobile Association exhibited the 
highest Total Pay Satisfaction score (x  11.75), the second highest Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism score (x =42.07) and the lowest Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract score (x=58.13). Thus, it would appear that, although pay satisfaction is 
high, there is some other factor that is reducing the level of the transactional 
psychological contract. It could well be that, as found in the exploratory studies, the 
strength of the emotional attachment and relational psychological contract with the 
organisation may be the explanatory variable here; that the attachment to the
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organisation and the ethos it promotes is stronger than that with organisational 
agents (managers).
In the third largest organisation, iResponse (/?=51), a comparison of the beta values 
revealed a lower value in the third test (p=0.32) than in the second test (p=0.39), thus 
confirming that pay satisfaction does act as a weak mediating variable, but only very 
weakly. Again this result is interesting as this organisation exhibited the lowest Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism score (x=36.63), the second highest Total Pay 
Satisfaction score (x=11.37) and, although ranked third, a relatively high Total 
Transactional Psychological Contract score (x  =64.02). At the individual 
organisational level, this is by far the most interesting and arguably counterintuitive 
result. Why does the organisation with the lowest level of perceived authoritarianism 
and a relatively high level of pay satisfaction display a relatively high transactional 
psychological contract?
In the smallest organisation, Glasgow City Council (/?=27), the data set was too small 
to conduct a full analysis. Consequently, whether pay satisfaction acts as a mediating 
variable can not be determined.
The most remarkable feature of the results is the degree of inconsistency in the 
results of the analysis. The potential explanation for this inconsistency lies in the 
sample sizes for each of the organisations. However, as a consequence of the 
results, the proposition that pay satisfaction will act as a mediating variable between 
high authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological contract is 
not supported. In the circumstances it seems appropriate to revise the proposition to: 
pay satisfaction might act as a mediating variable between high authoritarianism and 
the transactional element in the psychological contract in certain circumstances, but 
the evidence suggests that satisfaction with pay is unlikely to exhibit a strong 
mediating effect.
6.3.2.2 Pay satisfaction as a moderating variable
In the regression analyses that were conducted to ascertain if Total Pay Satisfaction 
acted as a moderating variable the results were equally disappointing, with only one 
organisation which the moderating qualities were exhibited. When Gross Pay was 
substituted for Total Pay Satisfaction and the regressions repeated the results were
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very similar. For the Relational Contract, Total Pay Satisfaction acted as a significant 
moderator in only on organisation, iResponse, in all other organisations it proved to 
have no statistically significant moderating effect. Likewise, for the Transactional 
Contract, Total Pay Satisfaction exhibited no statistically moderating effect. When 
Gross Pay was substituted for Total Pay Satisfaction and the analysis repeated, only 
on incidence of a statistically significant moderating effect was found, again in 
iResponse for the Relational Contract. This suggests that satisfaction with pay cannot 
be used, with any certainty, as a means of reducing the impact of authoritarian 
management on the psychological contract. This in itself is an interesting finding as it 
suggests a potential link with the work of Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman (1959); 
as noted in Chapter 2, pay and the level/quality of supervision, which might be 
equated with an authoritarian management style, are regarded as hygiene factors 
which act to prevent dissatisfaction. It seems unlikely that one hygiene factor (pay) 
can be used to moderate the impact of another hygiene factor (supervision or 
management style); whereas building realistic expectations or ensuring those 
expectations that have been created are met is more likely to lead to a stronger 
relationship or psychological contract between the individual and the organisation.
Further analysis, in which Total Expectations was substituted for Total Pay 
Satisfaction, produced more interesting and important results. Total Expectations 
acted as a significant moderating variable between Total Perceived Authoritarianism 
and the Relational Psychological Contract in each organisation (excluding Glasgow 
City Council where the sample was too small for regression analysis to be 
performed); however, Total Expectations failed to act as a significant and consistent 
moderator in the Transactional Contract. Indeed, the influence of expectations on the 
psychological contract has been discussed by numerous researchers over the last 
four decades. For Levinson et al (1962) expectations equate to promises in the mind 
of the individual, that even when these expectations are tacit there is a perception 
that the organisation (and its agents) is duty bound to fulfil them. For Portwood and 
Miller (1976) individual expectations are compared with the job reality, thus creating a 
perception of the degree of reciprocation in the psychological contract. In a slightly 
different interpretation, Robinson (1996) suggests that expectations are what people 
think they will find in the organisation. These perspectives highlight the importance of 
careful psychological contract management and imply that the more expectations are 
met, the healthier the state of the relationship is likely to be. However, as noted by
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Rousseau (1989) and Milward Purvis and Cropley (2003), it may not be so much 
about explicit delineation of what each party has promised or obligated itself, but 
rather about creating a realistic set of expectations about what life in the job and the 
organisation will be like. Given that organisational relationships are constantly 
changing and being revised, managing expectations is a continuous process, as 
psychological contracts evolve over time (De Vos, Buyens and Schalk, 2003; 
Levinson et a/, 1962). To achieve a healthy psychological contract there is a need for 
sound communication between the organisation (or its agents) and the individual; if 
authoritarian management adopt a restrictive policy in relation to information, 
disseminating on a ‘need to know’ basis whereby knowledge is used as an instrument 
of management power in order to impose its authority, then this is likely to be a 
counter-productive move.
So, as organisations continue to change in terms of their structure, grow in size (by 
number of employees) and extend their global reach, what might the future hold for 
the employment relationship? If, as Hales (2002) suggests, heavily bureaucratic 
organisations with extended managerial hierarchies and centralised regulatory 
systems are being replaced by post-bureaucratic structures which are characterised 
by empowerment, internal networks and systems for facilitation and coordination, 
then authoritarian management may be a thing of the past. In essence this represents 
a shift in managerial roles as defined by the likes of Fayol’s (1949) and Mintzberg’s 
(1990) frameworks, in which the nature of managerial work is less focused on 
command and control and more on communication and coordination/ however, as 
Hales (2002) observes, in organisations where change has ostensibly occurred, there 
may be a considerable gulf between the rhetoric and the reality; although 
empowerment programmes may be introduced these may not create a significant 
change in organisational climate. Organisations may masquerade as ambassadors of 
empowerment but this may, in practice, be little more than a process of de-layering 
and becoming, as Hales (2002: 61) term it, ‘bureaucracy-lite’. If de-layering and 
empowerment are promoted as a genuine means of giving employees greater 
autonomy, what will happen if this is found to be a charade and that, in reality, there 
is little change in the day-to-day experience of employees? Hales (2002: 61) found 
that middle-managers had become cynical as they felt they ‘had been promised 
something that did not exist’. This has a particular resonance in relation to the
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psychological contract as there is a clear depiction of perceived promises not being 
kept.
There is also the possibility that as organisations change ‘management’ as an 
organisational group may recede into the distance. If this is the case then there will 
be further implications for the psychological contract. If organisations become 
increasingly centralised and managerial behaviour is controlled through centrally 
designed and implemented regulations that are created to maximise organisational 
performance, then employees may become increasingly psychologically ‘detached’ 
from the management and develop a more distant relationship with the organisation 
itself. If this is the case then a further question is raised: How close to active 
management do employees need to be for a meaningful, personal psychological 
contract to exist in an identifiable form? It is possible that in some of the organisations 
that participated in this study the lack of evidence of a widespread perception of an 
authoritarian climate may be owing to the detachment caused my centralised and 
distant control mechanisms being in place. It could be the case that participants were 
just getting on with their jobs and were to all intents and purposes disengaged with 
‘management’.
Possible explanations for the disengagement may lie in the work of Goldthorpe et al 
(1968), who found that whilst workers appeared not to derive intrinsic satisfaction 
from their work they did not collectively express dissatisfaction either; the conclusion 
drawn from the evidence was that the workers had adopted an instrumental 
orientation to work, they simply tolerated the deprivations associated with the work as 
it provided them with a good standard of living; certainly in the [qualitative] exploratory 
studies there was a high reported level of pay satisfaction, although this was not 
reflected universally in the main [quantitative] studies, where the level of pay 
satisfaction hovered around the mid-point on the scale; this may also be owing to a 
rather ambivalent attitude among employees towards management and the 
organisation.
6.3 The Research Contribution
This research has made a number of modest but substantive contributions to the 
existing body of knowledge about the psychological contract in general and its’
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relationship with other variables, in this case managerial authoritarianism and 
employees’ satisfaction with pay, in particular.
First, the research has explored the relationship between a single aspect of 
organisational climate and its’ relationship with a single element in the psychological 
contract, the transactional element. The results indicate a positive correlation 
between the level of authoritarianism practiced in organisations and the strength of 
the transactional element of the psychological contract. One of the most interesting 
findings and potential contributions is the difference in perceptions of authoritarianism 
and the transactional psychological contract between Managers and Supervisors.
Secondly, the research findings indicate the transactional element in the 
psychological contract can be broken down into smaller elements and as such is 
sufficiently complex to make further investigation worthwhile and necessary. To be 
able to identify, with a degree of accuracy and precision, not only the strength of an 
individual’s transactional psychological contract, but the root cause of this, be it the 
relationship with the job or with the organisation, would provide a much deeper 
understanding of individual and organisational behaviour. This in turn would provide 
valuable information enabling potential enhancement of psychological contracts for 
individual and organisational benefit.
Thirdly, the investigation of the effect of pay satisfaction as a variable which mediates 
or moderates between perceptions of authoritarianism and the level of the 
psychological contract has taken the psychological contract research into a new 
research arena. The findings of the regressions performed on the total sample and 
sub samples indicate, that pay satisfaction exhibits a weak and inconsistent 
mediating effect between the Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Transactional 
Psychological Contract and a weak and inconsistent moderating effect between the 
Relational and Transactional Psychological Contracts. This has implications for 
organisational behaviour theory and management practice, as beliefs that 
management might exercise extreme authoritarianism on the assumption that if 
employees are paid enough to create high pay satisfaction and which, in reality, locks 
them into the organisation as pay elsewhere is lower, the level of their transactional 
psychological contract may be held down. The findings reported upon herein suggest 
this is not the case, that satisfaction with pay cannot be used with confidence to
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manage the psychological contract. A more significant finding emanated from the 
additional line of enquiry, in which Total Expectations proved to be a significant and 
consistent moderator between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and the Relational 
Psychological Contract (but not the Transactional Contract). This finding makes an 
important contribution as it provides clear evidence which reinforces the role of 
expectations in the psychological contract formation and maintenance, as the early 
literature suggests (Levinson et a/, 1962; Portwood and Miller, 1976) suggest, the 
psychological contract is founded upon the reconciliation of an individual’s 
expectations and the reality they experience. Thus, one could argue, the more 
realistic an individual’s expectations are, the greater the likelihood of a healthy 
[relational] psychological contract, which highlights the importance of the careful 
management of employee expectations by organisations and their agents.
6.4 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has offered a discussion of the findings of the research in relation to the 
two qualitative exploratory studies and the main quantitative research. The findings in 
relation to each of the three research objectives and propositions were discussed in 
relation to the literature which underpins them and, in the case of the third, a revised 
proposition is suggested.
In the previous section a brief discussion of the small contribution this research has 
made to our understanding of the psychological contract with particular reference to 
managerial authoritarianism and employees’ satisfaction with pay and, more 
importantly, the close match between expectations and the reality experienced. 
Perhaps the most important contribution this research can offer lies not in the 
answers it provides, but in the questions that still remain. The research that was 
conducted is not perfect; many of the results are not wholly conclusive; much work 
still remains to be done in this area of organisational behaviour. The following, final 
chapter presents a broader conceptual discussion and a critique of the research 
process. The chapter provides an identification and discussion of the limitations of the 
research process and output, which is followed by recommendations for further 
research.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented a discussion of the results in relation to each of the 
three research objectives; to investigate the relationship between managerial 
authoritarianism and the transactional element in the psychological contract, to 
investigate the composition of the transactional element of the psychological contract, 
and to investigate if satisfaction with pay acts as a mediating or moderating variable 
between managerial authoritarianism and the transactional psychological contract. 
This closing chapter in the thesis presents some final comments and observations 
about the research.
The chapter commences with a brief overview of the research process that was 
designed and followed. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations associated 
with the research design, process and outcomes. The final substantive section 
presents recommendations for future research, these combine recommendations for 
overcoming some of the limitations set out below and for taking the research in a 
slightly different direction.
7.2 Reflections on the Research Process
The research commenced with reviews of the literature in relation to authority in 
organisations and the psychological contract. A further investigation into the literature 
relating to pay satisfaction and the way this might reduce the impact of extreme 
managerial authoritarianism identified a paucity of research in this particular area. 
Following the literature review the research objectives were defined, which led to the 
posing of research questions and the formulation of propositions, followed by the 
design of the research process.
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The field research commenced with two sequential exploratory studies, adopting a 
qualitative methodology, with the purpose of identifying the way in which employees 
perceived their relationship with the organisation, the state of their psychological 
relationship, or contract, with the organisation and whether pay satisfaction was a 
potential mediating factor. Access to the two organisation took three months each, 
creating some delay in the process. The findings of the exploratory studies identified 
perceptions of excessively authoritarian management, a strong transactional 
psychological contract with management, and suggested that satisfaction with pay 
was an important factor.
Having established the appropriateness of the research focus, the data collection 
method was altered to a quantitative approach and a questionnaire was designed. 
The questionnaire combined pre-existing scales to measure authoritarianism, the 
‘climate of fear’ scale (Ashkanasey and Nicholson, 2003) and the transactional 
psychological contract, extracted from Millward and Hopkins (1998); a derived scale 
to measure pay satisfaction, from Heneman and Schwab(1985) and a newly created 
scale to measure total expectations. The questionnaire was tested by way of a small 
pilot study, which confirmed the validity, reliability and overall suitability of the 
instrument.
As a result of the literature review, which identified overtly authoritarian management 
as a common feature in call centres, the decision was made to restrict the research to 
this type of organisation. After a considerable amount of effort, and numerous 
refusals, nine companies of various sizes and locations were recruited to participate 
in the research. The time delay from readiness to collect data, through access 
negotiation, to actual data collection was six months, which delayed the research 
even more; the main objection was the nature of the questions in the ‘Climate of Fear’ 
scale. Questionnaires were despatched to a named individual in each organisation 
and distributed internally, with responses mailed directly to the researcher with pre­
paid postage.
A total of 486 completed questionnaires were returned, but a large number contained 
unanswered questions and sections, resulting in a high number of missing values in 
the data set. As discussed in chapter 4, the decision was made to remove all the 
questionnaires with missing values, thus reducing the data set to 256 and which,
295
although preserving the integrity of the data, restricted the type of statistical analysis 
that could be performed on the data.
7.3 Reflections on the Research Findings
The psychological contract is a more complex phenomenon that it perhaps appears 
at first sight; the theoretical foundations on which it is constructed are many and 
various. Whilst successive attempts to define the construct clearly, by sub-division 
and categorisation, appear to have enhanced our understanding on the one hand, it 
could be argued these have also diluted it. For example, by investigating at the 
relational and transactional elements in fine detail a de facto separation has occurred 
giving each element contract status in their own right; indeed the common 
terminology of relational and transactional ‘contracts’ confirm this. Additionally, a 
number of assumptions appear to have been made about the two different elements. 
First, the short-term, economic character attributed to the transactional element 
seems to assume there is no relational content; this may not necessarily be the case, 
as short-term contracts are also highly likely to have an emotional element, 
particularly in relation to the way in which subordinates are treated by their superiors 
in pursuance of organisational goals. The research conducted for this study and 
reported in this thesis has fallen foul of the micro-focus; upon reflection, the decision 
to investigate the single ‘transactional’ component of the psychological contract using 
the full Millward and Hopkins (1998) was misguided and erroneous. When the short 
Relational Contract scale was used it proved Rousseau and McLean Parks’ (1993) 
view of the transactional and relational contracts occupying opposing ends of a 
‘contractual continuum’ as incorrect; as the logical expectation that more of one (e.g. 
Relational) would result in less of the other (e.g. Transactional) was not borne out by 
the results of either mediation or moderation. Instead Total expectations proved to be 
a more significant predictor of the Relational Contract, but not the Transactional 
Contract.
Much of the psychological contract research to date takes account of the contribution 
of the organisational climate to the health of the psychological contract, but in a highly 
constrained manner. Whilst, for example, Guest and Conway (1997) factor 
organisational climate into the ‘causes’ component of their psychological contract 
model, this is largely limited to the degree of bureaucracy and the extent to which 
employees are involved in decision-making. Much of the psychological contract
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research pays scant attention to the way in which management conducts itself at both 
the macro and micro-level in relation to achieving organisational goals and the way 
this affects the employment relationship. Similarly, the relational/transactional stance 
adopted by Millward and Hopkins (1998) is one of a dichotomous job and/or 
organisational focus; their research approach implies a longer-term relationship 
between the individual and the organisation and a shorter-term focus, which might be 
regarded as utilitarian, on the job. Once again managerial behaviour is not 
considered explicitly as part of the psychological contract construct.
The psychological contract represents an intricate conceptual network which draws 
upon a wide range of literature and theory. Although the relationship is founded on 
Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964) leading to a degree of mutual dependence, the 
development and maintenance of the employer-employee relationship is affected by 
a number of other factors. It cannot be denied that organisations are complex entities, 
indeed this is confirmed by Boulding (1956), but the complexity is not restricted to 
their structure, there is also the psychological complexity associated with the 
individuals within them. From the managerial hierarchy perspective the organisational 
structure reflects the requirement for some individuals to be in positions of authority 
and others to be subjected to it; the role of some is to direct and the role of others is 
to obey. The execution of authority and the relationship this creates between the 
superior and the subordinate evokes considerations of organisational justice, of 
rectitude and fairness, in the minds of both contracting parties. Consequently 
judgments surrounding the legitimacy of authority (Barnard, 1938) and the manner 
with which it is applied are highly relevant to the psychological contract (Bies and 
Tripp, 1998; Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003); the consideration of employee 
perceptions of interactional justice (Bies and Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1990) appear 
to be conspicuous by its absence in much of the research to date.
Whilst there is something rather seductive about the deconstruction of the 
psychological contract construct, in terms of the ease of scrutiny and understanding, 
this detracts from our deeper, holistic understanding of the construct. Much of the 
research to date which addresses the relationship between management and 
workers considers the organisational climate in relation to information-sharing, there 
is little attention paid to the style of treatment to which the subordinate is subjected. 
Given the findings of Bies and Tripp (1998) regarding the abusive nature of some
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managers, this appears to be a serious omission. Likewise, there is an absence of 
adequate research into the role of pay satisfaction and the way this might affect the 
psychological contract in general and, in particular, how it might act as a counter­
measure for perceived unfair treatment of the subordinate.
Similarly, the limited attention paid to effect of the external environment on the 
psychological contract, in terms of the changes in social norms and labour market 
conditions, also gives rise to concern. The implication of this is that the psychological 
contract is insular and exists in an organisational ‘vacuum’, protected from the 
external world, whereas the reality is arguably far different. The state of the labour 
market is likely to have a considerable impact on an employees resolve; that 
authoritarian management may be tolerated by an individual when the prospect of 
alternative employment is unlikely and the exit mechanism (Hirschman, 1970) is not a 
viable option, but when labour market conditions change the toleration level may 
reduce and employee dissatisfaction may manifest itself in voluntary labour turnover.
One relationship which appears to be neglected in much of the research into the 
psychological contract is that of pay satisfaction and the way this might act as a 
mediator for management style. If management style constitutes a relational 
component in the psychological and pay represents a transactional component, then 
further research into the interaction between these two elements seems long 
overdue. Not only would such an investigation increase our understanding of the way 
in which pay satisfaction might act as a counter to a particular management style, 
such as the degree of authoritarianism, but it would also reinforce the importance of 
viewing the psychological contract from a more holistic perspective.
7.4 Limitations of the Research
Although responsible for the design and execution of the research, rarely is the 
researcher in total control of the research process and, as a consequence, limitations 
are inevitable in terms of both the research process and the research output. The 
guiding light for this section is, were the research to be conducted again, would 
anything be done differently and why. The following limitations have been identified in 
relation to the research reported upon herein and should be taken into consideration 
when assessing the results and the contribution of the research.
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7.4.1 Research method
The first limitation is manner in which the research was conducted; research is 
frequently compromised by time and budgetary constraints and this research was no 
different.
Methods of data collection differ in terms of the quality and quantity of data 
generated; face-to-face techniques are more likely to result in high quality rich data, 
whereas the conventional survey is more likely to result in a higher quantity of data 
but it will not be as rich; this was clear in the quality of the diary and interview data 
collected during the exploratory studies. The data collection for the main study was a 
survey which produced a snapshot of the employment relationship in the participating 
organisations. I some cases whole sections of the questionnaires were uncompleted, 
usually reverse pages, suggesting that double-sided printing may have contributed to 
the data collection problems. The survey was anonymous, owing to the nature of the 
survey and the construction of the instrument itself. Although anonymity was 
considered essential to enhance the response rate, it created limitations as it 
provided no opportunity to collect missing data and reduce the number of missing 
values, or to conduct any follow-up research to probe the information provided by the 
respondents.
7.4.2 Research context
The second limitation is that the research was deliberately conducted in a single 
sector and the same type of organisation, contact/call centres. The rationale for this 
was twofold, that high authoritarianism was likely to be found in this type of 
organisation and to reduce the potential impact of industry sector as an additional 
variable and controlled for technological differentiation. Not only did this informed 
judgement prove incorrect, as discussed in section 7.4.5 below, but also the 
restrictive research focus inhibits the potential for generalising the results of this 
research across other industrial sectors. A broader industrial base which included 
organisations of greater heterogeneity, such as construction, hotels or retail, might 
have produced data sets with a wider range for each scale, thus providing for more 
detailed analysis and results capable of being generalised..
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7.4.3 Sample size and distribution
The third limitation concerns the sample size and distribution; this was disappointing 
on both counts, but particularly in relation to the number of incomplete questionnaires 
returned and the disproportionate distribution by organisation and job category. This 
had a negative impact on the data analysis insofar that more sophisticated tests 
could not be performed on some of the data. For example the full data set (n=256) 
was adequate for performing the regression analysis in relation to the third research 
question, but the same analysis could not be performed with the same degree of 
confidence on two of the organisational samples (Automobile Association and 
iResponse) and it could not be performed successfully on the fourth (Glasgow City 
Council).
Likewise, the organisational samples were deemed too small to be subjected to more 
detailed analytical techniques. For example Structural Equation Modelling, would 
have been appropriate were it not for the sample size, particularly at the 
organisational level. Whilst some authors suggest a minimum of 100 cases can be 
considered acceptable (Hayduk, 1987; Loelin, 1992), others Loelin (1992) 
recommend a minimum of 200, particularly where the data are not normally 
distributed, as is the case with the data in this research.
Similarly there were limitations created by the distribution of the data according to 
employee job category, with some categories containing very small numbers (e.g. 
Manager n=9; Supervisor/Team Leader n=11; Technical /?= 19). Consequently, one of 
the most interesting findings, of Managers exhibiting the lowest correlation between 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract and 
Supervisors/Team Leaders exhibiting the highest correlation between Total 
Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological Contract, is 
undermined by the small sample size in these categories.
7.4.4 Questionnaire distribution and self-selecting bias
The fourth limitation relates to the agreement of organisations to participate and the 
manner in which the questionnaires were distributed and the potential motivation by 
individuals to respond.
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Distribution was conducted within each organisation by a member of management. 
Consequently, there was a lack of absolute control over whom the questionnaires 
were given to. Manager may have deliberately avoided including openly dissatisfied 
individuals in the • survey. Given the range of scores for Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological contract, there were clearly 
some respondents who reported high score on both scales, but the low sample mean 
scores for each scale in total and by organisation does provide cause for concern.
As far as self-selecting bias in concerned, there are two ways in which this might 
have occurred. First, organisational participation was voluntary and it is possible that 
organisations with highly authoritarian regimes excluded themselves from the 
research, leaving only those with a more moderate management style. Secondly, 
individuals were not obliged to participate in the survey, cooperation with and 
participation in the research was again entirely voluntary. It could be that individuals, 
selected themselves to participate and returned questionnaires did so because they 
harboured a grudge or had an ‘axe to grind’. Once again, the range of responses on 
each scale indicates a low level of self-selecting bias, but the lack of ‘high’, rather 
than ‘higher’, Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract scores does give rise to concern.
7.4.5 Data profile
The fifth limitation is the data set itself. There was an expectation that, at the very 
least, one of the participating organisations would be characterised as ‘high’ in terms 
of managerial authoritarianism and/or the transactional psychological contract, as it 
was, none of the individual organisations were very far away from the scale mid­
points for Total Perceive Authoritarianism or Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract. This necessitated a broader interpretation of the data in relation to the first 
proposition and to evaluate the relationships between the variables in relative terms, 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’, rather than absolute terms ‘high’ and ‘low’.
7.4.6 Narrow research focus
The sixth limitation is that the research was focused on a single element of the 
psychological contract, the transactional. Whist the justification for this was sound it 
may have limited the scope of the research and compromised the results. The 
inclusion of the relational component might have revealed additional results, such as 
the potential relationship between the Total Perceived Authoritarianism scores and a
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Total Relational Transactional Psychological Contract. There might, for example, 
have been a negative correlation between Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total 
Relational Transactional Psychological Contract, stronger than the positive 
correlation found between Total Perceived Authoritarianism scores and a Total 
Relational Transactional Psychological Contract.
7.4.7 Individual authoritarianism measurement
The seventh limitation concerns the way in which authoritarianism is measured. 
Management authoritarianism was measured using the Climate of Fear scale, but the 
potential authoritarianism of subordinates was not measured; the justification for this 
being that the inclusion of another scale might have had an adverse impact on the 
response rate. However, if the views of Schneider (1975) and Schneider and 
Reichers (1983) are accurate, that certain individuals are attracted to particular jobs 
and organisations because of the person-organisation ‘fit’ with their own 
personalities, and that certain individuals like to be subjected to high levels of control 
(Fromm, 1961) owing to their high authoritarian personality (Adorno et al, 1950; 
Schuler, 1976); it could be that employees working in [potentially] ‘high’ authoritarian 
regimes do not perceive it as such, hence the lower than anticipated Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism scores.
7.4.8 Exclusion of external factors
The eighth limitation is that no account was taken of externalities which might have 
impacted on the research and affected the results. For example, the state of the local 
external labour market may have influenced intention to stay or quit decisions and the 
consequent perceptions of the psychological contract. Guest and Conway 1997: 6) 
recognise the role of [the lack of] ‘alternatives’ in the causes of the psychological 
contract; likewise Guest (2004: 6) acknowledges the impact of ‘wider contextual 
factors’. If there is high unemployment, then employees may decide to stay with the 
organisation, to put up with their bad lot, until such time as suitable alternatives 
become available.
7.5 Recommendations for Future Research
Upon reflection there are a number of recommendations which can be made. The 
following recommendations are made for two principal reasons; first, to remedy the 
process and output limitations of the research which are discussed in the previous
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section and, secondly, to advance this research by taking it into areas which, hitherto, 
have not been investigated.
As far as the limitations outlines above are concerned, the following 
recommendations are made. Although a quantitative methodology facilitates the 
collection of a large amount of data, there are limitations regarding the richness of the 
data collected. The first recommendation, therefore, is that any quantitative study is 
augmented by a qualitative study; not only would this will provide a means of 
triangulation, it would also allow issues identified in the quantitative research to be 
investigated in much greater depth, thus providing for a greater understanding of why 
certain behaviours are exhibited.
The second, recommendation is that the research context be expanded to include 
organisations and individuals from different industrial sectors. A broader contextual 
approach is likely to produce a greater diversity in terms of perceived authoritarianism 
and transactional psychological contract scores. If this were to be the case then it 
would provide opportunities for enhancing our understanding of why individuals and 
organisations behave in certain ways, in certain circumstances. It could be that 
certain industries attract certain types of individuals and encourage particular types of 
behaviours and such a research approach would allow this to be identified in a 
systematic way, rather than simply speculated upon.
The third recommendation is that a larger overall sample be obtained to allow for 
more sophisticated analytical techniques to be applied. A stratified sample according 
to, for example, job category or employment status, would be desirable as this would 
allow the data to be subjected to analysis to identify differences in perception of 
authoritarianism and the transactional psychological contract, such as those between 
Managers and Supervisors/Team Leaders identified in this research, could be 
measured and discussed with greater confidence. Of course the structural nature of 
organisations dictates that the higher the position in the hierarchy, the fewer 
individuals there are in each job category. However, a better representation than was 
achieved in this research should be possible.
The fourth recommendation concerns the distribution of questionnaires; this should 
be done in such a way as to reduce the potential distribution bias. Distribution by a
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staff representative may reduce the bias created by managers being inappropriately 
selective when deciding to whom questionnaires are given. Direct distribution to 
named participants would be preferable, but this may not be possible owing to the 
restrictions imposed by the Data Protection Act.
The fifth recommendation is that externalities, such as local or national labour market 
conditions should be taken in consideration. If job mobility is restricted by high 
unemployment and low job opportunities this might influence perceptions of 
authoritarianism and be reflected in the psychological contract measure. 
Consequently, it would be advantageous to include some measure of external 
conditions. Likewise, it may also prove beneficial to measure in some way individuals’ 
intention to quit taking a short-, medium- and long-term perspective.
The main recommendation to advance this research is to broaden the psychological 
contract and to look-at the construct in its entirety in relation to management 
authoritarianism. The rational for this is that perceptions of extreme authoritarianism 
may have an effect on the relational element of the psychological contract which is 
disproportionate to the effect on the transactional element; the two elements may not 
be in perfect balance. Perceptions of ‘high’ management authoritarianism may cause 
the relational element to decline and the transactional element to increase, but the 
increase/decline may not be proportionate or symmetrical.
Furthermore, if individuals exhibit a propensity toward ‘high’ or ‘low’ authoritarianism 
and this does influence their decisions in terms of organisational destination (Adorno 
et al, 1950; Schuler, 1976), then it is recommended that any future research includes 
the measurement of the individuals’ authoritarian personality, as this may influence 
their perception and judgement of management behaviour.
Similarly, the evidence of the role of reciprocal commitment in the construction of the 
psychological contract is worthy of further investigation. If there is a potential 
relationship between employment status, as the results of this research suggest, then 
appear sensible for this to be included in subsequent research.
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7.6 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
Guided by the literature, this research has investigated the relationship between 
employees’ perceptions of managerial authoritarianism and their own transactional 
psychological contract, taking their satisfaction with pay into account. By adopting this 
particular approach the research has delved into hitherto unexplored combined 
aspects of behaviour in organisations.
The adopting of this particular approach has advanced organisational behaviour 
research in a number of ways. The theory and practice of authority in organisations 
and the way this is perceived by subordinates has been the subject of considerable 
attention throughout the 20th Century; the authority- power relationship, together with 
authority and authoritarianism have been the subject of many studies. Likewise, since 
the late 1980s, there has been a growing interest in the emotional attachment 
between individuals and their organisations and its’ agents, commonly referred to as 
the psychological contract. What appears to have been overlooked is the potential 
relationship between the way that organisational agents, management collectively 
and individual managers and supervisors, behave towards their subordinates and the 
impact of these behaviours on the perceptions of the relationship constructed by the 
subordinates themselves.
In the psychological contract research to date there appears to have been a 
preoccupation with identifying the components of the construct by adopting a holistic 
approach and although different dimensions or elements, such as relational and 
transactional, have been consistently identified and measured, there has been an 
absence of research which takes a single element and investigates its’ relationship 
with other factors such as managerial authoritarianism. This research has addressed 
this shortcoming and has attempted to fill the knowledge gap by looking in detail at a 
single aspect of organisational climate, managerial authoritarianism, and its’ specific 
influence on the [transactional] psychological contract.
Similarly, there has been considerable research into pay satisfaction, but again this 
has been addressed from a narrow perspective, either simply measuring satisfaction 
with pay in isolation or as part of the broader concept of job satisfaction. There has 
been no in-depth research which investigates the role of the potential mediating role 
of pay satisfaction in the relationship between perceived managerial authoritarianism
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and the psychological contract. By adopting an integrated approach and investigating 
the relationship between perceptions of managerial authoritarianism and the 
transactional element in the psychological contract incorporating pay satisfaction as a 
potential mediating variable, this research has broadened the research agenda. In 
doing so it has not only made a small contribution to the understanding the 
relationship between the actions of management, but it has identified an area where 
further research would be beneficial.
This chapter has discussed the research process that was adopted from conception, 
through execution to its conclusion. The chapter has identified and discussed the 
limitations of the research in terms of both the process and the output. The chapter 
has also made recommendations for further research, to reduce impact of the 
limitations in the future by adjusting the research process and focus, and for 
extending the research to take other factors into account.
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Exploratory study: self-complete diary - clean example
337
SELF-COMPLETE e-DIARY
CONFIDENTIAL 
Research Diary
Respondent’s name
Alf Crossman, School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH. 
Tel: +44 (0) 1483 689347, e-mail: a.crossman@surrev.ac.uk
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS
The aim of this research is to identify how incidents or events at work impact on employee attitudes and 
behaviours towards other people or the organisation. Please remember you can withdraw from the study at 
any time. On a daily basis make a record of the thoughts and emotions you experience, the incident that 
caused them and your subsequent attitude/s or feelings about your relationship with the organisation your 
superior/s, subordinates or colleagues. For example, you might experience negative emotions such as: 
frustration, anger, resentment, insecurity or injustice. Likewise you might experience positive emotions such as 
enthusiasm, optimism, euphoria, fairness or justice and these may be a result of how you are treated or how 
you see others around you treated. Some examples of how you might complete the diary are set out below. 
Events/incidents should be recorded as soon as possible after they occur. Keeping the diary should not 
influence the behaviours of the diarist. The study period is two weeks and runs from Monday 9th June to Friday 
20th June (excluding weekends). In-depth interviews will be held with each diarist on Monday 23rd. The 
interview will be tape recorded to facilitate a flowing discussion; the contents of the diary, audio tape and any 
notes will remain confidential.
Please return the diary as an e-mail attachment to me (a.crossman@surrev.ac.uk) whenever you feel like 
doing so, the more frequently the better, but no later than at the end of week two please (Friday 20th June). I 
would appreciate it if you could answer the questions below, by deleting as appropriate (*), with your final diary 
submission at the end of the second week.
Questions
1. Do the events recorded in your diary represent ‘normal’ daily events? Yes/No*
2. Were the incidents recorded immediately afterwards? Yes/No*
2a. If ‘no’, were they recorded: a) within on hour? Yes/No*
b) at the end of the day? Yes/No*
3. Did diary-keeping increase your awareness of your relationships at work? Yes/No*
4. Did keeping the diary influence your attitudes or behaviours? Yes/No*
D ay /T im e Em otion experienced Trig ger
(incident or even t)
A dditional inform ation, 
observations or feelings
Example: 
Mon 09.00
Disappointment /  w a s  scheduled to attend a training course, but 
my boss wouldn’t release me at the last minute.
Example: 
Tues 11.30
Anger My boss promised me promotion if  1 got a good 
annual appraisal, but someone else was 
promoted instead.
Example: 
Tues 14.00
Confirmation A long-serving colleague was very ill; the 
company sorted out private medical care for him 
free of charge.
Example:
Wed15.00
Guilt 1 was given a productivity bonus but my 
colleagues did most of the work for me.
Example: 
Wed 16.45
Enthusiasm My boss told me what a good job 1 was doing and 
how important 1 was to the company.
Example:
ThurlO.OO
Unfairness One o f my colleagues is always on time and 
works hard, but she was disciplined for being 
late just once.
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Day/Time Emotion
experienced
Trigger
(incident or event)
Additional information, 
observations or 
feelings
-
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Exploratory study: self-complete diary - completed example
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CONFIDENTIAL 
Emotions at Work e-Diary
Respondent’s name: Research Advisory Service Manager, Centrica IS
Alf Crossman, School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH. 
Tel: +44 (0) 1483 682006, e-mail: a.crossman@surrev.ac.uk
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS
The aim of this research is to identify how incidents or events at work impact on employee attitudes and behaviours 
towards other people or the organisation. Please remember you can withdraw from the study at any time.
On a daily basis make a record of the thoughts and emotions you experience, the incident that caused them and your 
subsequent attitude/s or feelings about your relationship with the organisation, your superior/s, subordinates or 
colleagues. For example, you might experience negative emotions such as: frustration, anger, resentment, insecurity or 
injustice. Likewise you might experience positive emotions such as enthusiasm, optimism, euphoria, or fairness and these 
may be a result of how you are treated personally or how you see others around you treated. Some examples of how you 
might complete the diary are set out below. Events/incidents should be recorded as soon as possible after they occur. 
Keeping the diary should not influence your behaviour; it should simply be a record. The study period is two weeks and 
runs from Monday 26th January to Friday 6th February (excluding weekends). In-depth interviews will be held with each 
diarist, by appointment, from on Monday 9th February. The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate a flowing 
discussion; the contents of the diary , audio tape and any notes will remain confidential.
Please return the diary as an e-mail attachment to me at (a.crossmm@.surrev.ac.uk) whenever you feel like doing so, the 
more frequently the better, but no later than 5pm on Friday 6th February. Finally. I would appreciate it if you could 
answer the Questions below, bv deleting as annrouriate (*), with vour final diary submission at the end of the second
Yes
Yes some 
Yes some 
On one day 
Yes
Yes, more aware
week.
Questions
1. Do the events recorded in your diary represent ‘normal’ daily events?
2. Were the incidents recorded immediately afterwards?
2 a. If ‘no’, were they recorded: a) within on hour?
b) at the end of the day?
3. Did diary-keeping increase your awareness of your relationships at work?
4. Did keeping the diary influence your attitudes or behaviours?
Day/Time Emotion
experienced
Trigger
(incident or event)
Additional information, 
observations or feelings
Exam ple:
Monday
09.00
Disappointment
Bitterness
I  w as scheduled to take a leave day, hut 
m y boss m ade me cancel it at the last 
minute.
Exam ple:
Tuesday
11.30
Anger
Resentm ent
My boss promised m e promotion i f  I  got a 
good annual appraisal, but someone else 
w a s promoted instead.
Exam ple:
Tuesday
14.00
Confirmation A work colleague w as very ill and the 
company sorted out private medical care 
fo r  him free o f charge.
Example:
W ednesday
15.00
Guilt One o f m y colleagues w as criticised for a 
m istake that I  had m ade and I  d idn’t 
own up.
Example:
W ednesday
16.45
Enthusiasm
Motivation
My boss told m e I  w as doing good job  
and I  w as an asset to the company.
Exam ple:
Thursday
10.00
Unfairness
Injustice
I  get reprimanded fo r the sm allest 
mistake, but som e o f m y colleagues 
seem  to get aw ay with murder.
Exam ple:
Friday
16.00
Euphoria My team leader told me I  had been voted 
Employee o f the M onth
WEEK ONE
Day/Time Emotion experienced Trigger
(incident or event)
Additional 
information, 
observations or 
feelings
Mon early 
am
Anger/frustration The state of the room in 
which I was expected to 
train
Made worse by the 
fact this has 
happened before 
and no action taken
Mon Mid 
am
Fury/embarrasment Fact that the software didn’t 
work and my delegates were 
all senior management who 
could be in a position to give 
us lots of work
Made worse by the 
fact that I had asked 
for the software to 
be tested
beforehand and was 
told all was OK.
Mon 30 
mins later
Relief Software issues resolved
Mon Late 
PM
Relief and pleasure Positive feedback from 
delegates (especially on how 
I took ownership of the 
problems experienced).
Tues early 
am
Joy On learning that a colleague 
and friend had been short 
listed for a major award.
Nice to see a gentle, 
helpful person 
getting recognition
Tues Mid 
am
Disillusioned resigned annoyed Memo from HR Director 
laden with meaningless 
“business speak” that 
nobody could understand
Made worse by fact 
that our Senior 
Management have 
been asked to raise 
this issue but have 
refused.
Tues early 
Afternoon
Seriously undervalued 
Demotivated
On discovering that more 
junior colleagues with less 
knowledge and experience 
are paid more than me (and 
other colleagues)
Wednesday
late
morning
Bored At having to train the same 
piece of software for the 
umteenth time
Worsened by the 
fact that senior 
management won’t 
follow team policy 
by ensuring that at 
least 2 people can 
train each course we 
offer
Thursday 
early am
Frutstration/ anger/ embarrassment Training senior managers 
and the software not 
working.
Worsened by the 
fact this happens 
each time we run 
this course and no 
action is taken,
15mins
later
Pleasure/relief/happiness That there was a contractor 
who responded so quickly to 
my cry for help.
Mid Pm Irritation At our inability to stop the 
flood of irrelevant emails.
Friday Pleasure Great set of delegates on a 
course
WEEK TWO
Monday
Late
Evening
Frustration/worry Being given inaccurate 
directions to my hotel 
resulting in my getting lost 
for 1.5 hours late a t night in 
a rough part of Manchester.
15 mins 
later
Gratitude At helpful attitude of hotel 
staff when I arrived.
Tuesday 
early am
Surprise and pleasure The security guards giving 
me access to the building 
without the usual half hour 
debate
10 mins 
later
Annoyance and embarrassment The PCs in the training 
room not working properly
The teams manager sending 
oOut an email with the 
incorrect start time
People arrived too 
early and saw the 
disorganisation. 
Doesn’t create a 
good imagine for IT 
training.
20 mins 
later
Fear At the comments of some 
delegates. They were 
talking of sending a memo 
to our director complaining 
about the training
All
morning
Feeling of uncertainly and 
insecurity
Due to ongoing problems I 
kept having to move 
delegates and re-jig the 
course to deal with problems
Lunchtime Stress As the PCs crashed 
completed and we had to 
relocate to another room.
Early
Evening
Contented Having a nice meal and a 
bottle of wine
Late
evening
Happy Watching a TV programme 
where a man very doubtful 
of his abilities amazed 
himself with how much he 
achieved when he put his 
mind to it.
Wed Early 
am
Absolute fury All technical problems and 
issue of wrong start time 
repeated despite assuarances 
that they wouldn’t
Lunchtime Relief that the course was going 
well despite the problems
Late PM Pleasure/pride At the positive feedback 
from delegates
Early
evening
Fear Driving home from 
Manchester in appalling 
conditions
Late
evening
Relief/contentment At being with my family 
again.
Thursday 
early am
Irritation At some delegates being 
given the incorrect start time 
for a course by my manager
40 mins 
later
Annoyance and embarrassment The email software I was 
training was not working 
properly.
Made worse by the 
fact that there have 
been ongoing 
problems with a 
training room since 
before Xmas and 
those who should 
fix i t , haven’t done 
so but also will not 
empower others 
with the requisite 
knowledge to fix it 
on their behalf.
Lunchtime Pleasure and pride At the comments from the 
group as to how flexible I 
was and how much they got 
from the session despite the 
problems.
Mid
afternoon
Irritation That a meeting had been 
rearranged but I hadn’t been 
told.
Friday Mid 
morning
Resingation At our Senior Manager 
refusing to deal with the 
problems in Manchester
Friday 
early pm
Defensive At having to attend an 
online meeting at very short 
notice with no real idea of 
its purpose,
Late Friday 
pm
Appreshension
Energised
Delighted
At the outcome of my 
annual review.
I have been 
earmarked for 
promotion &have 
Deen given 
objectives to further 
development my 
skills.
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EMOTIONS AT WORK INTERVIEW
1. Interview: Date / / /
Time ........../..........
2. Interviewer: Aif Crossman
3. Interviewee .................... ............................... .......
4. Job title   ...........
5. Age ...........................................................
6. Gender M/F
7. Length of service ...........yrs mths
8. No of previous jobs ...........
9. Why did you decide to work for Centrica?
10. Did you previously work for the AA?
11. What expectations did you have about your job when you first joined the 
company?
12. How did you build those expectations, what were they based on. What
sources of information did you draw on?
13. Can you give me any examples of how your expectations have/have not
been realised or met?
14. Can you think of any examples of how your expectations have been
exceeded?
15. In what ways has your job changed since you joined the company?
16. Are these changes for the better, worse or you don’t really mind?
17. How well do you think you are paid?
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So Paul, what’s your job title?
Er, Senior Claims Negotiator.
And how old are you?
I’m thirty six.
Ok. And how long have you worked with Centrica, AA?
With the AA for nineteen years or there abouts.
Wow nineteen years. How many previous jobs did you have?
Er, within the AA?
In total.
I’ve only ever worked for the AA.
Onlyev...
I left...I came straight from school.
Right. You’re the first one that I’ve got that [?]. And I think that’s quite important 
because it means that you haven’t got any other experience of any other 
organisations to judge things like fairness and all the rest of it. Ok. Erm, so you 
bri...you’ve always worked for the AA?
Yeah.
What made you join the AA?
Erm that’s an easy one to answer actually. My dad was working here while my dad 
was a maintenance guy. I’d left school and I was doing a bit of temping I was sixteen 
and I was working in a factory making deep fat fryers. You know deep fat fryers?
Yes.
Putting the little elements in the bottom and it was probably the most mundane, boring 
job I have ever done in my life. It was a great laugh don’t get me wrong. I was sixteen 
and I was earning cash.
Right. Oh right. Ok.
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And it was like it was a job but I realised that I never...I never...I just did not want to 
work in a factory. That was it I was like no this is...this is boring me to tears, and a 
YTS, believe it or not I actually started as a YTS, er opportunity came up at twenty six 
pounds a week which was earning probably half of what I was earning just temping.
So that was about 1983/84.
84. 1984. So I started as a YTS and I took that opportunity with the AA, they offered 
me it, I said my dad was working here so it made me feel like I knew somebody within 
the AA. Erm, started as a YTS, got offered a full time position nine months later and 
I’ve been here ever since.
Ok. So when you came into the YTS scheme in the AA, what did you think it was 
going to be like? Can you remember?
A job for life.
Ok.
That’s what I thought. I thought it’s the big AA. The AA’s been here since you know 
before I can remember, the big tall white building, it was a job for life. Obviously I’ve 
seen it change a lot since then but that’s...that’s what I thought.
Ok. So why...why did you think it was going to be a job for life.
Erm, just...just because the AA was...it was the AA. It was...The name the AA you 
know people...people respected the AA in Basingstoke. All the people I knew that 
worked here and people knew somebody that knew that worked here they just got on 
really well and you know they said ‘if you get into the AA there’s lots of opportunities for 
you there’. Obviously people think of the AA as the patrol and that’s what I did to start 
with but I said I got into the insurance division and it was great I worked with a young 
team and obviously I was young I was only sixteen at the time and it...which was great 
and that was really it really. So it was just...
So how long had your dad worked here?
My dad worked here for about four, five, six years something like that. My dad moved 
around jobs but he’d been with the AA for quite a while and he liked it here and I mean 
he just looked after me when we first came here.
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So would it be fair to say that some of your first impressions/expectations of the 
AA came from your dad?
Yeah.
Ok. So you’ve got some sort of rough idea what it was going to be like.
Yeah you know about the company, the type of company it was, it was a nice company 
to work for, nice benefits and that they looked out for ya. And I had friends of my 
brothers that worked over here. There used to be a site over the road called [?] which 
used to be a warehouse. They worked in there and you know they all used to I 
suppose realise I was a bit of a jack that lad at sixteen. I never wanted to go to college 
or University. I hated school and I just wanted to get out and earn money and this was 
an opportunity at YTS to go and earn money. I went to college through that scheme 
and erm you know they told me about all these benefits they had and that was it really.
So all your expectations, have they been met?
They had been met but they’ve been distorted over the last three years I suppose. I 
mean I’ve always worked... I’ve always enjoyed working for they AA even through some 
of the rougher times it’s you know...The hardest time was when they got taken over by 
Centrica but there was times before that when...I...I’ve predominantly worked within the 
insurance division erm rather than er the AA side the membership side so...and we 
had a company director come in erm his name is Mark Wood. There’s no secret about 
the guy, even he came in, he was only with us for eighteen months. That was probably 
back in...trying to remember when he came with us now. Must have been the late 
1990’s round about 97, 98 time and he cut the division quite sign...Basically his job 
was to come in, chop the staff down, to get rid of the dead wood and at mainly head 
office and the insurance function as you know there was a lot of people there and that 
was the first time I’d...it...it...it was not I wouldn’t say shattered but I was quite shocked 
that...
Why were you shocked?
Well because like I said to you earlier it was a job for life. You were in insurance...see 
that’s...that’s the thing it was AA but it was really I worked for insurance and it was like 
you work in insurance you’re in a job for life, people always want insurance. But what I 
didn’t appreciate was that things move on. Computers started becoming more efficient, 
erm and therefore you know we had a...it was almost like a family because I knew 
ve...l knew a lot of people you know we all knew each other in Basingstoke and to see
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them go, all of a sudden there was probably a good third that were being made 
redundant.
So people sitting next to you were suddenly weren’t there any more?
Yeah. And then that happened again a little bit later on.
So what did you think about that when you’ve got someone sitting at the next 
desk to you. Friday they’re there the following Monday they’re not?
Erm, I’ve already...I was probably hurt really. Hurt that...hurt in such as the you know 
the management, in the way it had been done and losing all my friends.
How did management deal with it?
I personally thing pretty poorly. It was a case of you know we weren’t told originally 
that this was Roger Wood was coming to do. Er, don’t get me wrong now I mean you 
look back I don’t blame the guy I mean that’s...he had a job to do and he’s done it very 
well and of course the company’s now you know exceeding it’s expectations, but I just 
felt that you know we weren’t really told what was happening. One minute they were 
there the next minute they were gone. I was lucky. I mean I go...I actually felt lucky as 
well because I had a job still you know I’d been made redundant I still had a job but I 
did feel for the people that had left and it’s like you start to think well this ain't the same 
company we’re working for any more.
Did at any point you think am I next?
Yeah. Without a doubt you it’s like at that time I can’t remember, I think I was working 
in the marketing division and it was it was like the admin side that really went first and it 
was yeah am I going to be next and I...I think as a result it sort of like probably 
prompted me into probably looking for a different role within the business. Perhaps I 
don’t want to be in insurance at the minute any more I need to start looking at other 
options within the AA. Perhaps I need to go to membership or...
But you stayed where you were?
I stayed where I was. I actually moved roles but always within insurance. I actually 
moved over to commercial insurance brokers I think at the time who were thriving.
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Ok. Can you think of any examples any instances when your expectations were 
actually exceeded? That what you saw was actually better than you thought you 
were going to?
Yeah. Erm, I remember a couple of incidences actually where comes down to almost 
teamwork. It was...we were taken on a couple of erm courses I don’t know if you’d 
really call them that some of them were courses, two of them were they were like team 
events where we had fun days and it really showed the business as what it was for. 
You know this we were a family and erm you know look at us all. I mean everybody 
had a great time. We had one outside the back of this building we had one up at the 
AA college in [?] and erm they were two really great days.
What did you think they were going to be like?
I felt that they were gonna be pu...we were going to be managed into...you know 
management were gonna take over and we were really gonna be there and do more of 
what we were asked to do and you know almost shepherd it down the route they 
wanted us to go down but they didn’t they gave you the opportunity to relax and enjoy 
yourself and have fun again because a lot...a lot of this happened after. One of them 
happened after the event, the redundancies, one of them was before. So it 
almost...like the second one we can still be a good team here and you know you can 
still get on and you know time and...I suppose the other times that I feel that we 
exceeded expectations were the times when management praised us within our areas 
you know we’ve had good bonuses, good pay rises over the years.
Is that something that was unusual? To be praised by management.
Yeah I think so. Erm, not so much in the later years er with erm one of directors in 
there Kerry Richardson, he was all for that. He’s a very good director I think just a 
pers...l mean I used to sit not far from his office and he would always say good 
morning, good afternoon. He’d come and have a chat with you about football, squash,
I used to play squash with him and er quite happily come and talk to you, you know 
during the day, in the mornings if he was passing he’d talk and that to me made it you 
know he’s a real person. You know he might be the co...he might be the man...er not 
managing director, chief executive or whatever he was at the time and most people 
would say ‘you’re talking to Kerry Richardson’ especially in the other departments. 
Because Kerry worked in the head office with us I had a lot of dealings with Newcastle 
and Cardiff. If he went there they would all be like this with their heads down sort of
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erm you know you can’t look up from your desk because Kerry Richardson’s walking 
past and he used to come 'alright Paul’ he’d put his arm around me and then we’d 
have a chat and that...that really made you feel you know this is a great place to work. 
Kerry was a nice guy.
What...What were management like in general? I mean it...it...it seems to me 
that what you’re saying is that because this guy was like he was he was special.
Yeah he was. He...He...
So does that mean that other people, other managers were not as good?
Yeah there was definitely some that you didn’t...that weren’t approachable. Or there 
were managers that you could name that weren’t approachable erm that you just didn’t 
feel that you could go and talk to them as openly as you could. There always been that 
them and us culture. It’s not always easy there’s always been that you can say what 
you like, when you like but if you know do ya. Because if you say what you like, within 
reason, you know is there gonna be a comeback on ya? I mean I’ve always felt if 
you’re gonna say something and you know you want to criticise a decision of 
management at the end of the day he’s the boss that’s what he’s paid to do, so long as 
you’ve got something constructive to say and you can back it up then fair enough they’ll 
listen. But there’s no point going into a manager and saying I think you’re crap 
because ok fair enough there’s the door. But that’s always been there. There’s always 
been well we’re an open policy but I don’t believe that they always was as open as they 
would have liked you to believe.
Ok. So since you joined the AA and worked in the insurance department up until 
now has your job changed? In a nutshell.
In a nutshell I’ve gone from being office junior to running around, tea boy doing what 
and as I was told to now I am a senior negotiator and I’ve probably got more respect 
now than what I had then. People rely on me for decisions. I can make decisions 
although I might have had a few disagreements in my report last week you know I feel 
that I am now looked upon as someone who’s been here for a while and somebody 
they can rely on to make a good decision regarding claims.
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So that discretion that you’ve got, is that important to you?
Oh very important. You know what’s the point being a senior negotiator, someone with 
you know why...you might as well put us all as admin clerks and pay us less if you 
don’t want us to make decisions.
So if I came in tomorrow and said ‘right Paul we’re changing the way we’re doing 
things. Now any decision you have to run it by me.’ How would that make you 
feel?
Totally gob smacked to be honest. I would just say well what’s the point? You’re 
paying me X amount of money £30,000 whatever it is, to do this job but you don’t want 
me to make the decisions that’s what I’m paid for you know you pay me a reasonable 
wage to make that decision. It’s trust. It comes down to trust.
Is trust important to you?
Very important yeah. I expect them to trust me as well as I trust them.
Do you trust them? Whoever they are.
Most of the time. Sometimes I...I get a little bit...it’s in the role that we’re in at the 
moment I feel a little bit that my senior management have a tendency to withhold 
information from us.
Give me an example of...of this?
An example is that if there’s going to be a change in the department, the structure or 
you know we...we just lost a part of our department their another acc...in fact Jo works 
for them who I mentioned, Jo Plank, she works for this section and they were going 
and they almost kept it as a secret until it was ‘oh now we can tell you’ and it was like 
but hang on a minute we’re all senior people in your department you know what you’ve 
done isn’t of top secret that we can’t you know that we shouldn’t have known about but 
they almost kept it as like well I know something that you don’t, and they left it until the 
last minute to tell us rather than ...whereas in the de...yeah as I say in the department I 
worked in before being marketing, our management was open with virtually everything. 
Obviously things of confidentiality and you know business decisions, big business 
decisions that we wouldn’t have been told about which you wouldn’t have expected to, 
they didn’t tell you about. But we were open about figures, what the plans were, ways 
forward where as down in the department where I am at the moment it’s sometimes
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like well we’re management we...I don’t blame them I think sometimes they think we 
don’t really wanna tell you because we don’t wanna bother you because you’re busy 
enough doing what you’re doing.
Why do you think they behave like that?
I think it...I think it’s because they...they just like to have a bit of an edge that there’s 
something going on that we don’t need to know about. I don’t know. I just think it’s a 
power thing to be honest. I think it helps them to think that we don’t know.
Ok. You mentioned before about pay. Do you think you’re well paid?
Reasonably paid yeah. I say I started off on twenty six p...twenty six pounds a week 
so erm for the job as a senior negotiator yeah I think I’m paid pretty reasonably well.
Do you think you’re paid well enough to put up with an awful lot of crap?
No.
Ok.....
I’d like a little bit more for the crap we deal with. Erm, no we are...it’s not a bad wage 
but the crap that we do deal with because obviously we’re dealing with claims, erm we 
get a lot more crap than I think people realise out of it. And sometimes I think that 
other departments think that we get paid a lot more.
So when you come to...when it comes to claims you’re a direct interface with the 
customer?
Yeah. And the customer, with the patrol force, with the service centres. Erm, basically 
anybody from the customer up to the solicitor. We could deal with anybody and talk to 
anybody to try to resolve the claim.
So what sort of crap do you have to put up with that you don’t think you’re paid 
well enough to?
Erm, we get customers on foul and abusive regular. Er, because I’m a bloke most of it 
don’t affect me. I don’t get it a lot but a lot of the girls get it and I see it and I think to 
myself you know we really don’t need this.
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So what do you do about it?
Er, we’ve raised issues with management but to be honest for myself because as I said 
I most of it I can just take just let it go over my shoulders, I’m fed up of telling them now 
‘we’re gonna deal with it’. It worries me it concerns me because I don’t think 
management realise erm we’ve had a lot of people go off with stress because of it, 
because of the environment, the working situation and it worries me that sometimes it’s 
almost like a [?] you know shouldn’t you be looking. You know we’ve had three people 
off sick now with stress does that not ring bells. It rings bells with me.
Do management realise?
Think they do but I...it’s almost like sometimes I think they’re trying to find other 
reasons. Rather than pinpoint the actual problem they’re trying to use other reasons 
perhaps maybe you know out of you know it’s like you said earlier it’s something to do 
with your problems outside of work. I think sometimes they think oh she’s got problems 
outside work that’s what her real problems are. Well you bring them into work that all 
affects everyday work and if your pressure your workload and your pressure is that 
strong then you know it does make it difficult.
So you’ve got these managers that aren’t doing anything. Would it make any 
difference if they weren’t here?
I wouldn’t say that I thought managers ain’t doing anything but I...yeah it would make a 
difference if they weren’t here because you still need their support. You still need 
someone to...to back you up. I mean Clive is my direct [?] and he’s a great guy and I 
feel that I can rely on him. Sometimes I think it’s the management above him that are 
the ones that...because I mean they do their own job they’re obviously more procedure 
and service levels and all that sort of thing [?].
So if I was to say to you who do you think your key employment relationship is 
with? Is it with Clive, your immediate manager, or the management in general or 
with the AA? Or with Centrica?
Erm, my...I would say Clive because Clive’s the one I rely on. You know it’s a day to 
day job. I don’t...Although I’m part of the AA part of Centrica, we don’t have enough 
involvement with them. We get a monthly, report which we sit and probably go through 
as a tern briefing about five or ten minutes flat. Quick read of what they’ve said. Clive 
is my day to day manager and the guy I rely on.
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So when things go wrong who do you blame?
Er, probably senior management. It depends on what it is that goes wrong. When 
you’ve got a serious complaint it is yeah with senior management higher than us 
because the ones that...the things that go wrong in our area are where we’ve made a 
decision on a claim, somebody has then taken it higher above so it’s to senior 
management they’ll write to Roy Gardiner’s office, and then the decision is taken 
someone will make a claim, we’ll make a payment on a claim and you’re thinking to 
yourself well hand on a minute I’ve spent months arguing with this guy getting foul and 
abusive language you know banter left, right and centre arguing it and proving a point 
and then management might turn over and say look I can’t be bothered to fight it so 
let’s pay it and that’s...that’s the tough part.
Ok. So when something goes really well who do you credit with that? Senior 
management or Clive? Immediate reaction.
Immediate reaction would be my...would be my colleagues. I wouldn’t even I wouldn’t 
even go as far as senior management. If things are going well and on a par it’s usually 
because the staff have done it. Maybe Clive and Nick second but immediately you 
know it’s the team.
Ok. And if tomorrow you were to get a pay rise who would you credit for getting 
that for you.
Clive.
Ok. Right lets look at some of these diary entries. Ok the first one 26th January. 
Emotion experienced anger. Letter torn to pieces by manager. Asked to write a 
letter for manager and it was torn to pieces with no explanation of what was 
wrong with it. Teli me about that.
Yeah. Because I’d worked in insurance I get to look at a lot of the professional 
indemnity claims which are claims against the business where we’ve made a possibly a 
business decision erm for an insurance product. We’ve sold somebody an insurance 
product and it’s gone wrong somewhere down the line. We had a claim come in which 
got sent to senior management erm in legal which they asked us to do a response on 
and that got passed that got passed to my senior manager which went to Clive and 
then came to me. So I looked in and he said Paul can you do a letter? You’ve worked
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in insurance you must know about life policies. Ok so I managed to sort it all out and I 
did a letter. It was two paged detailed letter. Gave it to management said there you go 
that answers the questions. They had a little look at it and said ‘ooh I’m not sure it 
don’t really make...don’t really make sense’ said fair enough ok I don’t mind ok so we 
changed it slightly. Came back, this was Clive, came back. It then went into the 
manager above that and I got called over to the desk and it was like ‘no no that’s crap’.
I said ‘what’s crap?’ ‘That letter1 Nick said this bla bla bla bla. Crossed out it was like 
lines across it, squiggle marks, two big red pens down the side ‘don’t like it’. I said ‘ok 
well tell me then. What don’t you like about it? What don’t you understand?’ ‘Dunno. 
He just don’t like it. Gotta do it again’. I said ‘Well it...I don’t mind doing it again but 
give me some guidance here. If you don’t like it tell me what you don’t like about it’. In 
time we then managed to...that manager came down and we sat and we talked about it 
and I actually redid that letter and I actually felt good because I actually got praise from 
the original manager that sent it.
What did you think would happen in the first place?
In the first place I thought well you know, I expected it to get altered because obviously 
I write in...I...I write similar to the way I speak. Without the language. Pretty straight to 
the point. I’m a pretty ordinary guy and I write how it is obviously technical stuff that I 
put in there and so I did expect it to get altered but I would have liked it have been 
constructive criticism. Rather than just come and...and say it’s crap just give me you 
know constructive criticism is what I was looking for. I don’t mind...don’t get me wrong 
I have no problems [?] if they want it altered that’s fine but it would have been nicer to 
have come out and said ‘Paul this is actually what we don’t like and we’d like you to 
change it and do this’. But...
Ok. So it wasn’t the fact that it was altered it was the way in which it was done.
Yeah. It was the way in which it was done. Being...just basically being told it was crap 
and they couldn’t be bothered to talk to me about it.
Ok. Lets take the next one which is un-trusted. Asked to review an urgent file, 
asked to make a decision on referrals then management questioned the 
decision. Can you remember what that was about?
I can’t remember the actual case itself but erm there was a...one of my colleagues 
cases, who’s the same level as me, the file had been referred to management.
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Management was a bit busy so they asked me if I’d have a quick look at the file and 
give them an opinion on the liability that was in it. It was only a small claim, a couple of 
hundred pounds, but basically I went through it and I agreed with the decision that had 
been made. Said ‘well you wanted me to make a decision, I gave my reasons for why I 
made the decision’. Then I think...I think it was because management actually had a 
phone call from the claimant, because I think they’d had the file for a couple of weeks, 
then the claimant had already rung up and was already discussing the claim. 
Management then said ‘Well I don’t agree with that decision. I said ‘well either you 
want me to make the decision or you don’t’. I said you know ‘if you’re not going to listen 
to what I’m saying now what’s the point?’. You know I was a bit frustrated because I 
felt that you’re asking me to do it and then again you’re changing your mind. You know 
what was the point in giving it to me if you want to go through it all and change [?] 
again.
So what did you expect them to do? Given you the file...
I expected them if you’re gonna give me the file do you want me to send the letter out 
in your name and I’ll do it for ya? And I’m quite happy to speak to the customer. Or 
you know if you’re not going to agree with my decision what’s the point in giving it to 
me? You might as well read it yourself and make your own decision.
Ok. Well the next one is initial unfairness. There was a meeting. Management 
meeting shows the opportunity to blame all poor decision rather than pull 
individual to one side. Can you remember what that was about?
Yeah I can. Erm, there's been a f...erm there’s been a bit of an upheaval recently with 
regards to liability decisions made on a couple of claims. It was only really one but I 
think management wasn’t having a very good day. He was sort of like running a little 
bit cold. Not very happy and pulled somebody to one side and given him a right 
roasting about it. It got a little bit out of order really. Er he then erm, we then had a 
team brief and we were asked to stay behind which is like the whole of the office. So 
you’ve got all the admin staff, all the negotiators, all the erm risk managers and our 
senior manager we all sit down and [?] we go through the stats and if there’s any other 
questions, anything to do with the businessrthat we can talk about you know it’s there 
[?] to do. We were all asked to stay behind afterwards and I almost felt it...it was like 
management knew they were wrong a couple of days before that in that when they 
rollicked the person that got the telling off I think they realised they’d made a mistake.
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Rather than apologise to that one person they then decided to use this as an 
opportunity to say I think there’s er some bad decisions being made on liability, I’m not 
happy about the state of some of the files, yet I know for a fact that they’d only looked 
through one persons files. They’d only looked through about five files and they were all 
belonging to one person and rather than pull that person to one side they’d used it as 
an opportunity to blame everybody. I’m not saying that we all do it perfectly every time, 
because we all make mistakes and yes some of the files may get a bit messy, but it 
was...it was like a cop out. Almost an apology to the person they had a go at but at the 
same time lets have a go at everybody and not pull that one person to the side again 
so I just think we were being treated unfairly because I don’t think it related to 
everybody it was more...
Ok. Ok. Erm, there's an interesting one here which says you felt bullied by a 
telephone call and this was from a member of the AA rather than a member of 
staff.
Yep.
Ok. Erm, wanted decision made there and then. Wouldn’t accept no for an 
answer. Give me a bit of background on that first of all.
This is...we...again within our...within our role, which is one of the reasons why 
sometimes it is a little bit more difficult, we’ve become almost like a call centre. We’re 
getting people put through, we are the claims team but you know as negotiators you’re 
there to negotiate and you need to have all the evidence in front of you. We’re getting 
a lot of calls put through to us now because they get them in other areas, they don’t 
know what to do and they put them through. I don’t mind answering them but on this 
particular call I had a member who was i...pretty irate. Erm, basically they wanted a 
decision. They were adamant that the AA was liable and they wanted me to tell them 
there and then that I was gonna accept the claim and we were gonna pay for it and he 
just kept going and going down that same route getting a bit more and more irate. In 
the end...at the time I felt bullied but I managed to resol...you know resolve the 
situation. I managed to calm them down and they agreed that you know we needed 
time to investigate and that they would have to submit the claim in writing and stuff. 
But at the time you felt very bullied by the customer. That you know...I don’t know
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whether bullied is probably the right word but it was bullied at the time. It was almost 
you know we’re being very ‘you’re going to make this decision for me’.
Could you have done anything about that by talking to management or...?
Erm, I think that’s...no. I th...Like I said I think I, being the person that I am, I was able 
to handle that situation anyway. At the time it was I felt that I was being bullied but 
that’s you know that’s what I’m there for. I am quite good at...in that time, by the end of 
the conversation I will diffuse it but it does you to start your blood boiling and you 
almost wanna give it back to them. What they’re giving you, you want to give it back 
and it’s like hey come on. I can’t speak to you like that so...you...it’s almost...that’s the 
hardest bit and I think as a senior negotiator and you know I’ve been in the claims 
department for quite a while now and that helps because that’s what I’m there for.
So do you see that as being part of your job? Part of what you’re paid for?
Not really I mean it’s changed a lot. You never...you never would have got that in the 
past. I think the problem you’ve got...it is part of my job now because that is the 
climate, the environment we live in that people are more claims orientated and they 
expect more. You know they see all these adverts on the telly saying that they’re going 
to resolve their claim in twenty four hours. Erm you know other insurance companies 
and these accident help lines. If you’ve had a claim or you’ve fallen over or you’ve had 
something you know people just want to go and claim compensation so we do get a lot 
more of it so it’s a lot harder now because you’re getting more and more of the bullish 
tactics from people that they do...again I mean earlier on just before lunch I had a guy 
come on because I didn’t give him the answer that he wanted he just started swearing 
at me but again it’s because of the type of guy I am I will raise my voice back. I mean 
I’m not going to sit there and take it. You’ve gotta be firm but you’ve got to be fair. 
Obviously you can’t swear back at these people as much a sometimes you think I’m 
going to you never do and I can usually...! spoke to him again when I came back from 
lunch, just before lunch [?] came back I went back to him because I...I didn’t know 
anything about his claim. I then went back to him and I went over the situation look I’ve 
spoken to the service centre that were responsible that he was clai...trying to say 
damaged their engine and erm I had the answers. If you’ve got the answers to his 
questions it’s not so easy for him to just keep firing off stuff at you and that’s the 
hardest thing because that’s why when they’re trying to make you...they’re bullying you 
into making a decision you can’t because you haven’t got all the information to hand.
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Let me give you a scenario. The phone rings in your office. What’s your first 
reaction other than to pick it up?
Other than to pick it up. Sometimes is I wish it wouldn’t ring or can somebody else get 
that? But most of the time...
Why do you think that?
I think that because you’re thinking I’m going to have another scream on the phone and 
you just don’t want it. You don’t need it.
So your expectation that when the phone rings is you’re gonna have somebody 
on there that is going to be irate, potentially abusive.
Yeah.
So this is now normal daily working life?
Yeah. I mean as I said I don’t get it often. I don’t get it as often as some of the girls do. 
Ladies get it a lot more than I do. But you do think that. You alw...as soon as that 
phone rings you do think oh God I hope this ain’t a screamer. Because you just don’t 
want it. You’re like God you know please I’m trying to help here I’m doing a job here 
I’m trying to help you. I’ll give you a bi...you know I’ll give you advise and I’ll try and 
help and we’ll try and sort it but you know give me a fair crack.
Do you think that management really appreciates that this goes on, on a daily 
basis?
No. No. Erm, if we did like we’re supposed to fill out the er I think is it accident book? 
It’s not accident book but you’re supposed to fill out every time you have an abusive 
phone call you’re supposed to put it in the book. It would be full up by the end of the 
week.
So why don’t people do it?
Because it’s part of the norm. You just take it as it is part of the norm. You just take it 
you know we...
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How do you know it’s part of the norm?
You don’t it’s just we...we assume that it’s part of the norm. We assume that 
everybody else takes it and that’s how they deal with it. We know they don’t because 
we’ve seen claims from other areas such as call centres and erm membership that they 
will fill out their books but in claims it’s just well it’s expected you know we’ve been here 
so long we know that people are going to get irate so you deal with it.
So you become almost immune to it?
Yeah almost Yeah. Like I said I’m quite a tough cookie I don’t...don’t really...it does 
bother me when I’m speaking to them and then sometimes you boil up but I’ve never 
let it...I think it’s only once I’ve ever put the phone down on somebody in all the time 
that I’ve been here but there’s girls in my department, and lads, that have been 
reduced to tears from people that have been on the phone and it ain’t right. That ain’t 
fair on them and you know...
So what...and do management see this happening?
They do but...
So what do they do about it?
Nothing. It’s just one...It’s part of the norm, you know you’re in claims what do you 
expect? You know and I’ve...I’ve...I’ve made suggestions to the effect that you know 
thye used to have a smoking. Like if you smoked you can have a cigarette break to 
calm yourself down. Unfortunately nobody in our department smokes anymore so 
that’s not actually an answer but there were people that did. If they’d had a really 
abusive phone call that’s what they’d do to calm them down. One of the suggestions I 
made to them was why don’t we have a quiet area that I could pick up a load of files, 
my own files, and just go and sit over there. Of course we can’t all do it because if 
everybody said I’ve had a crap phone call we’re all gonna sit over there there’d be 
nobody answering the phones, but if you have that really abusive time sometimes you 
need to get up and walk away you know if you had a little quiet area someone could go 
and do that it’s sort of like it’s ‘stupid idea’ you know ‘what do we need that for? It is 
part of the norm’ so it is it is part of the norm.
That seems to suggests to me that management isn’t being terribly supportive in 
terms of...
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Yeah they’re wrong. They’re wrong.
So what do you think their expectation of you is? Just get on and do it?
Yeah. Just so long as...My expectation of management unfortunately at the moment is 
that they’re more concerned with stats that the stats look good at the end of the week 
than they are with probably what’s going on with some of the emotions of the staff. 
You know they wanna see they don’t’ wanna see that figure of total number of claims 
outstanding more than 250 or whatever the mark is. If it’s over that they start 
panicking. If you’ve got more than two diary outstanding, why have you got have you 
got more than two diary outstanding. [?] might have been busy. Because every claim 
is individual. You can’t say that one claim’s gonna take five minutes. One might take 
me an hour, one might take me two so...
Ok. Then I’ve got another entry here on 31st January. Which is you were 
experiencing distrust because the file returned [?] and decision was overturned 
without consultation.
Yeah.
So just give me a little bit of background.
That was I...I’d taken a file to another area. We’d had a...we’d had a new claim sent 
down to us I’ve read it and it wasn’t a claim it was a er warranty issue. We don’t deal 
with warranty issues. If it’s just someone’s had a new part fitted and this part’s failed, it 
goes to another department and the information I held I took it to another department 
and I stood there for fifteen minutes discussing it with them, they agreed it was theirs. 
It took about a week for it to come back but rather than ring me up, bearing in mind I 
know this department they erm sent it back via their manager. They went to their 
manager and said ‘oh no I don’t think it’s one for us Paul’s brought it back. Can you 
take it back down?’ and rather than them come to me being a senior negotiator, they 
went to Clive. Clive agreed the decision and there was notes all other the file as to why 
you know oh claims should be dealing with this, I’ve discussed it with Clive and claims 
are going to take it on. It was just hang on a minute I made a decision on this 
unfortunately some other information that came into light that said yes it is one of ours 
but rather than just ring me up and say 'Paul look I found this other information out I 
think it’s one of your’ it was just the way they’d gone round the houses to do it. It was 
like you know pick up the phone. I was quite happy to come and speak to you about it
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so why don’t you come and talk to me about it? Clive...Clive...you know to be fair to 
Clive he said he couldn’t remember he said ‘yeah I just saw it we sat and first of all I 
was really angry about it because I felt totally like I said I was you know nobody trusted 
me on my decision. You know you bung this back without...
Is that what it was all about the lack of trust?
Yeah. There was a lack of trust. It was the lack of trust and they’re quite happy to ring 
you normally but it was almost like they’re frightened to ring ya about this and it was the 
lack of trust you know. All I’m saying is Alistair I’m quite happy to come to you, you 
should have come to me with that file. You didn’t need to go to Clive and bother him. I 
would have quite happily of...You now if he’d have come and said to me ‘Paul this is 
the reason why I’m sending it back’ and after I’d seen this extra sheet of paper I’d have 
said yeah definitely one for us but instead of doing it, it was almost like I’m going to 
your manager and telling on you because you’ve put the file in to me. Why? I just 
couldn’t get my head round it and it just got me a little bit hacked off at the time.
Ok. And then I’ve got another one here on the 5th February. Frustration. 
Meeting with manager. Discussed a complaint. Suggested ways to resolve. 
Didn’t consider it important even though it could have leaded to larger 
complaint. Now what was all that about?
This was actually about another member of staff. One of my colleagues erm 1 deal 
wi...Because I’ve been there a long time I know a lot of the area managers in the 
business and one of my colleagues had upset one of their agents that they do business 
with so they...they look after the agents for us and he’d rung me up and had a bit of a 
go about one of my colleagues and I wasn’t in a position to comment because William’s 
the same..the same level as me so I didn’t like you know I don’t wanna you know I said 
‘I can’t really get involved in it’ I said ‘I’ve already passed the issue over to Clive’. So I 
went and sat with him I was talking about two things. I had two claims to talk to him 
about and this issue so I went through the claims, they were fine. I then got on to this 
issue and so I said to Clive ‘look this guy is really ***sed off with you, with us, 
particularly Billy boy’ erm that he’s upset one of his agents. ‘He’s already making 
noises that he’s gonna take it further’ I said ‘you’ve got a meeting to go to in about 
three weeks time, an agency review meeting and I can tell you now that this is gonna 
get raised.’ I said ‘what we need to do is nick it...nip it in the bud now. Look give Dave 
a ring, he wants you to give him a ring and sort it out’ I said ‘just give him a ring and
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invite him in here’ I said ‘invite him in. Get him to meet Billy Boy. He’s a good lad.’ I 
said ‘once he’s met him, once Dave has met him he’ll realise he’s a good lad and 
William can explain his decision on why he did what he did and he’ll realise that we 
haven’t done nothing wrong’. Clive just [?]] ‘look I haven’t got time to ring him. It’s not 
important. I’ve got other things on my desk at the moment.’ And I said to him again 
‘Look I’m telling you this is going to become a big issue for us because we have a you 
know we rely on these guys to get our money back from the agents when we pay 
claims out and if we’re going to upset them you know when it comes down to us saying 
to them ‘oh do us a favour can you pop round and see so and so’ he’s gonna say ‘well 
you didn’t sort out my problem last time, why should I help you?” and that was what 
was you know that was what frustrated me because I was trying to help you know we 
can nip this in the bud lets get it sorted. But management was like oh I’m sorry I ain’t 
got time.
What was the thing that was frustrating you most of all?
Because management wouldn’t listen.
Ok.
They wouldn’t listen to the problem. It was like it was a non-issue that’s what frustrated 
me and I...There was an easy solution. This is the solution for this claim lets get it...for 
this problem not claim for this problem. This is the solution. Lets get him in lets talk to 
him about it we’ll nip in the bud now.
So what did you think was going to happen? When you raised this issue first of 
all what did you think would happen?
I expected erm it was quite an important issue because this agency is [?]. I expected 
management to ring him not to leave it for a week because it had been going on for a 
week. It happened...it started earlier on in the week it was now er whatever day that 
was the 5th so that was like Thursday so it had been you know they’d had the issue 
there and every time...I’d spoken to this guy a couple of times and he’d rung up and I 
just knew it was boiling again it was becoming a big issue for them, it wasn’t for us, it 
isn’t a big issue for us but it was a big issue in the overall picture because I knew that it 
was gonna escalate outside our business and in the end it’d go to Nick and he’d be like 
‘I’m not happy’ and it was just frustrating that they just didn’t see it as important and it
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was like it is going to be important because you’re going to be...I ain’t going to the 
meeting with ya. You’re the one who’s going to sit there, you’ll have forgotten about it 
and they’re going to tear you off a strip.
But was there also, I suppose subconsciously, a thought that this might at some 
point come back in your lap because you’ve been involved in it?
Yeah. Because I...I mean the guy the area manager that we were referring to Dave I 
know him quite well so I knew that if Clive didn’t sort it Dave would end up ringing me 
back up again and what I...I was more...one of the things I was really...that really 
frustrated me was this. They were complaining about one of my colleagues Da...Erm 
about Billy Boy and erm he’s a good lad, he really knows his stuff and they were getting 
on to me about him and having a go and I...I wanted to defend him but it wasn’t my 
position to get involved in someone’s work ethics whether or not he’d been polite or not 
to this agent but I felt it was something that management needed to...to deal with rather 
than me. I mean I was quite happy to do it. I would have defended William fully but 
you know William is the same level as me so it’s not for me to start criticising or having 
a go about one of my colleagues and that’s what really frustrated me that...
So you felt you were dumped in it?
I felt that I was dumped in it and I felt that management were gonna you know if they 
didn’t sort it one of my colleagues were gonna be dumped in it as well because that’s 
what it would have been as well. Later on in the meeting William would have been torn 
to pieces by these other managers and we wouldn’t have been able to defend 
ourselves.
Who would have...who would you have blamed for that?
I would have blamed Clive. Without a doubt. As I say I get on great with Clive he’s a 
really good guy but it was a issue that I felt he wasn’t taking seriously enough and I felt 
it was gonna...something that was really gonna...
Why do you think he didn’t take it seriously?
He was so busy. He was busy doing other things. There were other things he has 
other things going on and so Clive, because he hadn’t spoken to Dave he didn’t 
realise...I mean I’ve spoken to the guy and I...I could tell by the tone of his voice how 
angry he was about the whole thing and because he hadn’t spoken to him he didn’t
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know. Clive actually did after...after that erm later on in the afternoon because I think 
that was about two o’clock in the afternoon, I think I put the time down, I think that was 
about two o’clock/three o’clock, Clive actually rang him in the end about four o’clock 
and he must have been on the phone with him for nearly an hour and you know there 
was quite a heated conversation going on over there. So he did actually do it in the 
end but at the time I frustrated me and it has actually now been resolved.
And how did that make you feel the fact that he got on the phone and did 
something?
It made me feel good but it also made me think well why didn’t you just do that a bloody 
week ago. If you’d done that a week ago we wouldn’t have had this problem and I 
wouldn’t have had to have Dave moan at me again. It was like you know that’s it. One 
phone call that’s all it took to sort it out. So it’s what’s priority to me might not be 
priority to manage I accept that but if it had gone above Clive, which it would have done 
in the end, Nick would have been down like a ton of bricks and he would have said, 
‘what’s going on here’.
And would that have affected you at all?
No that wouldn’t have affected me. Well it would I suppose...
Indirectly...
Indirectly it would have done because it meant that senior management would have 
been hacked off with us all and we’d have had to start more procedures put in place to 
make sure that someone’s doing this that and the other or you’re gonna have to fill in 
more forms before you send it off to the agent garage sort of thing but...
Is the AA now incredibly bureaucratic?
Very.
Unnecessarily so or...
Erm, most of the time I think yeah. I think sometimes there’s’ a little bit too much red 
tape. They feel like it's gotta be done just to you know everybody’s trying to cover 
everybody else’s backs because they don’t want to be the person who’s dropped in it 
because they haven’t done their procedural bit but it is sometimes.
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So would you say there’s a culture of blame. Of trying to make sure that 
somebody else holds the blame by covering your own back?
I think there’s more a culture of outside of our area because in our area you know that’s 
the whole point of making a liability decision you know when you say no you’re always 
gonna upset somebody. But there is, we quite often get people ‘it’s nothing to do with 
us. We didn’t do it.’ And it’s quite happily well we’ll put it over to claims they can deal 
with it. You sort it out. There is definitely a culture of people trying to cover their 
backs because they are worried that they are going to get jumped upon. The way I 
look at it is like I said to you earlier we all make mistakes in claims and sometimes I’m 
going to make the wrong decision but I make the decision that I think...and that’s the 
whole point and that comes down to the trust thing again. You know...
So when you make a wrong decision what do you expect management to do?
Erm, well you only get...
Give you a bollocking?
You only ever get a bollocking on a wrong decision when someone’s complained about 
it. You never get a pat on the back when you ‘ve made the right decision. So 
whenever management get a referral it’s nine out of ten times or probably ninety nine 
out of a hundred times is because you’ve turned someone’s claim down. So that’s the 
reason why we get complaints rather than bollocking.
[TAPE ENDS]
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Appendix G
Research Context: Participant Organisations Profiles
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The Automobile Association (AA)
The AA is a nationwide organisation providing a range of household services. The 
organisation has been in existence for in excess of 100 years and is best known for its 
roadside breakdown and recovery service. Originally the organisation was ‘mutual’ and 
owned by its’ members but in the late 1990s it was de-mutualised and sold to Centrica 
pic. The AA’s motto was ‘courtesy and care’ which, whilst directed towards the 
membership, also extended to its’ workforce.
As well as breakdown services, the Association is the largest independent insurance 
broker offering 1.2 million motor, household and life policies annually. Its’ financial 
services division arranges 120,000 loans each year and the publications division 
provides hotel and restaurant guides, maps, route-finders and road signs. The majority 
of member services are provided through call centres located throughout the United 
Kingdom. The centre participating in this research was located in the North East of 
England at Cheadle, with 150 call centre employees, all of whom were included in the , 
research.
The AA is generally regarded as a good employer and provides structured training and 
development for employees, competitive salaries and a range of employee benefits. 
This was certainly borne out by the findings of the exploratory studies, which were 
conducted in two different AA locations and discussed in the main body of this thesis.
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Glasgow City Council Access Centre
The Access Centre forms part of Glasgow City Council’s modernisation strategy and is 
designed to provide a single point of access for the Council’s customers. The Centre is 
open 24 hours a day provides and receives information relating to roads and lighting, 
Council Tax, corporate communications, asylum, freedom of information, anti-social 
behaviour, cleaning and recycling, pest control, parks and parking.
According to the Access Centre web site (www.glaslow.gov.uk) is designed take 
information from and provide information to customers using a “.... single cohesive 
team, capable of answering the majority of calls from the public and referring to service 
department colleague only on an exceptional basis”.
The Centre has created service level agreements covering its’ performance in call- 
handling and request fulfilment between the different departments within the Council 
and between the Centre and its’ customers. This implies specific performance targets 
and measures employed in call centre operations, such as telephones answered within 
a specified number of rings, although the actual performance measures were not 
specified. The Centre switchboard handles 2,000 telephone calls per day and utilises a 
database of approximately 24,000 entries to provide answers to a range of queries 
from its’ customers, the citizens of Glasgow. All 100 Access Centre agents were 
included in this research.
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iResponse
iResponse provides a wide range of business services on behalf of its’ from a network 
of contact (call) centres at Cumbernauld and Bishopbriggs in Scotland which employ 
either inbound or outbound telephone calling. The markets in which iResponse offers 
its’ products and services include insurance and protection, utilities, credit cards, loans 
and mortgages, retail and FMCG, telecommunications (fixed line, mobile, broadband), 
subscription and member services, debt collection, and public sector.
The organisation utilises both full- and part-time employees and offers flexible working, 
training programmes, a financial bonus scheme and other incentives, career 
development, National Vocational Qualifications, bus transport to and from work. The 
working environment is described as ‘relaxed and friendly’ (www.iresponse.co.uk). The 
company employed 320 employees at the time of the research, all of whom were 
included.
The organisation is clearly customer-focused and results-driven with great store placed 
on building strong client relationships. iResponse aims to get things right first time and 
openly advertises its sophisticated call monitoring systems and staff training as a 
means of achieving this. Testimonials on the iResponse web site indicate a high level 
of customer satisfaction, although there may be dissatisfied customers that are not 
evident. Interestingly the main focus is on the customer relationships and little attention 
is paid the company as an employer.
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LEGO Direct
The LEGO Company was founded in Denmark in 1932 and has grown from a small 
firm operating from a carpenter’s shop to a global enterprise. The company 
manufactures toys (LEGO and Duplo bricks) and operates LEGO theme parks. The 
LEGO Direct operation is based at Slough in Berkshire and offers sales support and 
after-sales service to customers who shop by telephone, web site, e-mail and letter.
According to the LEGO Direct web site the call centre Advisors (full-time and seasonal) 
based in Slough handle approximately 1,000,000 calls per annum from 18 European 
countries in 13 languages (www.lego.direct.com). The company provides basic 
induction and telephone training before allowing new employee to handle more 
complex queries. The pay and benefits are competitive, but the quid pro quo is a 
commitment to temporal flexibility in terms of shift patterns and weekend working. The 
contact centre team is 100 in total, many from Easter Europe, all of whom were 
surveyed.
Although the LEGO web site portrays a corporate culture of fun and excitement, of self- 
expression and non-conformity, there are covert indicators that suggest a degree of 
conformity to flexibility and buy-in to the LEGO culture in pursuit of organisational 
performance. This creates the potential for mixed messages and confusion in the way 
that employees might be expected to behave. The purpose of one job vacancy was 
described as “.... to maximise sales for the LEGO Company whilst offering a fun, 
reliable, knowledgeable and engaging service to customers....”
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Market Makers
Market Makers have been in existence for over 25 years and specialise in 
telemarketing and telesales. The company is located at Portsmouth in the south the 
England. The company offers clients a range of facilities as part of a telesales 
campaign. Information on the Market Makers web site (www.marketmakers.co.uk) 
suggests that sales calls are heavily scripted, which is unsurprising. However, the 
Company also offers clients a CD of all sales calls made as part of its campaign; this 
clearly indicates a policy of continuous call monitoring and recording. In common with 
other companies in the research, Market Makers places great emphasis on service 
provision to clients, but, in contrast to other participating organisations, there is an 
absence of any information about the working environment and conditions of 
employment.
The Company proclaims to offer its clients with a hand-picked team of experienced 
telephone sales operators. The absence of any employee recruitment information 
suggests that Market Makers utilises agencies and ‘headhunters’ for its specialist staff, 
as it claims. The Portsmouth call centre employs 30 agents, all of whom were included 
in this research.
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MGt pic
MGt was founded in 1998, has 1,200 employees and operates from six locations in the 
United Kingdom, the headquarters being at Kirkcaldy in Scotland. The company 
proclaims itself the leading provider of outsourced support services specialising in 
the digital broadcast and new media markets” (www.mgtplc.com). The company 
employs 800 full- and part-time call centre agents, all of whom were included in the 
survey, are located at the headquarters.
The company specialises in providing its’ .customers, including broadcasters such as 
BSkyB, Sony Entertainment, and Freeview, with a range of revenue management and 
viewer relationship services.
The company advertises “a variety of excellent career opportunities at all levels in an 
exciting and dynamic environment” (www.mgtplc.com). Call centre agents are required 
to deal with inbound and outbound telephone transactions ranging from dealing with 
customer queries and complaints to filling orders and information recording and data 
entry. Overall there is little information on available from MGt regarding the working 
environment, although most of the promotional information on the web site and in 
brochures stresses the importance of customer service, implying a customer-focused 
and target driven organisation. However, the testimonial of one customer in the MGt 
brochure (MGt, 0506) specifically mentioned their dedicated team as being “.... 
enthusiastic, informed, and most importantly, happy to help any customer calling with 
an enquiry”.
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Thames Valley Housing Association
The Thames Valley Housing was founded in 1966 and registered as a friendly society 
and is based at Twickenham in West London. The organisation became the Thames 
Valley Housing Association in 1991 specialising in developing and managing affordable 
homes for rent or shared ownership for ‘key workers’ in the Thames Valley region in 
collaboration with local authorities. The Association currently manages 4,000 rented 
houses and 2,000 shared ownership properties. Among other categories of tenant, the 
Association provides accommodation for the hospital staff of four National Health 
Service (NHS) Trusts in London and the South East of England and the Hammersmith 
Hospital.
The company employs 12 people in its call centre at Twickenham. The Association 
provides little information in any of its web site information about employment. 
However, in March 2006 the Association won the accolade of being “.... named one of 
the 100 Best Small Companies to Work For in the annual Sunday Times list” 
(www.tvha.co.uk). This suggests that the employees who were surveyed for the 
competition endorsed the Association’s values and leadership, both of which were 
specifically mentioned.
The Association measures its performance against Service Promise Targets, such as 
answering telephone calls within 5 rings, handling letters within 10 days, e-mails within 
2 days and appointments within 5 minutes of the scheduled time.
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Zomax
Zomax is an international company with 1,000 employees located in the USA, Canada, 
Mexico and Ireland. The 30 participants in this research were located at Dublin in 
Ireland.
The company specialises in providing its’ clients with supply chain outsourcing services 
including e-commerce based order management, global procurement, Just-in-Time 
production services, and physical and electronic distribution. The Company provides 
services to the following types of client; IT hardware manufacturers, software 
publishers, consumer electronics, marketing services, and corporate information 
services.
In a press release outlining the selection of Zomax by Morningstar Inc, a provider of 
investment research, the vice president, Morningstar advisor business, John Faustino 
is quoted as saying "Our customers require timely information delivery of specific 
products and content. We selected Zomax because of its range of services, ability to 
meet tight timelines, and proven experience in managing complex fulfilment programs." 
(www.softwarebusinessonline.com).
There is no information in the Zomax publicity material about the organisation’s 
leadership and management, other than contacts details, or employment opportunities 
and conditions of employment.
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Appendix H
Statistical comparison: Total Transactional Psychological 
Contract Spearman rh o  and Pearson r  correlations
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Table H1: Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract
Total
Total Transactional
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Psychological
Contract
Total Perceived 
Authoritarianism
Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
1.000 .373**
.000
N 256 256
Total Psychological 
Contract
Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman's rho 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.373**
.000
1.000
N 256 256
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table H2: Total Perceived Authoritarianism and Total
Transactional Psychological Contract
Total
Perceived
Authoritarianism
Total
Transactional
Psychological
Contract
Total Perceived Correlation Coefficient 1 .400**
Authoritarianism Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 256 256
Total Transactional Correlation Coefficient .400** 1
Psychological Contract Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 256 256
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Appendix I
Inter-item correlations: Total Perceived Authoritarianism, Total Pay 
Satisfaction, Total Transactional Psychological Contract
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Inter-item correlations
Total Perceived Authoritarianism
Variable/item
Pearson
(r)
Sig.
N
TPA01 0.486** 0.000 256
TPA02 0.528** 0.000 256
TPA03 0.650** 0.000 256
TPA04 0.580** 0.000 256
TPA 05 0.526** 0.000 256
TPA 06 0.394** 0.000 256
TPA 07 0.641** 0.000 256
TPA 08 0.715** 0.000 256
TPA 09 0.635** 0.000 256
TPA 10 0.528** 0.000 256
TPA 11 0.560** 0.000 256
TPA 12 0.344** 0.000 256
TPA 13 0.641** 0.000 256
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailec
Total Pay Satisfaction
Variable/item
Pearson
(r)
Sig.
N
PAYSAT01 0.752** 0.000 256
PAYSAT02 0.662** 0.000 256
PAYSAT03 0.714** 0.000 256
PAYSAT04 0.657** 0.000 256
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailed)
Total Transactional Psychological Contraci:
Variable/item
Pearson
(r)
Sig.
N
PSYCON01 0.586** 0.000 256
PSYCON02 0.232** 0.000 256
PSYCON03 0.412** 0.000 256
PSYCON04 0.515** 0.000 256
PSYCON05 0.297** 0.000 256
PSYCON06 0.366** 0.000 256
PSYCON07 0.542** 0.000 256
PSYCON08 0.625** 0.000 256
PSYCON09 0.480** 0.000 256
PSYCON10 0.638** 0.000 256
PSYCON11 0.456** 0.000 256
PSYCON12 0.491** 0.000 256
PSYCON13 0.413** 0.000 256
PSYCON14 0.674** 0.000 256
PSYCON15 0.546** 0.000 256
PSYCON16 0.679** 0.000 256
PSYCON17 0.544** 0.000 256
PSYCON18 0.612** 0.000 256
PSYCON19 0.408** 0.000 256
PSYCON20 0.613** 0.000 256
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailed)
394
Total Expectations
Variable/item
Pearson
(r)
Sig.
N
TPAEX14 0.508** 0.000 256
PAYSAT02 0.662** 0.000 256
PCEXPE21 0.414** 0.000 256
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve (2-tailed)
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Appendix J
Independent-samples t-tests
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Appendix J (a)
Independent samples t tests: 
Total Perceived Authoritarianism
397
10*-<
CO
Q.
3
Oh>
CD
V)0
h-i
H-
ot  C
w $
■d2
co
CO
T- '3'm- r^  
u> co
t-  h- T- Tt
h-
in mh-
o> coh> T-
co
co mCD CM
in co
O  CD 
r -  t—
CD O h- CO
(A
CD
Htf)
i£
Q.
E
CO
CO
*-»
c0)T3
c0)
a.a>•o.c
CO
i_  a>o u *— c
»-g
to a> o3 5H 
03
I I—1 onLU
co
££  <u
I g
a> 2
l i
-g Q  
c  3>
O  :
O-spO'-in
0 3
cu
a.
a.
fT
fc c 
LU 2> 
. a) 
2  *E 
CO Q
CD O c c 
CO 03
:>£
CM
CT
CO
g
CO
0 3Tf
in
03M-
co
h-h-CM
co
CO
in M"CO T™CD M-o inT- 03
co
o
CO
03
CDCMCO
M"00
COCDmoco
COCDino
co
M-
co
03CDCO
■M-
in
CM
CD
CM
oh-
co
in
inCD
CO
o
03
co
Q3ocCO
l iS-mtr co 
LU CD
CO 
03
g-o.1 1 
to  3
>  CO— w ro co
0-0 LU c
ino55tnsTO4->
CD
Q.5
Ou
o
m
0  
H1
h-
1— CO 00
o CD co
t  c ■M- o
n j re o> COm  TO CO
T-‘ T-"
CO
c
o in CO
re CM h -
■> CO cqTO■M- COa T~
2
w
05 Tt-
T“ m
c CO T“
re CO CO
TO o
2 : •M- M"
co CO
T—
T“
Z
a:
LU _TOa rez TO ELU re TOO S U_
E
CO
'cre
re
.±0
o£
"5
<
re
o
1 -
tn
£
tna
Q.
Ereco
ea>
T3cTOaTO■cc
in
re
£TO Q)
TO 2 9 TO
T J  Q  
C  ®o  £  
O -  
0
in
o
t  c 111 2 
• TO T J t£•M ?!Z
CO Q
TO
Oc c re to
I I
CM
05 •t—
CO 05
T ~ O
CO 05
N -
■M- ■M"
■M- CDN - 05
00 N -CM inCO CO
CM CM
o
CM CMO •M"O T~
CO 00
T - r —
h -
M - ■m -CO CO
T-
CM CM
r— T-
O
O
in
co
o
in
■M-
in
CM
co
co
f -
c \i
co
CM
CD
h -co co
tn i_ TO
2 £  +-> re into ni 
»“ >  
CO 
TO °  
C  5H TO ~> re
3  Ol 
LU
TO
h -
CO
CO
O
CO
COTO
Ocre
c  __*o 2  
-  E
M
LU re
CO TO
C 13 
.1  |  
re zj
>  CO — COre to
cr o
LU c
(0
CO
a .
3o1-
0
0
t—I
I -
ot  C
UJ g
CO
oo CMo N-o oCM CM03 CM
CO
CO inCO COCO T“CM CD03
CO COT_
N-Om oCD
o m■M"
03 h-CM CMCM
DC
o
h~O
LU
a  w o  oi— —t 
O CD 
LU ID 
CO 0 l
(Aa>H
»re
a
Ere
CO
e
a>■ocrea.a>TJc
re
£
re q>
JEgre ® u reC fcre 3= •a Q
c ® o £
^  °  o'*in03
k ® 
£ £  
LU 2 
• re 2 t  
CO Q
re o c c
tn
i_  ®o o **- c re
C/3 ~re*
C/3 u —"re °  c 5H re s  > re3  U] 
LU
OJ|
CO
re LL
f'-rj- CM03 O■M" 0303 O
CM
CD CM03 N-CM COCO o■M- CDO t~•r-i i
CM COW CON- Tf03 IDCD CO
CM CO
in mh-co CDm inh- h-
rf■ tl-■
CMo CDCO
■<TinCM
oCO
co
oco
CM CO•tf- r—CO Tfr— r—
cof"-
oh-co
coreocre‘i— _ _re TR 
—  E
§■“  cr a)LU co
tnre
£-a 
.1 £ 
re n
>  CO 
—  CO
re  to3 a_, O' oLU c
tn
o
*3
tn
re
tn
Q .
3
Ot—
O
CO
a>
H
ot  C
w $
2 2
55
tn
■<t •o-T”  T—t- a> 
oo  
CM CM
' t  h- 
CM 05
h »  o o
CO CO 
CO CM
' t  M"
CD CO 
T~ O  h- 00 
CO CO
d
' t  Tf
' t  CM 
CO CM
tn
a>
H
tn
0)
a
Eretn
*■>c
0)TJ
C
0)a
0)TJ
C
tn
*- re tn ~  
re 
l - >
CO0) oc >H re
I I—1 31 111
re
£
a* <d
I g '
CD £
■ o D
c J! 
o £  
Om_
vO O
CO 
05
i- CD 
fc C 
HI £ 
• CD Bid 
co b
CD
Oc c re rea> 'z?
Sig
CM
a
co
a
CO
U -
' t 0005 to
CO to
to to
CM CM
CM to
CO 05
' t CM
CO CO
1X5 to
■M-i M-i
to o
CM to
O 05
05 00
h - N -
—^ T—
05 05
CO CD
00 00
O O
O O
T— T~
' f
N -tO
■M-
1X5
CM
CO
CO
to
05
O
CD
CM
CO
CM
CO
1X5
N -
CD
CM
to
CM
■M"
CO
to
tn CO
a> (D
o o
c c. T J_ro . 2 CD"i— EroT3 re 3> a) > CO_ £ _ COre 3 re re
3 CO 3
CX CO C T O
LU re LU c
T3
CO
00 T—
CM 03
c CD CM
0 00 T“"
0 00 P
2 CO
IB<*■*
CO
a
3oI—
0
tn
o>
h -
CO co
03 M"
03 ■M-
CM
CO O
M-
T“ T""
o 00
o CO
o
CM 03
CO o
M- M"
CD
CO
INI
1/3
5  §  03 -5
'>  *°
s £
P -2
03
CD
O
1-0O 00 -E I- J*
tn
o
H0
0
Q.
E
n
CO
c0
TJc0a
0
TJ
C
03
i_  0
& £  —> (0 
03 *c 
0 *
03 0
—1 cr 
LU
0
£
£  0is0 s>
^  0
g £
T3 Q
o  £  
O h -  
O
lb
03
t  c 
LU Si 
• 0  
£  fc
cob
0  o 
c c 0 0 
°> n>
CM
O)
CO
03
ooo
N-
oo*
o
COoo
CO
co
Nf
03
o
CO
CO
CM
CM
CM
inoin
M"in
CM
h-
CD
CO
ooin
h-m
COin
03T—
m
o’
h-
h-
pco
coo
CM
03
03
CM
CM
CM*
COin
o
m
CM
CD
in
in
S'S
— E — co - m
m 0
c T3
.1 s 
5  3> tntn
_  _  § to
3  03 5-*-ET tn O^O LU 0 LU c
St
d.
 E
rro
r
 
JO
BT
EN
 
(B
an
de
d)
 
N 
Me
an
 
St
d.
 D
ev
iat
io
n 
M
ea
n
To
ta
l 
A
ut
ho
rit
ar
ia
ni
sm
 
up 
to 
2 
ye
ar
s 
19
7 
40
.7
20
8 
13
.9
09
63
 
.9
91
02
 
ov
er
 
2 
ye
ar
s 
 
 
59 
42
.5
93
2_
__
__
__
__
_1
5.
51
98
6 
2.
02
05
1
(A0)
I -
<n©
a
E(0
CO
E©
•a
E©a©
•D
E
O
©
3D1
LU
to
h-> as w _  
.© as 
* - >  
co 
©
as ~  
>  as3cr| 
LU
©
©
£© oj 
1 8  © £ 
S«g •Sb
n ® o £  
O m-
vo Oo'-
in
as
o o fc c 
lu £ 
. as 2  tj= 
co b
© o c c © © © k—
TJ
_©
’©
iCM
O!
CO
as
CO
05
Omo
co
CM
a>ooo
CD
CM
O05
05
■M-O
CD
05■M-'CT
CO
CD
CD
CM
CM
CM
f"-
■M-O
in
CM
CM
■M"
CMN-
OO
•M"
CM
00
OO
CO
00o■M"
■M"lO
CM
o
COr^ .
oo
cocooo
CMcooo
CDoo
o
CDh-
Cft tn
© ©u o
c E TJro © ©“ E
© ~o © 3> © > tn_ E _ tnro ~3 ro ©3 cn 3CT tn CT OLU © LU E
(0acs
.2sro«•>
CO
Q.
3
Ou.0
tf>
Q>
H i
( -
ot  C
UJ $
2 s
CO
CO o
05 t -  
CO T— h- 
O  CO
00 TJ- O h- 
CO CO 'I- ^  C5 05
ro  r t
05 O
00 o
05 LOT ^
O  CO rf -M-
co o  
h~ oo
roro
> .
o
tn c  
ir  ro-ZZCM S=
o  ro
I I
co0)H
(0©
o .
Ero
CO
Mc©
TJ
c©
a©
TJ
C
tn  
i_ a>
2 S
*> ro 
tn -c
C/5 •«— 
©  °  
c  ><
Q) .^1
i f .
LU
ro
&ro a>
<=S s ^Sig
- § 1
I *
o  £  
O  * -
^  °o'*
m
05
i- ©
t  c 
LU 2?
• ro  ■ a  s t**-» !SC0Q
ro 
a  c c ro ro
I I
03
CO
00 lO
•M" CO
T- 00
CO ■M-
N- 00
in CMh- T"“co T“CO in00 05
CD CD
in -Too COCM C-05 05
T— T—
■M" ■M"r- t—T- T~in ino o
CO CO
CM
CM
CO
CO
lO
■M-
CM
u—■o
25
4
14
3.
46
5
05 CD
00 "M"w m
-4—» T- T—
tnro
c tj ro ®ro ""i— _  'i— c
ro I  ro ro 
S. to S.*- c r  tn c r  o  lU ro LU c
tno*3
tn33CO
CO
a
so
0
H
C/>
CD
f -i
* -
ot  c
UJ g
2  ^  
CO
£= TJ 
O  (U
,t« coc m
g ,©E? N
O  co
■m- ■m-T“ —^t- a> 
T f oo 
CM CM
■M- h- 
CM CD h- CO 
CO CO 
CO CM
M" ■M-
CO CO 
T - O  K  CO 
CO CO
o' r-: 'M- *'fr
■M- CM 
CO CM
COTO
h
(ATO
"5.
ETO
CO
*1ca>
TJ
CTO
aTO
TJ
c
CO
I-
*-• TO tn ~  
,© ro 
1“ >  
to TO O
cTO ~  
> TO 3  Dl 
LLI
TO
TO
t
TO fl)
I STO £O Q) C■si
c ®
o r
# °to
o>
2 S
LU £ 
■ TO 2fc=  
CO Q
TO O E C TO TOa> in Ssg
CM
03
CO
L i.
•M"
CD
CO
U5
CM
lO
CMO
CD
CD
CDCOOO
•M"
to
"tl-iO
CM
CO
CD
to
CDO
CD
CM
CO
CM
CO
lO
to
tO
CM
CM toCO CDCMco COto to
■M- ■M-
O
toCDCOK
CD
CO00OO
CON-
lO
N-
CO
t-
CM
lO
CM
M-CD
lO
COTOO£=TO
g ’S
15 |  = m cr co 
LLI TO
to TO
C T3 TO |
TO 3 
TO (§
a"o  
LU c
tn_oic
tn
«
co
CL
3
Oi_
0
(ft
a>
Hi
H *
St
d. 
Er
ro
r 
M
ea
n
1.
03
18
5
1.
77
96
5
c CO o
o o  m05 05ro O  05
*> ■M; coro ■<fr COD T“ T—
2
CO
■«- h-
cm inc co in
ro CD CO
ro O ’ CM•M-
in t-
05 CD
X
s :
05
X
5
o_j>,ro O S
Q. _ i X
E
to
'cro
*u.
ro
o
x :
3
<
ro
o
H
tna>H
tno
a
E(6
CO
4->ea>
■oc
0)a
o>
TJ
C
tn
£ 2  — to tn — ,a> ro 
* - >  
tn 0) ° c >H 0) jS
—1HI
CD 
& ■ ro a>
■Eg
0) g)
c  ® o  £
o « -
so Oo'*lO
a>
k °  
t  c 
111 a) ■ a> 
2
cob
ro(5c cro ro0) u.
2
Q
CM
ra
CO
ra
CO
UL
o in05 05inm or— ■t—
CM CM
00 CMCM COCM COO inT— o
CD CD
CM inT“*CO h-05 ino o
CM CM
05 05CD CDCO CO
05 05T— T~
l''-
CO
in
CM
tj-a>
co05
co
CD
in
o
"3-
co
"M-Oin
co"
o
05
in
a>
tn05o
cro
’S'S
— E
§.« cr co 
LU ro
to  ro
S-aro £
’ts = ro 3> co — 10
3  ®
CT o
LU c
CD
Q .
3
O>_
o
CO
a>
i—
i
F—
w 8
S  ^CO
CD — ■ 
O  T J
05-S 
- 2 ^  
O  ID
O 0 
S*' —  
tn  t>  
0 -  CD
£  E
° o
oo r t ­
f '-  05 
CO r -  
CM CO
o  co
CM T f 
CT> CM 
T - O
T- 05 
CO CO 
rfr CO 
CM t -
CD CO* 
CO r f
05 h- 
CM CM
« I
to
0
L -
(0
0)
Q .
Ere
CO
M
c
0)
■D
e
0a
0
•oc
tn  
, 0
£  c
to-2 0,0
1/5 © °c 5H 
0  ~
—1 oi 111
0 ® 
S |•si
o £  
O  h-
o 
in
05
0
Q .
Q .
LU ® ■ 0TJ t t4-> iSSCO Q
0 
a  c c 
ro 00 Jr 0^  tt=
CM
gj
CO
DJ
CO
CO
CM
O
00
LO
CD
CO
05
CO
CM
N -
CM
to
CO
00
05
CO
to
CO
f^
CO
f '-
N -
co
CD
o
CO
to
COCO
05
o
CO
to
CO
CO
o
o
o
o
o
o
'tf-
to
CM
oTf
CD
co
CM
o
05
CO
00
h«-
CD
to
CD
O
o
CO
CD
CD
tn0
o
cro
ro -o
— E
P.cr mu tn «-» LU ro LU
tn  0
c ’oro ®
ro =3 
>  tn  
—  tn  ro ro
B o
Appendix J (b)
Independent samples t tests: 
Total Pay Satisfaction
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Regression analysis for Total Pay Satisfaction mediation by organisation
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Abstract
There has been considerable debate over the nature of the psychological contract and 
whilst there is consensus over the foundation reciprocity of contribution, there is 
considerable disagreement over the parties to the contract. Whether organisations are 
capable of perception has dominated the debate in recent years, almost to the 
exclusion of the role of agents in contract construction and reconstruction. There can 
be no doubt that agents play a key role in the psychological contract and 
anthropomorphising the organisation seems unavoidable, as individuals will 
undoubtedly form personal relationships over certain contractual dimensions, whilst 
forming an impersonal relationship over others. This paper explores the dynamics of 
the psychological contract by drawing on existing literature in order to stimulate a 
broader research agenda into the field. A model is presented to illustrate the factors, 
and the way in which they interact, which impact on the construction and reconstruction 
of the psychological contract as a result of positive or negative critical incidents. Whilst 
much of the existing psychological contract literature concentrates on the negative 
construct of violation, this paper proposes that positive critical incidents lead to contract 
enhancement and, as such, is an area worthy of further research.
Key words: Psychological contract, violation, enhancement, commitment, trust.
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Introduction
In recent years there has been considerable debate about the nature of the 
psychological contract around two main themes. The first is the nature of reciprocity in 
the psychological contract and whether this is one-way, as advocated by Rousseau 
(1998), or two-way as argued by Guest (1998a). The second theme is the importance 
of breach or violation of the psychological contract (Robinson, 1996), but other 
changes, such as enhancement of the psychological contract remain unexplored.
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate debate on the inherent uncertainty and 
dynamic nature of the psychological contract. Drawing on the literature, the paper 
opens with a brief assessment of definitions of the psychological contract. This is 
followed by a consideration the environmental and organisational factors that influence 
the construction and reconstruction of the psychological contract and the ‘relational’ 
and ‘transactional’ forms it may take. The paper concludes with a speculative 
exploration of the way in which critical incidents may stimulate a contract shift from a 
relational contract to a transactional contract (or vice versa) and from a personal 
contract to an impersonal contract (or vice versa).
Defining of the psychological contract
There is an abundance of literature on the psychological contract and agreement exists 
among observers that the psychological contract is founded on the notion of reciprocity 
and mutual obligation (Schein, 1978; Rousseau, 1989; Rousseau and McLean Parks 
1993; Robinson, 1996; Guest 1998a). However, the definition of reciprocity adopted by 
Schein (1978, p. 112), that “a “psychological contract” is formed which defines what the 
employee will give in the way of effort and contribution and exchange for challenging or 
rewarding work, acceptable working conditions, organizational rewards in the form of 
pay and benefits, and an organizational future in other forms of promise of promotion or 
other forms of career advancement” seems to have been complicated by the debate 
over whether organisations are capable of perception.
Rousseau (1989, p. 124) suggests that the psychological contract emerges when
“ an individual perceives that contributions he or she makes obligate the
organization to reciprocity (or vice versa)”. Likewise Rousseau and Tijoriwala (1998.
p.680) argue that psychological contracts “  originate when individuals infer promises
that give rise to beliefs in the existence of reciprocal obligations”. From the position
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adopted by Rousseau (1989, p. 126) it can be inferred that the organisation is merely a 
passive party to the psychological contract, as “organizations cannot “perceive”, 
although their individual managers can”. As Rousseau (1995) and Morrison and 
Robinson (1997) acknowledge, the organisation is comprised of multiple agents with 
whom the psychological contract is made, but the authors do not consider these as 
proxies for the organisation as there may be differences in what each agent is offering 
or expecting. Indeed, the discretionary actions of organisational agents may contribute 
to employees’ perceptions of procedural fairness (Moorman et al, 1998) and lead to 
these being regarded as actions of the organisation itself (Eisenberger et al, 1986). 
Whilst there is reluctance to anthropomorphise the organisation, it is, in reality, made 
up of agents with divergent values and that this may be the root cause of psychological 
contract breaches or violations. Indeed Guest (1998a), in response to Rousseau 
(1998), acknowledges the problem of organisational perception by supporting the 
concept of ‘agency’ and the role of organisational agents in shaping the psychological 
contract. Similarly, Herriot and Pemberton (1996) suggest that both the individual and 
the organisation are capable of perception, but relate the organisation to agency theory 
and highlight the potential conflicts between different organisational agents and their 
perceptions of the importance of organisational interests.
The employment relationship is founded on social exchange theory and, as Masterson 
et al (2000, p.740) observe, “.... an employee is involved in at least two social 
exchange relationships at work: one with his or her immediate supervisor, and one with 
his or her organization”. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the individual may have 
concurrent psychological contracts; one that is ‘personal’ with an organisational agent 
and one that is ‘impersonal’ with the organisation. Regardless of whether the 
individual’s psychological contract is with the organisation or with an agent, it can still 
be argued that the contract is founded on the individual’s perception of, rather than the 
actual, mutuality and reciprocity (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998).
Whilst the debate is an important one, the focus of this paper is on the individual 
perspective; the way in which the individual constructs his or her psychological contract 
and establishes a relationship with the organisation, its agent/s or a combination of the 
two across different contractual dimensions. The literature seems to suggest that 
problems with the psychological contract arise when there is a perception that it has 
been breached or violated; when the individual ‘believes’ the organization has failed
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keep its promises (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). Whether this violation is factual or 
imagined may be irrelevant; it is the individual’s perception of reality that is important 
(Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998). The violation of the psychological contract is the 
product of the mismatch between the individual’s expectations of how things should be 
and how they really are.
For the psychological contract to remain intact there is a need for reciprocity of trust 
and commitment and there should be a perception of equality of contribution; where 
inequality exists then there will be some form of contract redefinition. The way that the 
psychological contract is constructed and subsequently reconstructed is depicted in 
Figure 1 and discussed in the following sections.
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Figure 1. The construction/reconstruction of the psychological contract
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Foundations of the psychological contract
As noted earlier the psychological contracted of founded on social exchange theory 
and is rooted in three principal constructs - the relationship itself, trust and 
commitment. These not only contribute to the construction and reconstruction of the 
psychological contract, but there is an interaction between each; changes in 
needs/motives may alter trust, which might in turn change the commitment form. 
Likewise, changes in levels of trust and commitment may alter the expectations of the 
relationship.
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The relationship
The relationship itself is stimulated by needs of the parties which, in the case of 
employment, tend to be economic, although may in some instances be social. Simply 
put, the organisation needs labour and the individual needs pay. The motive is what 
drives the individual to choose particular organisation, but choice may be limited and 
imperfect. The individual may be driven purely by present-time economic 
considerations, the need of a ‘job’, or by a longer-term perspective on career (Herriot 
and Pemberton, 1996). Indeed, the motives for entering into a particular employment 
relationship may be driven by self-perception (Super, 1986) and notions of ‘career’ 
versus ‘job’, which in turn underpin any individual or organisational expectations that 
may subsequently form. Moreover, it may also be appropriate to consider a shift in the 
traditional view of individuals as an organisation’s human resources towards one of 
individuals using organisations as career resources, through which they enhance their 
own human asset value by obtaining knowledge and expertise for future use (Inkson et 
al, 2001).
Commitment
In the area of commitment, Meyer and Allen’s (1991) three-component model of 
organizational commitment - affective, normative, and continuance -  is a particularly 
useful framework in relation to the psychological contract. Affective commitment 
suggests a high degree of congruence between individual and organisational goals, 
values and ideology; that commitment is achieved out of the mutuality embedded in the 
relationship. As Eisenberger et al (1986) note, the degree of perceived organisational 
support and the way and individual is treated might influence their interpretation of this. 
Indeed, O’Driscoll and Randall (1999, p.205) found that “.... perceived organisational 
support and satisfaction with intrinsic rewards made significant positive contributions to 
both job satisfaction and affective commitment”. Normative commitment is based on 
the notion of social desirability, the expectation that commitment should be 
demonstrated. Whilst this is a plausible form of commitment it is rather more difficult to 
define and identify than the others in the model. Continuance commitment is based 
more on the ‘need’ of the individual to stay with the organization, perhaps for economic 
motives or lack of labour market choice; this is a rather utilitarian approach to 
commitment, as the individual will probably only stay with the organization until a better 
opportunity arises. This appears such a self-serving approach that one could question 
whether this should be considered a genuine form of commitment.
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Thus far commitment has only been considered at the individual level, but in reality 
commitment is a two-way street; the type of commitment given by the individual may be 
related to the level of commitment initially and subsequently received from the 
organization in terms of tenure, employment status and career. In the early stages of 
the relationship both parties may engage in “a mutual testing and exploration period” 
before deciding where to put their commitment (Schein, 1978) and one might, for 
example, expect lower levels of affective commitment in a shorter contractual 
relationship as the individual may perceive a commitment shortfall from the 
organisation. If the organisational commitment is perceived by the individual to be a 
long-term relationship, it is likely to lead to a ‘relational’ psychological contract, thereby 
creating ‘affective’ commitment typified by sharing of goals and ideologies and a mutual 
intention for continued association. If, on the other hand, the intended association and 
contractual status is perceived to be short-term, this is more likely to lead to a 
transactional contract, where the commitment form is more likely to be ‘continuance’ 
and longer-term success of the relationship undermined.
Evidence to the contrary is presented by McDonald and Makin (2000), who found 
significantly higher levels of affective and normative commitment in non-permanent 
employees, which the authors suggest may be due to anticipatory socialisation. In 
practice there may be no difference in tenure between ‘short-term’ and ‘open-ended’ or 
‘permanent’ contracts, as the latter may still be terminated after a short period 
(Smithson and Lewis, 2000). It is not the reality that is important here, but rather the 
individual’s perception of reality (Sparrow and Cooper, 1998) and individuals who feel 
they have been unjustly treated may respond by complaining, exiting the organisation 
or changing their behaviours (French, 1964). According to Adams (1963), individuals, 
perceiving a state of inequity in the relationship, might adjust their behaviour by 
increasing or reducing inputs to restore a state of equilibrium. In other words, the 
individual who feels their commitment to the organization is not being adequately 
reciprocated might adjust their own level of commitment downwards to restore the 
perceived balance. Thus, equity theory (Adams, 1965) is concerned with the perceived 
fairness of treatment and the degree to which views of the organisation and its agents 
might be trusted to create equitable conditions.
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Trust
The importance of trust in the employment relationship has interested scholars for 
many years and there is a degree of consensus that a certain amount of trust is 
necessary for the adequate functioning of society (Beccerra and Gupta, 1999). The 
way in which trust is defined is a crucial component in any debate or analysis of its 
relevance to the psychological contract. Whilst numerous authors form their own 
definitions of trust (Mellinger, 1956; Mayer et al, 1995; Lewicki et al, 1998) all contain 
the common theme of expectation and predictability; that the other party will behave in 
an acceptable manner. Although, as Deutsch (1958) suggests, with trust comes the 
risk that behavioural expectations will not be met, with uncertainty leading to swings in 
behaviour between engaging in and avoiding trust. Similarly, Whitener et al (1998:513) 
argue that “.... trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the other party 
- may not full fill that expectation”. The definition of trust adopted in this paper is that of 
Lewicki et al (1998, p.439), a set of “positive expectations regarding another’s 
conduct”.
Whilst there is a body of opinion that trust develops incrementally over time (Blau, 
1964; Zand, 1972; Rempel et al, 1985), one would expect some element of initial trust 
at the point on relationship entry. According to McKnight et al (1998), the source of this 
initial trust may be through five streams of trust research. Knowledge-based trust 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1995) evolves over time as trust-relevant knowledge 
(organisation reputation etc) accumulates; calculative-based trust (Shapiro et al, 1992; 
Lewicki and Bunker, 1995) is a rational assessment of costs and benefits with low 
incentives resulting in low trust; personality-based trust develops through the formative 
years and results in a propensity to trust (Rotter, 1967; Mayer et al, 1995), 
consequently we find some individuals more ‘trusting’ than others; institution-based 
trust (Shapiro, 1987) revolves around the context and is closely linked to security 
issues, such as contractual tenure; cognition-based trust (Meyerson et al, 1996) is 
constructed from first impressions formed by the individual, derived from cognitive cues 
such as regulatory frameworks or high levels of autonomy. This form of trust has a 
broader application to atypical organisations forms and temporal organisational 
relationships where swift trust (Meyerson et al, 1996) is essential. Organisational 
justice perceptions also form an important component in the trust building process; the 
extent to which individuals believe they, or their colleagues, have been justly treated 
will impact on the level of trust created. Individuals who perceive low distributive justice
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relating to outcomes received, or low procedural justice, the procedures through which 
the outcomes were determined, is likely to lead to low trust. As Gopinath and Becker 
(2000, p.65) observe, “employees can be expected to trust and become committed to 
organizations that treat them fairly”.
The importance of trust is not confined to the formative stage of the psychological 
contract. The positive constructs of trust building and the establishment of 
trustworthiness, behaviours such as transparent communications and sharing control 
(Whitener et al, 1998) that engender trust, continue throughout the relationship. 
Likewise the negative trust constructs also continue. Breaches of trust can occur when 
the trust one party has placed in another are unfulfilled or fall short of expectation. This 
in turn may be regarded as a breach or violation of the psychological contract, 
however, as Robinson (1996) suggests, the extent or seriousness of the breach may 
depend on the degree of trust that previously existed. Where prior trust was high the 
individual may interpret a breach in positive terms by assuming it was not the fault of 
the organisation. If, on the other hand, prior trust was low, the individual might regard 
organisational transgressions may be regarded as a deliberate act. Distrust, defined by 
Lewicki et al (1998) as “confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” 
may be institutionalised into organisational roles such as supervisors and inspectors, 
characteristics of the low trust environment are embodied in the principles of Scientific 
Management and subsequently Fordism (Depickere, 1999; Crossman and Lee-Kelley, 
2002). Consequently trust, trustworthiness, breach of trust and distrust are products of 
the dynamics of the relationship and govern the way in which the participants conduct 
themselves within it.
Environmental and organisational factors
The psychological contract does not exist in an organisational vacuum; each individual 
constructs and reconstructs their contract according to a variety of internal and external 
environmental stimuli. Thus, as changes occur in the external environment or within the
organisation so the psychological contract is redefined.
>
Environmental factors
The literature confirms the psychological contract is constructed, at least partially, upon 
the expectations derived from a variety of sources. The first of these is the state of the 
labour market (Smithson and Lewis, 2000). During periods of recession, when there is
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a plentiful supply of labour and high levels of competition for work, an individual’s 
expectations may be a lower than when labour is in short supply and vice versa. 
Likewise organisational expectations of individuals may also vary according to labour 
market conditions.
The degree of importance of organisational commitment may also be age-related. 
Smithson and Lewis (2000, p.692) found evidence that “young workers do have higher 
expectations, or a sense of entitlement to support, from their employers in other ways 
not felt so strongly by earlier generations”. These include equality, life-work balance, 
and being valued for the work that they do rather than the commitment they give to the 
organisation.
Changes in the values and expectations of broader society will be influential in the 
construction of the psychological contract; job insecurity is a good example of this 
(Smithson and Lewis, 2000). As Tornow and De Meuse (1994, p. 167) observe “Both 
parties -  employer and employees -  realize that lifetime job security can no longer be 
guaranteed and the employees have to be more self-reliant now”. The scaled-down UK 
public sector provides an excellent example of this.
For the majority of individuals, experience of previous employment is a key source of 
information and knowledge (Rousseau, 1995; Grant, 1999). The way an individual was 
treated in previous employment relationships might serve as a benchmark for 
subsequent ones (Pate and Malone, 2000). Similarly observation or knowledge of 
external employment relationships, through environmental scanning, might act as 
stimuli for an individual to construct or reconstruct their own psychological contract.
Organisational factors
Within the organisation an individual might construct his/her expectations from the 
organization’s image and reputation, from brochures and reports, from what they may 
have gleaned implicitly or explicitly during the recruitment and selection stages. 
Furthermore, as Wright et al (1996) observe, the psychological contract is also 
influenced by organizational practice, personal observation and experience. Thus, the 
individual may draw on present experience such as the prevailing organizational 
culture (Grant, 1999), the organisational environment and norms (Thomas and 
Anderson, 1998), and the predominant management style and ethics. The issue of
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perceived organisational support, the extent to which employees believe they are 
valued by the organisation, is also an important factor; as Masterson et al (2000, p.740) 
suggest, “employees perceive acts of fairness to be contributions that enhance the 
quality and desirability of their ongoing relationships”.
Employment status, opportunities for promotion and the duration of the tenure offered 
may also act as cues for the construction of the psychological contract. These 
expectations will undoubtedly be adjusted over time as the individual becomes more 
familiar, or socialised, with the organization and any changes that occur within it 
(Schein, 1978). As Turnley and Feldman (1999, p.915) observe, “major changes in 
organizational structure and staffing levels led many managers to believe their 
employers were reneging on long-standing promises of promotion”. Likewise, the 
presence or absence of trade union recognition may also provide an important social 
cue.
The nature of the psychological contract might vary according to the size of the 
organization and the hierarchy of management that exists. Indeed, as Rousseau 
observes (1998), the role played by the organization’s ‘agents’, such as supervisors or 
managers, in the psychological contract will vary according to whom the employee 
perceives their psychological contract to be with. The relationship is likely to be 
different in smaller, conventional organizations where the parties are psychologically 
and geographically close, than in the large, faceless corporation.
Whilst the psychological contract is ostensibly between the individual and the 
organization; the health and maintenance of it is not exclusively reliant on their direct 
actions or interactions and the way other organizational relationships are conducted 
and develop may be equally, if not more, influential. Individuals compare their own 
“contributions and outcomes with those of others to determine distributive justice” 
(Chan, 2000, p.72). The psychological contract does not exist in a vacuum, within the 
organisation there is a multiplicity of coexisting psychological contracts each unique 
and developing in its own way and at its own pace.
Any observed perceived breach or violation may impact on the psychological contracts 
of other individuals, as they consider their own relationship in the light of these 
developments (Figure 2). For example, individual ‘B’, who previously trusted
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management and felt secure, might revise this after a colleague, individual ‘A ’, was laid 
off or individual ‘C’ disciplined. As Umphress et al (2000, p.C2) note “....co-workers and 
their opinions regarding justice provide a rich information context within which one is 
embedded”.
Fig 2. Inter-contractual impacts
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Contract
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Psychological
Contract
Thus, the psychological contract is a dynamic phenomenon, constantly in a state of flux 
and being re-evaluated, consciously or sub-consciously, by the participants as a result 
of direct and indirect events. The psychological contract is not an objective reflection of 
the information collected, but rather a personal, subjective and, indeed idiosyncratic, 
interpretation of it; every individual constructs his/her own organizational ‘reality’ 
(Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998; Sparrow and Cooper, 1998) and, as Robinson et al 
(1994) observe, there is a tendency for ‘overestimation of one’s own contributions and 
an underestimation of other’s contributions’.
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The organizational structure, or changes to it, will be a major factor in the construction 
or reconstruction of the psychological contract. In conventional structures, where 
relationships are visible, psychological contracts may be different than in ‘virtual’ 
organisations where the relationship is technology-mediated. The psychological 
contract of remote workers could be more personal and idiosyncratic, being 
constructed in a social vacuum, than if constructed using the usual benchmarks of the 
conventional organization structures, relationships and practices. Geographic 
fragmentation and web-based communication technology may impact on the 
psychological contract, particularly in the trust dimension (Handy, 1995; Jarvenpaa and 
Leidner, 1999; Nandhakumar, 1999; Lee-Kelley and Crossman, 2001).
The importance of organisational form should not be underestimated. Assumptions are 
made that the adopted organisational form is driven by changes in the external 
environment. However, what if the form is the product of other organizational motives, 
such as a desire to fragment the workforce within a divide and rule strategy? Thus, the 
fragmentation and distancing of the workforce and the use of information and 
communications technology could be regarded a deliberate, Machiavellian strategy 
(Latour, 1998). Through the calculative creation of a remote and fragmented workforce 
organizations could be used to reduce the visibility of breaches elsewhere in the 
organization and, in doing so, increase organizational power; this approach may prove 
a useful mechanism for reducing workforce solidarity and individualising the 
employment relationships. If, however, individual actors identify this motive, then the 
relationship between them and the organization will undoubtedly be affected; the 
psychological contract will be reviewed on the basis of reduced trust.
Critical incidents and the dynamics of the psychological contract
Having synthesised the personal environmental and organisational inputs, the 
individual constructs a psychological contract. The literature suggests psychological 
contracts come in two forms ‘transactional’ and ‘relational’ (Rousseau, 1990). However, 
the psychological contract may not be transactional or relational, it may contain 
elements of both in different contractual dimensions (McDonald and Makin, 2000).
Transactional contracts are essentially instrumental and based on economic exchange; 
overtime and high performance in return for performance-based pay (McDonald and 
Makin, 2000). According to Robinson et al (1994), violations of the transactional
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contract are likely to generate a sense of economic inequity or distributive inequity 
(Adams, 1965). Ultimately the individual may seek to redress the imbalance “by 
increasing the perceived entitlements or by decreasing perceived obligations” 
(Robinson et al, 1994, p. 141). The relational contract is “characterised on the 
employees’ side by perceived obligations to their employer of loyalty, and on the 
employer’s by an obligation to provide job security” (McDonald and Makin, 2000). The 
relational contract, on the other hand, is emotionally based; any perceived violation 
might result in procedural inequity and the psychological contract may be renegotiated 
in purely transactional terms (Herriot and Pemberton, 1996). The critical incident will 
feed back into the commitment form and may cause the individual to alter their 
commitment type (continuance to affective), which in turn will impact on the 
expectations of the relationship. Similarly the critical incident will impact on level of trust 
the individual places in the organisation or its agent leading to trustworthiness or 
distrust, which will also influence the level of expectations. The critical incident will also 
have a direct impact on the psychological contract itself through the individual’s 
perception of violation or enhancement, resulting in a reconstruction of the contract 
under the renegotiated terms. From this analysis of the dynamics of critical incidents 
the following propositions can be made:
Proposition 1. Critical incidents (violation) will stimulate a transfer from a
relational to a transactional psychological contract.
There is little literature that deals with contract enhancement, where the individual 
reconstructs his/her psychological contract as result of some element of the 
relationship being better than expected, or some critical incident of a positive nature. 
This view is supported by Rousseau (1989, p124), who states the “belief in a contract 
is also enhanced when a promise precedes rather than follows an employee’s 
contribution”. Similarly, De Meuse et al (2001) imply contract enhancement by 
suggesting changes to it can be good or bad. Furthermore, from the model presented 
by Guest (1998b, p661), one can identify the potential for contract enhancement, that is 
if the ‘deal’ delivered is better than that anticipated.
Proposition 2. Critical incidents (enhancement) will stimulate a transfer from
a transactional to a relational psychological contract.
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Whilst considerable attention has been paid to the transactional and relational 
constructs, there are other contractual forms that deserve more attention than that 
been given to date; that ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ psychological contracts might be 
constructed and reconstructed in certain circumstances. Guest (1998a) and Rousseau 
(1998) have debated the relevance of the role of agents in the psychological contract, 
but inadequate attention has been paid to this. It cannot be denied that if we are to 
anthropomorphise the organisation it must be though its agents. Thus, it is conceivable 
that the individual may construct a psychological contract that is ‘personal’ with one or 
more agents of the organisation and a contract that is ‘impersonal’ with the 
organisation itself. As with the relational and transactional contracts, there may be a 
combination of concurrent personal and impersonal contracts involving different 
dimensions. It is conceivable that the individual may have a personal psychological 
contract with their manager, yet depersonalise the contract by attributing blame to the 
organisation when a negative critical incident occurs.
Proposition 3. Critical incidents (negative) will stimulate a transfer from a
personal to an impersonal psychological contract.
Similarly, the individual may have an impersonal psychological contract with the 
organisation, but. a positive critical incident may drive the individual to personalise the 
contract by attributing the cause of the incident to an agent.
Proposition 4. Critical incidents (positive) will stimulate a transfer from an
impersonal to a personal psychological contract.
One could argue that, over time, the psychological contract could oscillate between 
personal and impersonal. However, given the role of trust in the construction and 
reconstruction of the psychological contract, caution should be exercised in making 
such a suggestion; deep-rooted perceptions of trust and trustworthiness may form 
relatively quickly, but, once lost, trust at the personal level may be difficult to restore.
Conclusions
A review of the literature has shown that previous researches have focused their 
attention on two main areas, the debate on whether organisations can ‘perceive’ and 
on contract violation. According to social exchange theory there can be no doubt that
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organisational agents play an influential role in the psychological contract and, if we are 
to address the concept of organisational perception, then the part played by 
organisational agents cannot and should not be avoided. There is an absence of 
literature on the notion of contract enhancement and this should be addressed by a 
broadening of the research agenda to include greater emphasis on the positive aspects 
of psychological contracts leading to enhancement, rather than persisting with the 
negative aspects of contract violation that has dominated thus far. This would shed 
light on the psychological impact of enhancement on the individual and the 
organisation or its agents.
The paper has identified an opportunity for closer scrutiny of the ‘personal’ and 
‘impersonal’ contracts that may coexist. The reasons for individuals to attribute certain 
contract dimensions to the organisation and others to an agent and why transfer might 
occur would also make a welcome contribution to the existing body of knowledge. 
Similarly, the nature of critical incidents that might occur and the way these might lead 
to a contract transfer is interesting and worthy of further research.
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